Upside Down: Notes on the UN and EU Presence in Mali (it's a clusterf***)

There may be Russians, according to US Africom, and Germany spent 2b €--same as on Ukraine--by Feb. 2022, and while there are worries about 'jihadists' in Mali, no such worries exist w/respect to Azov

In keeping with the tradition of these pages of bringing to your attention information you’d might otherwise miss (like, e.g., my updates on Moldova), here’s an article by Jürgen Hübschen, which appeared earlier this week in the German (Old Labour) portal nachdenkseiten.de.

If you have the option of reading German (or using machine translation), I can only highly recommend nachdenkseiten.de, because it is one of the few serious and, above all, non-legacy media outlets that (still) exist in German-language Europe. They consistently decry the warmongering by politicians of all stripes, and they frequently run pieces, such as the one below, about places that are important but typically overlooked by those working in self-declared ‘quality media’ (Qualitätsmedien).

That said, here’s the piece by Jürgen Hübschen, which will be, as always, ‘accompanied’ by a few bottom lines by me below the divider. As always, all emphases are mine.

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Current reporting on the war in Ukraine had almost caused the Bundeswehr’s deployment in Mali to be forgotten. Only the change of the mandate for the mission within the framework of the EU, and the suspension of the commitment within the UN framework of the mission, have reawakened interest in what is currently the most dangerous deployment of German soldiers. On 29 June 2022, the United Nations had extended its Mali mission by yet another year, that is, until the end of June 2023. 13 of the 15 member countries of the UN Security Council had voted in favour of the new mandate, with China and Russia abstaining. The below article addresses the question whether Germany should continue to be militarily active in Mali or end the mandate for the Bundeswehr and bring the soldiers home.

Mali: a brief Recap of the Prehistory of International Operations

The West African presidential republic of Mali covers an area of approximately 1.3m square kilometres (about 3.5 times the size of Germany [and thus slightly smaller than Alaska], but its population is just shy of 15m, most of whom live in the southern part of the country. Almost 90%of the people of Mali are Muslims, 5% are Christians, and the rest are followers of natural religions. Mali was a French colony from 1893 until its independence in 1960. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, but there exists great mineral wealth. It lies in the so-called Gold Belt of Africa, which runs from Senegal through Guinea, Ghana (former British colony ‘Gold Coast’), Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon throughout West Africa. The gold mines in the south of the country make Mali the third largest producer of the precious metal in Africa after Ghana and South Africa. Besides gold, there is oil, natural gas, phosphate, copper, bauxite, diamonds, and other precious stones. Uranium has been found in the west of the country and even pure hydrogen has been discovered deep in the ground. The bulk of Mali's raw material deposits have not yet been tapped.

Map added, courtesy of Wikipedia

Coup Plotters with US Training

In March 2012, Mali’s elected president, Amadon Toumani Touré, was overthrown by mutinous military officers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, who trained in the US between 2004 and 2010. Sanogo handed over power to interim president Dioncunda Traoré a short time later. Subsequently, a civil war broke out between Islamists and rebels in the north of the country and Mali’s regular armed forces. A major reason for this was the war in Libya in 2011, which was illegal under international law and after which thousands of Tuaregs fled to Mali, taking heavy weapons with them. Interim President Traoré asked France and the United Nations for support. On 12 January 2013, France launched Operation Serval with air strikes. The French intervention marked the beginning of European ‘engagement’ in Mali. On 1 July 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was launched, a United Nations peacekeeping mission that merged the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).

The mandate of the Bundeswehr for participation in the missions EUTM and MINUSMA until 31 May 2022.

European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM)

On the basis of a UN resolution of December 2012, the EU foreign ministers decided on 17 January 2013 to officially launch the EU training mission. The aim of the EUTM is to provide basic military training and advice to the Malian armed forces to enable them to take action against Islamist militias in the region. EUTM Mali itself is not to be involved in combat operations in the north of the country.

[Note how this works: ‘provide basic military training and advice’ so that—in this case Malian—troops can ‘take action against Islamist militias in the region’, i.e., possibly across internationally recognised borders of another UN member-state. At the same time, the EU ‘trainers’ and ‘advisors’ are not to be fighting along those they ‘train’, i.e., the dying is to be done by the Malian forces: how is that not ‘colonialist’?]

Germany is participating with up to 600 soldiers. The mission of the German armed forces is ‘to participate in the command and control of EUTM Mali Support to improve the operational capabilities of the Malian armed forces through military advice and training, including pre-deployment training’. In addition, the Bundeswehr also supports the other G5 Sahel states Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad by ‘establishing the operational capability of the “G5 Sahel Force Conjointe” (G5 Sahel Force) and the national armed forces of the G5 Sahel states through military advice and training, including pre-deployment training’.

