Upside-Down: Tensions Rise in Transnistria: Kyiv is set on Escalation to drag Romania (NATO) into the conflict

Don't take my word for it--Mr. Zelensky's advisors are open about it, drones and explosions rocked Transnistria in the past weeks, all the while Western media ignores this (or omits key context)

Ever heard of a place called ‘Transnistria’?

According to the (unofficial) Ministry of Truth™, its official name is the Pridnestrovian Moldovian Republic (PMR), and it

is an unrecognised breakaway state that is internationally recognised as part of Moldova. Transnistria controls most of the narrow strip of land between the Dniester river and the Moldovan–Ukrainian border, as well as some land on the other side of the river's bank.

Here’s a map to help you find Transnistria, courtesy of the WaPo:

It’s a small, mostly unrecognised state that sits right along the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. Its origins may be traced back to the establishment of an autonomous region in the Ukrainian SSR in the mid-1920s, even though the place and its inhabitants suffered various changes during the Interwar Period and WW2.

Its more recent history commences in 1990 when the Pridnestrian Moldovia SSR was formed to ensure that, if Moldova would seek (re-) unification with Romania (like in the Interwar Period), Transnistria’s inhabitants may remain united with Russia.

Like the other constituent SSRs of the former USSR, Moldova became independent in 1991 and didn’t join Romania (a notion that is still on the table and would, since Moldova is so far among the candidates for future accession to the EU, constitute some kind of a fast-track into that club). Hostilities erupted in November 1990 and dragged on until spring 1992 when a ceasefire was declared, effective 21 July 1992, which all but ‘froze’ that conflict.

Why, you may ask, was there a conflict in the first place?

Well, Moldova isn’t that different from neighbouring Ukraine in many respects: among the borderlands between ‘East’ and ‘West’, its population is comparably fragmented. While the majority self-identifies as ‘Moldovan’ (approx. 3/4, according to the 2014 census, as relayed by the Ministry of Truth™), there are sizable minorities of Romanian, Russian, and Ukrainian origins.

Moldovans, or Moldavians, are an Eastern Romance ethnic group, i.e., they are de facto ‘Romanians’ (hence also Bucharest’s interest in the conflict: it might help them to reacquire ‘ancestral lands’), which helps to explain, to certain degrees, as to why the Russian minority (and other smaller groups) in Transnistria attempted to secede and ‘stay with Moscow’.

This constellation also goes a long way towards explaining why Moldova, that little, unhappy country, finds itself between a rock and a hard place: desperate to join ‘the West’ after decades as a Soviet republic, independence came—and with it lots of promises of ‘the good life’ in ‘the West’. Fuelled by EU expansion into the former Soviet Bloc, in particular Romania’s admission in 2007, Moldova has become, in many ways, Ukraine’s—or the southern Caucasus’—poor relation in this regard, with the one big difference being, of course, that Kiev, or Kyiv, matters more to the swamp masters in DC and their lizard-brained executioners in Brussels, mainly due to its sheer size and the potential to ‘bleed Russia dry’.

It might not surprise you, but since 1992 there’s a bunch of Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria to ensure that no Moldovan security forces ‘pacify’ the area (another unfortunate, if not entirely coincidental, parallel to, say, the situation in Crimea and the Donbass, or Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for that matter).

There’s also a EU-led ‘border assistance mission’ (BAM), which took over in 2005, and which is a glorified way for civilian EU forces to literally ‘look at things’ and instruct the puny natives ‘how this is done in civilised countries’:

Sidenote: back when I worked in the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this was my main daily work routine: provide information for the EU Political and Security Committee (PCS), the de facto EU equivalent of the US Nat’l Security Council. There’s a bunch of these EU ‘civilian’ assistance missions, and they play an outsized role in these proceedings. They are horribly expensive, consist of a few ‘experts’ that ‘supervise, assist, and train’ local staff. It’s really a big shitshow, and it’s part and parcel of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in particular Brussels’ soft power approach: ‘we’re here to help you do things the way we tell you to do’. Maybe I’ll find the time to write a bit about this, but it’s mainly a way of force projection by other means (not that the EU has military means, but perhaps this will change before too long; also, don’t worry, like many other things, a EU Army would be yet another horribly expensive paper tiger, but still, you don’t hand mentally incapacitated people—like the ones running the EU and NATO—military-grade hardware to monkey around…)

