Flashpoint Moldova: Escalation Cometh, Perhaps From Yet Another ‘Forgotten’ Corner as Ukraine’s Neighbour Experiences its July Crisis

Possible consequences incl. Moldovan-Romanian 'unification', which means Russian troops on EU and NATO territory, heralding a spill-over of the Ukrainian conflict to neighbouring countries

Back in May, I brought a special place to your attention: Transnistria, a small, mostly unrecognised state that sits right along the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. Its origins may be traced back to the establishment of an autonomous region in the Ukrainian SSR in the mid-1920s, even though the place and its inhabitants suffered various changes during the Interwar Period and WW2.

Transnistria and Moldova are special, with the latter recently having been ‘awarded’ the long-coveted ‘price’ of official EU accession candidate. This has been done in an effort of bad faith, I shall argue in this piece, as the EU so far didn’t invite any new members into its club that have, say, border conflicts and a questionable track record on the West’s pet projects, mainly ‘human rights’, the ‘rule of law’, and the like. But I digress.

Bypassing and circumventing virtually all the ‘laws’, ‘conventions’, and ‘treaties’ held up that, so far, have been used to deny this status to, say, the Western Balkans (mainly Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo), since its independence in 1990, Moldova shared many ‘features’ with neighbouring Ukraine, which, as I shall argue in the following, is why the ‘West’ is heaping gasoline onto the smouldering embers of the frozen, and forgotten, conflict that characterised this particular corner of Europe.

In all brevity, here’s why paying attention to Moldova may be warranted right now, as I explained back in May:

Moldova isn’t that different from neighbouring Ukraine in many respects: among the borderlands between ‘East’ and ‘West’, its population is comparably fragmented. While the majority self-identifies as ‘Moldovan’ (approx. 3/4, according to the 2014 census, as relayed by the Ministry of Truth™), there are sizable minorities of Romanian, Russian, and Ukrainian origins.

Moldovans, or Moldavians, are an Eastern Romance ethnic group, i.e., they are de facto ‘Romanians’ (hence also Bucharest’s interest in the conflict: it might help them to reacquire ‘ancestral lands’), which helps to explain, to certain degrees, as to why the Russian minority (and other smaller groups) in Transnistria attempted to secede and ‘stay with Moscow’.

This constellation also goes a long way towards explaining why Moldova…finds itself between a rock and a hard place: desperate to join ‘the West’ after decades as a Soviet republic, independence came—and with it lots of promises of ‘the good life’ in ‘the West’. Fuelled by EU expansion into the former Soviet Bloc, in particular Romania’s admission in 2007, Moldova has become, in many ways, Ukraine’s—or the southern Caucasus’—poor relation in this regard, with the one big difference being, of course, that Kiev, or Kyiv, matters more to the swamp masters in DC and their lizard-brained executioners in Brussels, mainly due to its sheer size and the potential to ‘bleed Russia dry’.

It might not surprise you, but since 1992 there’s a bunch of Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria to ensure that no Moldovan security forces ‘pacify’ the area (another unfortunate, if not entirely coincidental, parallel to, say, the situation in Crimea and the Donbass, or Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for that matter).

For the full background, I refer you to my 11 May piece:

Upside-Down: Tensions Rise in Transnistria: Kyiv is set on Escalation to drag Romania (NATO) into the conflict

Why Moldova and Transnistria Matter *now*

Ever since 2020, pro-Western politicians are back in power. Led by one Maia Sandu, a US-trained (Harvard Kennedy School of Government) and well-connected (worked at the World Bank) operative is pushing her multi-ethnic country hard towards ‘the West’. She has called for a ‘cleansing of the judiciary’, which Western politicians and media celebrated as ‘reforms’ and the like, and has cozied up to the US, calling them ‘a strategic partner’ (according to TASS).

My above-linked piece explains the rise in recent tensions, including increasing numbers of (attempted) drone attacks on the Russian peacekeepers in the area, which emanate from Ukrainian territory.