The forces of the Military Assistance (MA) Mission ‘Gazelle’ in Niger, which will be integrated into the structures of EUTM Mali, also serve to fulfil the mission. Further tasks of the German armed forces ‘are coordination, cooperation and exchange of information with other actors involved in supporting the armed forces of Mali and the other G5 Sahel states, as far as necessary for the protection and fulfilment of the mission’, in addition to ‘the performance of protection and support tasks, also in support of personnel of the UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Participation in combat operations continues to be excluded. The mandated area of operations covers the whole of Mali as well as the territories of the other G5 Sahel states Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Chad once the legal basis has been established.’

[Again, note the anodyne wording as well as the omission of the ‘context’ behind the 2012 coup: have a putsch, place UN troops there, and claim that security in one country transcends borders. I do wonder how people get the idea that the UN facilitates the undermining of national sovereignty…also, here’s the text of the re-authorised UN security council resolution 2640 (2022); MINUSMA’s website is here.]

Until the end of 2021, EUTM was led for six months by German Brigadier General Jochen Deuer. The mission-related additional expenditure for the continued participation of armed German forces in EUTM Mali will total around €117.5 million for the period 1 June 2021 to 31 May 2022.

[As noted by the Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland, as of February 2022 the German government had spent around 2 billion € on its mission to Mali, which has been running since 2013. Note that German expenditures in support of Ukraine since 2014 until mid-February 2022 totalled ‘around two billion euros’, too, according to the Bundesregierung’s website. Yet, the former piece mentions that the mission is ‘increasingly hopeless’ and that it will likely be discontinued (it wasn’t) while, well, you know how the latter is going since February 2022…]

On 12 April 2022, the High Representative of the EU, Josep Borrell, declared to suspend the training of the Malian armed forces within the framework of the ‘European Union Training Mission Mali’ due to the current developments in the country. From the German side, this decision was welcomed by Defence Minister Lambrecht. The Minister stated after her trip to Mali, which lasted several days, that

The EU’s step to end the training of Malian soldiers within the framework of the European Union Training Mission for the time being is consistent and correct. In view of possible massive human rights violations committed by Malian troops together with Russian forces—possibly even mercenaries—we have to ask ourselves who we are actually training.

Most recently, around 100 German soldiers trained Malian army personnel for the fight against militias and terrorist groups as part of the European Union Training Mission Mali.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

The proclaimed mission of MINUSMA is to

(a) Support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and to the full realization of the Political Transition… (b) Support to stabilization and restoration of State authority in the Centre…(c) Protection of civilians…(d) Promotion and protection of human rights…(e) Humanitarian assistance

[As well as a bunch of ‘other tasks’. Please refer to the UNSC resolution text cited above, pp. 7-10.]

Germany has been participating in MINUSMA since 2013, with a Bundeswehr contingent of up to 1,100 soldiers and police officers.

In accordance with international law and the UN rules of engagement, the Bundeswehr assumes tasks in the areas of command and control, civil-military cooperation, observation, and advice. It also supports the personnel of the EU mission in Mali and makes an important contribution to the overall situation of the UN mission with reconnaissance assets on the ground and in the air (including drones). Another possible mission is air-to-air refuelling for French forces at the request of the UN. ‘Supporting the restoration of state authority and the implementation of the April 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation’ are also Bundeswehr tasks. Furthermore, with the air transport base in Niamey, Republic of Niger, Germany ensures tactical and strategic patient air transport as well as logistical support for the German soldiers and their partners in MINUSMA.

Soldiers from Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are integrated into the German contingent. In addition, both the Swedish and the British contingent in Gao have been integrated into the German-led ‘Camp Castor’. The military engagement with MINUSMA is complemented by the deployment of up to 20 German police officers with MINUSMA.

‘Participation in counter-terrorism operations is not covered by the mandate.’

The current mandate of the German Bundestag defines the area of operations as the whole of Mali as well as the Republic of Niger for the operation of an air transport base in Niamey.

Extension of Bundeswehr mandates

Despite a steadily deteriorating security situation and increasing difficulties from the ruling military junta, the German Bundestag extended the mandates of the Bundeswehr on 20 May 2022 for another year until 31 May 2023, albeit with some changes.

European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM)

The mandate for the EUTM now trades as ‘continuation of the participation of armed German forces in the capability building of the European Union in the Sahel with a focus on Niger’.

The personnel ceiling was lowered from 600 German soldiers to up to 300. Parliament had decided to discontinue the Bundeswehr’s engagement in the areas of training, reconnaissance, and protection within the framework of EUTM. For the time being, the Bundeswehr will therefore only maintain a few soldiers in Mali as part of the European Union Training Mission to provide technical advice in Bamako. The presence in Koulikoro, Mali, will be terminated. The priority until the end of the year will now be the continuation of the ‘Gazelle’ mission in Niger. There, the Bundeswehr trains and supports the Nigerien special forces with the help of German combat swimmers (note that Niger is a landlocked country). Should the situation in Mali change, the Bundestag will deal with the mandate again.