To sum up this part so far: Moldova has ± comparable problems with ethnic minorities, frozen conflicts, and big-power interests. Much like Georgia in the Caucasus, Transnistria is a break-away area with a Russian contingent that effectively prevents the central government in Kishinev, or Chișinău, from doing to its inhabitants what Kyiv has been doing to the inhabitants of the Donbass since 2014. As such, the situation on the ground is as close to a real-world ‘experiment’ that shows the ‘calming’ effect Russian troops can have in such conflict zones.

Further Particulars on Kyiv’s Plans vs. Russia

This entire, if horribly abridged, background is important for the current mess in Ukraine for one key reason: President Zelensky and his ilk are getting ever more desperate. More ‘bad news’ for them is coming out every day, from the apparent breakthrough of Russian forces in the Donbass near Popasna (see here over at the Moon of Alabama for context) to the increasingly desperate Ukrainian forces (as related by Larry Johnson).

So, when Oleksiy Arestovych (Ministry of Truth™ entry here), advisor to Mr. Zelensky, speaks, one should listen.

You see, back in March 2019, Mr. Arestovych gave an interview (see here, if you understand Ukrainian or Russian), arguing that neutrality wouldn’t be an option for Kyiv. The only possible choices for Ukraine would be—re-unite with Russia or join NATO.

Now, we all know the choice Mr. Zelensky and his ilk opted for, but there’s more in the 2019 interview: Mr. Arestovych argued that in order for Kyiv to join NATO, war against Russia would be the essential prerequisite. Furthermore, he argued that Kyiv should see to it that NATO forces would come to Ukraine, under the guise of ‘training missions’, to potentially involve the US-led bloc directly in the fighting. Asked directly about the best way forward for Ukraine, Mr. Arestovych answered:

Of course, a big war against Russia.

Fast-forward to 2022: funny how Mr. Arestovych’s musings from March 2019 turned out to be ‘eerily prescient’, eh?

Mr. Arestovych further held that no sacrifice, be it socially or economically, would be too big to ensure Ukraine’s ‘western’ integration. In that vein, his consideration of expanding the current conflict to Transnistria and Moldova would be among the ‘options on the table’.

Doing so, of course, would be rather tricky for Russia: Moscow’s troops in Transnistria would be immediately cut off from any kind of support, and Mr. Putin might be forced to change plans in the Donbass to help the Russian forces in Transnistria.

While I personally doubt that the Russian General Staff has no contingency plans in their drawers, such a move on part of the Kyiv regime might be extra dangerous: Moldova is yet another country in-between ‘east’ and ‘west’, but it’s already a EU accession candidate, its domestic policies are similarly torn between ‘pro-Moscow’ vs. ‘pro-Western’ camps (much like in, say, Serbia). Kishinev applied for EU membership on 3 March 2022, but there’s also the lingering issue of unification with Romania, a NATO member that might ‘inherit’ Russian forces on its (claimed) territory in Transnistria. You know, what could go wrong?

Transnistrian Connections

Shortly before the escalation in Ukraine, in 2020, Maia Sandu won the Moldovan elections. Of course, she is supported by the expectable plethora of pro-Western state and no-state organisations (Ms. Sandu graduated from the JFK School of Gov’t at Harvard, worked as an Advisor to the World Bank, among other stints), hence the many positive pieces in ‘Western’ media, such as this portrait by the Wilson Center.

In the wake of her electoral victory over, naturally, a ‘pro-Russian coalition’, Ms. Sandu set out to remake Moldova. Here’s German media giant and BS purveyor Der Spiegel, which interviewed Ms. Sandu in summer 2021 as the new president announced a ‘cleasing’ (Säuberung) of the judiciary. Furthermore, Ms. Sandu has declared the USA as an indispensable partner for future reforms, and, equally expectable, full NATO membership is certainly in the cards, too.