Now, with Ms. Sandu’s ever more repressive course against anything Russian—which is widely used in commercial life due to its higher usefulness (Russia is a bigger market than, say, neighbouring Romania, much like German was more useful to 18th-century Czech and Polish merchants than their own languages, or English and Mandarin are today), the government is increasing the pressures on the Russian-speaking communities.

At the end of May, the leading opposition politician, former Moldovan President Igor Dodon, of course accused of being ‘pro-Russian’—much like former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych stood accused on being ‘pro-Russian’, as opposed to ‘pro-Western’—has been placed under house arrest. According to Reuters, this was done ‘to allow prosecutors to investigate allegations of corruption and treason’.

At the same time, TASS reported on first, if still unsystematic, instances of censorship among media, citing a few journalists who claim that the Sandu government would impede, or hinder, their work. These reports came at the heels of a state of emergency, announced by Ms. Sandu in late 2021, which arrogates to the government the ‘right’ (sic) to ‘coordinate’ media.

The main reasons for these developments appear quite obvious: since Moldovan independence in 1990, no government was able to reclaim Transnistria, which indicates that Ms. Sandu is hell-bent (hopefully not literally) to do so. Yet, doing so means getting the Russian peacekeepers to leave, one way or another. Furthermore, Ms. Sandu holds dual citizenship (Romanian), speaks Romanian, and, quite likely, would like to push for (re-) ‘unification’ of Moldova with Bucharest, thereby fast-tracking EU and NATO membership for what would then be ‘her’ ex-country.

This is, of course, insane.

While I support the principle of self-determination—which is, you know, a principle that applies to, e.g., both the people of Kosovo as it does to the peoples of South Ossetia or Crimea—doing so implies a number of pitfalls (which I’d rather call ‘hell-holes’ for their implications): merging with Romania would mean:

Russian troops on EU and NATO territory (what could go wrong).

Moldova is a neutral country, which means a change of its constitution, hence such a move cannot be done via executive or parliamentary fiat, due to the notion of popular sovereignty.

What would be the future basis for denying immediate accession to both EU and NATO to, say, all the other crisis-ridden Eastern European countries (esp. in the Western Balkans), to say nothing about the financial implications for the rest of the EU, which would be saddled with enormous costs for ‘reconstruction’?

How big a threat is such a course of action?

Well, here’s Mr. Dodon who took to Telegram, as reported by TASS on 8 June (my emphases):

‘The military and political annexation of our country to Romanian territory is being prepared, including a renunciation of neutrality…in order to prepare the unification technically, it was necessary for Moldova to demonstrate its inability to ensure economic, energy, and territorial security on its own. It was necessary to demoralise citizens so that they would stop believing in their own country’, Dodon wrote on his Telegram channel on Wednesday [8 June]…

The crisis is exacerbated by Moldova’s accession to anti-Russian sanctions, as well as consultations on the need for Western countries to improve Moldova’s defense capabilities. ‘The danger of being dragged into a bloody regional war and losing statehood is real’, says the former president.

Two days later, on 10 June, a cabinet official, one Oleg Serebrian, Minister for Reintegration of Transnistria (sic) pleaded for the US and the EU to get involved to a much higher degrees in these affairs. As reported by TASS, speaking to media outlet RTR Moldova, Mr. Serebrian (my emphases)

noted that the fate of the current ‘5+2’ negotiation format (Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine and observers from the US and EU) depends on the outcome of events in Ukraine.

‘The 5+2 format has been at a standstill since 2019. It is exhausted, it needs a reset, it is not working now. But no one has signed its death certificate; the one and only, as well as the most important obstacle to the format right now is the relationship between Ukraine and Russia. In my opinion, we should reconsider the role of the EU and the US in this process, turning them into full-fledged participants. This would be the right thing to do, especially in the current situation’, Serebrian said. Earlier, Ukraine temporarily suspended the activities of military observers in the peacekeeping operation on the Dniester.