UN Multidimensinal Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

The personnel ceiling for MINUSMA has been raised from their current 1,100 German soldiers to up to 1,400. Of these, up to 230 men and women continue to belong to the Joint Special Operation Task Force (JSOTF) ‘Gazelle’ in Niger.

The Bundestag justifies the continuation of the commitment and the increase in the number of soldiers with the geopolitical importance of the Sahel zone, also for Germany. It is a matter of stability and security in Central Africa—and deriving from this, the security of Germany and Europe. The mission of the Bundeswehr within the framework of MINUSMA continues to be to support the Malian government in implementing the peace agreement in the north of the country and in restoring state authority in central Mali. There are, however, some changes to the mandate. For example, Germany will expand medical care in Gao after the withdrawal of French medical forces. The protection of German soldiers will be strengthened. The NH-90 helicopters will be replaced by CH-53s. The Bundeswehr is also increasing its support for air operations. These additional tasks had made it necessary to increase the German personnel deployment to up to 1,400 soldiers.

Development of the Security Situation and Cooperation with the Military Junta

A nationwide state of emergency is in force. Terrorist attacks are possible everywhere in Mali. Particularly in the north and centre of the country, there are repeated violent clashes. Terrorist groups are also active in the north-eastern and central parts of the country and in areas along the borders with Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire.

Different clans fight for power and influence, and there are obviously more and more jihadists. In the north of the country, the Tuaregs, most of whom fled Libya, feel excluded from Mali’s development. Since 2012, there have already been three military coups in the country. Currently, a military junta under Assimi Goita, who overthrew the elected president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in 2020, is in power. The interim president Bah N’Daw, who was appointed by the junta, was also overthrown by the same junta in another military coup. At the end of May 2021, Assimi Goita proclaimed himself interim president. Goita, the coup leader, received international [sic] military training, including in Germany. With the approval of the putschists, members of the Russian mercenary force ‘Wagner Group’ have been in Mali for some time. According to information from the US Africa Commander Stephen Townsend, several hundred of these mercenaries are now in the country [see here for a propaganda piece by Voice of America, which cites no evidence beyond official statements]. They were allegedly transported by the Russian air force, according to US information. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned that the involvement of mercenaries in the conflict in Mali should not ‘compromise the objectives’ of the UN.

After the Organisation of African Union (OAU) suspended Mali’s membership in June 2021, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) followed suit. In addition to suspending Mali’s ECOWAS membership, the other 14 member states closed their borders with Mali and withdrew their ambassadors from Bamako. The military junta’s foreign assets have been frozen, allowing only vital trade. Mali now only has open borders to the north, to Libya and Mauritania. The French ambassador Joël Meyer was already declared ‘persona non grata’ at the end of January 2022 and had to leave the country.

French President Emmanuel Macron decided to withdraw his soldiers from Mali in mid-August 2022 and made it clear that he would not support a government that no longer had democratic legitimacy. The spokesman for the military junta in Bamako, Colonel Abdoulaye Maiga, said in a message to the French president:

The transitional government calls on President Macron to finally put aside his neo-colonial, paternalistic and contemptuous attitude and understand that Malians can best take care of themselves.

In addition to the deteriorating security situation, Mali’s military rulers are making the work of international troops more difficult by obstructing service operations. For example, German transport planes are repeatedly not granted overflight permission to Niger, German soldiers had to be withdrawn from the airfield in Bamako, and for several weeks now the routine rotation of German military personnel cannot be carried out. 140 soldiers who have completed their mission have been waiting for their flight home for weeks. A civilian plane with German paratroopers on board to secure the airfield in Gao was not given permission to land. They were supposed to replace the French troops who were once present in Mali with 4,500 soldiers because they have been completely withdrawn since 15 August 2022. The military junta had terminated the defence agreement with France in May 2022.

The Federal Ministry of Defence declared on 12 August 2022 that it would suspend the Bundeswehr’s participation in MINUSMA’s operational mission until further notice due to increasing difficulties on the part of the military junta. Other nations are also repeatedly experiencing difficulties in carrying out the MINUSMA mandate. This is why Egypt, for example, has suspended its participation in the UN mission.

On the other hand, those in power are signalling more and more clearly that they prefer closer cooperation with Russia instead of Western states and the UN. Thus, at Bamako airport on 9 August 2022, numerous weapons systems were handed over to the Malian armed forces in a large ceremony attended by the transitional president Assimi Goïta. Almost all of them came from Russia and the Russian ambassador to the West African country was also present.