This is important as there were a number of recent escalations, including, among others:

Kyiv’s decision to refuse entry of cars bearing Transnistrian licence plates since 1 Sept. 2021, partially to increase the pressure on the breakaway region.

Then there’s Ms. Sandu’s repeated insistence that the Russian forces in Transnistria are there ‘illegally’, even though their presence hails from an agreement Kishinev has signed in the mid-1990s.

Earlier this year, Ms. Sandu’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs re-iterated its stance (as reported by TASS on 19 Jan. 2022; my emphases), calling for

the cooperation [with NATO] has the goal of the orderly and complete withdrawal of the Russian military illegally present on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration will continue its efforts to transform the existing peacekeeping operation into a civilian mission with an international mandate…

According to the [cooperation] plan, NATO will continue to help the Moldovan army rearm and provide further support to the government. In return, the Republic of Moldova will participate in peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the UN, the EU and the OSCE.

The new Moldovan government believes that the Republic’s constitutional status of neutrality should not prevent security cooperation with other countries and does not imply isolation. The Republic has been cooperating with NATO since 2006 on the basis of an individual partnership plan. There is a NATO Information Centre in Chișinău and a NATO Liaison Office was opened there in December 2017.

Again: what could go wrong?

Escalation in Transnistria

In recent weeks, talked about by Western media without any of the above context, tensions have been increasing drastically: drones launched from Ukraine are repeatedly flying into Moldovan (or Transnistrian) airspace, and ground there are a number of reports of explosions close to the Ukrainian borders.

As reported by Vesti7 on Russian TV, though, drones entered Transnistrian airspace during the night and tried to attack Russian military units stationed near Voronkovo. Even if you don’t understand Russian, do check out the video for images (the below pictures are screen grabs to illustrate some of the points I refer to in the following):

The Russian TV report speaks of UAV (drones) that hover in the skies—every night. From the village of Voronkovo, it’s about 10km to the Ukrainian border. The above view from the observation tower shows the border crossing at Kuchurhan. The Ukrainian troops are fortifying their positions, but they already laid land mines in the no-man’s land and blew up the railroad bridge that once connected Tiraspol (Transnistria’s capital) with Odessa, Ukraine.

Repeated terrorist acts of sabotage from the Ukrainian side paint a dire picture of a possible future conflict. The above-linked Russian TV report also quoted Mr. Arestovych as follows:

We, too, have open wounds. And as soon as you need us in peace or in war, we will always come to your aid.

Mr. Arestovych’s statement is book-ended by Russian TV with a quote by EU leader Charles Michel, showing the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize-winning EU’s true colours:

We plan to significantly increase support for Moldova. We provide additional equipment for your armed forces.

This stands in stark contrast to the official position of Transnistria whose Foreign Minister, Vitaliy Ignatyev, is quoted as stating:

We have an unresolved conflict. There is a peacekeeping force. It is clear that peacekeepers fully guarantee peace and security. Why does the Republic of Moldova need military support? Against whom? Transnistria does not threaten either the Republic of Moldova or Ukraine.

Of course, Moldova doesn’t recognise Transnistria, hence there’s a lot of ‘domestic’ bickering involved. Still, with EU accession Ms. Sandu’s declared aim, it’s obvious that official Moldova has already chosen its side.

Economically, Kishinev tries to strangle Transnistria—the Russian TV report shows a steel factory, which is granted export licences valid for a month only, subject to reapplication every four weeks. For some four months now, the ovens, which are cold now, will remain unused for the foreseeable future, it appears.

It’s the same with agricultural produce. The soil, black earth, is of excellent quality, and the area belonged once to the granary of the USSR. One last quote from the Russian TV report:

Transnistria is already keeping its head above water only thanks to its farmers. All the wealth of the country is concentrated here. This is also where you can find all the latest news. ‘Everyone is worried, but we are holding out. We hope that Russia will recognise us, and everything will be fine. Our children are there, so we are only with Russia’, say the locals.