For Ulf Laessing, the Bamako office manager of the CDU-affiliated Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the junta's line is clear:

At the moment, it looks like Mali is going all-in on Russia.

Laessing considers the situation of the German forces in Gao problematic:

So far, the Russians have moved into all the barracks that the French have vacated, and if they come to Gao now, the Russians, there will be logistical problems: How are they going to serve Gao airport? If there are Russians in the middle of it, you won't be able to patrol together with them. That adds another dynamic to the drama.

No one currently knows how the technical operation of the airport in Gao will be carried out after the withdrawal of the French and how the entire facility can be secured. The four German ‘Tiger’ combat helicopters have been withdrawn and have not yet been replaced. Allegedly, Bangladesh and El Salvador want to provide replacements. Yet, these would be Russian-made helicopters.

Summary Assessment

Within the framework of MINUSMA, the mission of the German soldiers after the military coup remains unchanged, namely: ‘To support the restoration of state authority and the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation of April 2015.’

In my view, this mission has become completely irrelevant after three military coups in the meantime, because it ultimately contributes to ensuring a coup junta’s hold on power.

Irrespective of this, it must be stated that, like EUTM before it, the UN mission MINUSMA has not achieved any concrete successes. Despite international involvement, the security situation has permanently deteriorated. Almost daily, civilians are killed in attacks by Islamist militias, with whom Malian soldiers repeatedly engage in combat. There are indications that these militias have links to Al-Qaida.

The justification that the Bundeswehr can make a significant contribution to containing terrorism in the Sahel within the framework of MINUSMA is rendered absurd by the current contrary development. Moreover, as already outlined, the mission of the Bundeswehr within the framework of MINUSMA states:

Participation in counter-terrorism operations is not covered by the mandate. [This is true, just look at the UNSC resolution text, which doesn’t include any such language either.]

The argument that Mali should not be left to the Russians, which is mentioned again and again, is not convincing either, because this is in no way the mandate of MINUSMA. Rather, it must be noted that the presence of the Bundeswehr is not desired by the military junta. There is no other explanation for the constant harassment, which is an additional burden for the soldiers in their already difficult and dangerous mission.

In retrospect, diplomats explain why the Bundeswehr is in Mali at all with higher politics: France wanted military support for its African missions, the Central African Republic was one of these options, but Germany preferred Mali. In the meantime, France has withdrawn the last soldiers from Mali, ended its operations and also its participation in MINUSMA. Actually, it is obvious what consequences this should have for the Bundeswehr.

At the time, the Bundestag and the public argued with the danger of Saharan jihadism for Europe. In the meantime, however, the mission has undergone a creeping rededication, namely to combating migration. A leading Bundeswehr officer in Gao declared:

If we left here, millions would make the journey to Europe.

I think that one can agree with this assessment and that the German government is not (any longer) concerned with ‘supporting the restoration of state authority and the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation of April 2015’, as it says in the Bundeswehr’s mission.

If, in addition to the situation in Mali, one now also considers the development of the situation after the military coup of January 2022 in the neighbouring country of Burkina Faso, the Bundeswehr should immediately start withdrawing from Mali and, in this context, not least also take care of the evacuation of local forces. There has never been a convincing German strategy for the Bundeswehr mission in Mali and, above all, it has never been defined when and under what conditions the mission should end.

Conclusion: if one wants to avoid a similar disaster as in Afghanistan, the motto can only be. It is certainly preferable to make a painful break now than to draw out the agony [Besser ein Ende mit Schrecken al sein Schrecken ohne Ende].

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Bottom Lines

I’ve refrained from adding too many inserts, but the Ukrainian comparison is both too striking and very painful to note.

Since around the same time (2013 in Mali, 2014 in Ukraine), Germany has spent about the same amount of money (roughly 2b € each by mid-February 2022) on these foreign adventures. Yet, there’s only a problem—really, some small, if not miniscule, moral qualms about funding that will eventually benefit questionable rulers. In Mali, that is.

There’s also the Russian (phantom) menace and, the one really big difference, that equipment that eventually ends up in the hands of jihadists, as opposed to the Neo-Nazi Azov troops in Ukraine. I suppose that not all unsavoury characters are created equal.

Furthermore, note how EU ‘solidarity’ works in the context of France asking for it, Germany providing assistance—and Paris then abandoning Berlin. Somehow, though, it wouldn’t seem that German ‘thought-leaders’ (ahem) are capable of learning anything from this, to say nothing about the apparent disliking on part of the Malian rulers (whatever one wishes to think of them) of ‘international’ (Western) support in the guise of a UN mission.

In short: expect more stupidity and waste to follow, in particular as the final point about ‘those refugees’ who would be storming ‘Fortress EU’ if the current quagmire won’t be prolonged, is equally disingenuous, as the experience with Operation Sophia shows.

Sigh.