Here they have their own currency, passports, and licence plates. The three official languages are Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian. Yet, the Russian flag can be seen just as often as the Transnistrian one. And even though there is no common border, there is a common past whose memory is carefully preserved here.

‘You cannot abolish 9 May. May 9 is in our hearts, in our minds, in our education, in our history, it cannot be abolished. We will distribute the St George’s Ribbon as a symbol of victory, it is a matter of principle. The history of Transnistria is also inseparable from the St George’s Ribbon’, Krasnoselsky said. Just as the history of Transnistria is inseparable from the history of Russia.

Bigger Picture: RAND sees this as a Wedge vs. Moscow

Well, why should you care about Transnistria?

In short: it’s about geopolitics, as we’re told by none other than the RAND Corporation. In their comprehensive 2019 publication, entitled ‘Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground’, there are a number of references to Transnistria.

Departing from ‘isolating Transnistria (a Russian-occupied enclave within Moldova)’ on p. 96, there’s an entire section dealing with ‘challeng[ing] Russian Presence in Moldova’ (pp. 130-35):

Russia has stationed between 1,000 and 2,000 peacekeepers in Transnistria (most of whom are recruited locally from the Russian-speaking population) and provides the residents with free natural gas and some pension assistance. According to some estimates, this amounts to $150 million in support a year. For its part, Transnistria keeps a pro-Russian government and prominently displays banners around town declaring that ‘Russia brings peace and stability’.

During the 1990s, Moldova received $25 million a year from the United States Agency for International Development—making it one of the larger per capita recipients of U.S. aid in the former Soviet bloc.

As to what the US might be doing about that, well…(my emphases):

The United States could encourage Transnistria’s youth (who, according to some journalistic accounts, might be more pro-West than their elders) to push their pseudo-state to leave the Russian orbit. Transnistria’s Russophile population and strong institutions—including a secret service still called the KGB—raise questions about this option’s feasibility. Moreover, even if this policy were successful and Transnistria rejoined Moldova, it could very well be a cost-imposing strategy against the United States and its allies rather than on Russia, given that Transnistria is impoverished and would likely require substantial Western aid.

The United States could also push for closer NATO and European integration with Moldova. While Moldova officially remains neutral, it already adopted the Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2006. Moldova also contributed a token number of peacekeepers to the Kosovo operation beginning in 2013. Under this option, the United States would encourage closer NATO cooperation with Moldova and possibly eventually offer it membership.

Finally, Washington could urge Moldova to terminate the July 21, 1994, cease-fire agreement between Moldovan President Mircea Snegur and Russian President Yeltsin that serves as the legal basis for Russian ‘peacekeepers’ in Transnistria. Ultimately, the intent here would be to increase the diplomatic costs for Russia to continue its presence in the area.

Under the header ‘benefits’, we find ‘Romania’, which might welcome the ‘return’ of the area. This would, in my opinion, be a veritable can of worms, for the above-mentioned reasons (Bucharest is already a NATO member).

Sure, Russia might retaliate economically, RAND noted, with sanctions hitting key Moldovan exports, which is what happened after Kishinev signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Brussels. While a precondition to eventual EU accession, doing so didn’t change anything with respect to Transnistria.

The Russian troops may or may not leave for whatever reasons, but, as RAND noted under the header ‘risks’,

the Transnistrian regime and population might violently resist incorporation into Moldova, a resistance that Moscow could abet from afar. Indeed, it is probably a concern about such a conflict that leads Moldova to tolerate the continued Russian military presence. Assuming such resistance could be overcome, the United States and the EU would be expected to pick up the tab for any postconflict reconstruction.

Bottom Lines

So, with Russian troops headed towards Odessa, and the Kyiv régime increasingly desperate, we better watch Transnistria, in particular the machinations of the Ukrainian side. This might well escalate before too long…

Oh, and please don’t come up with anything like, say, ‘so-called universal values’ on this one. If anything, the RAND report shows how these are ‘appreciated’ by those who wish to impose their ‘rules-based order’ on anyone else.