The Dniester is the river that constitutes the frontier between the government-controlled parts of Moldova and Transnistria, which literally means ‘the land across the river Dniester’:

Map credit: https://www.washingtonpost.com/pbox.php?url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/files/2014/03/WVtransnistria-1.jpg&w=1484&op=resize&opt=1&filter=antialias&t=20170517

Surely, this was opposed by the Transnistrian and Russian governments, both of which called upon Moldova to return to the negotiating table.

Here’s what Mr. Serebrian added (same source as above, my emphases):

‘To say that [Transnistria’s refusal] doesn’t constitute a threat to our security is simply impossible, because any frozen conflict is a threat. There is a theoretical possibility that this conflict could escalate into a military clash. On a ten-point scale, the threat can be assessed at four to five, but unfortunately, attempts at destabilisation could be repeated’, Serebrian said, noting that the Transnistrian leadership ‘is not interested in aggravating the situation, and even less interested in this are businesses and society’ on the left bank of the Dniester [i.e., in Transnistria].

This is highly important as it shows, in a nutshell, that

• There’s a roughly 50 : 50 chance of military escalation

• ‘Destabilisation could be repeated’, but if it is, it will emanate from Moldova

Close Ties, Censorship, and Persecution of the Opposition

Recent developments include an agreement between the parliaments of Romania and Moldova to increase cross-border cooperation in judicial, public safety, customs and border protection, police work, cultural affairs, and education, as reported by TASS on 18 June (my emphases):

In her speech, Moldovan President Maia Sandu expressed her conviction that the close ties between Chisinau and Bucharest will boost Moldova’s European integration process. She stressed that Romania's experience is very important for Moldova, which has to adjust its legislation to the European one…

Earlier, MPs from the opposition Bloc of Communists and Socialists in the Moldovan Parliament refused to participate in the event, which in their view undermines the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity…Opposition politicians stress that it is, in fact, a ‘national betrayal’.

A number of extra-parliamentary political parties in Moldova and Romania have for years promoted the idea of unification of the two countries with the tacit consent of the pro-European governments in Chisinau. According to opinion polls, they have not yet gained wide support.

In short: unification with Romania is a pipe dream of a minority, supported by Brussels and D.C., but, at least according to Russian media reports (which may not be entirely trustworthy), there is no widespread popular support for any such move, to say nothing about its above-noted international implications.

To make matters worse, the Sandu government has officially introduced censorship on 22 June as ‘a law banning Russian news programmes entered into force’:

According to the law, broadcasting of Russian news, information and analytical programmes and films with military content is banned in Moldova. However, entertainment programmes are allowed, but without a militaristic context.

Earlier, the head of the Television and Radio Council, Liliana Vitsu, said that the Moldovan authorities were concerned about the flow of disinformation in the pre-electoral period and were ready for tough measures. If media broadcasters violate the law on the protection of the information space, they can have their licenses revoked for seven years.

This reminds me of Ukraine and the comparable actions of the Kiew régime.

On 23 June, the Sandu government extended the state of emergency for yet another 45 days, as reported by TASS (my emphases):

‘As the facts show, hostilities in the neighbouring country [of Ukraine] have not subsided. Security risks remain for Moldova, including economic, energy, humanitarian, and military risks. In this situation, we consider it justified to extend the state of emergency’, Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita said in her speech to MPs.

During this period, the Commission for Emergencies will be able to impose the rationed consumption of natural gas and other energy carriers, to allocate funds from the budget, to coordinate the mass media, and to take other emergency measures.

The republic has been living in a state of emergency since late last year, when the measure was imposed because of possible gas supply disruptions.

Two things: first, note that the emergency powers include the ‘coordination’ of mass media, i.e., government agit-prop, which is apparently fully o.k. with the EU (and which tells you a lot about ‘EUropean values’). Secondly, the state of emergency was declared due to ‘possible gas supply disruptions’, which is to say that they didn’t happen yet. In other words: the justification given doesn’t support the stated aims. Logic and constitutional niceties notwithstanding, no-one in the Western press is questioning either the merits of Moldova’s EU accession status or the questionable credentials of the Sandu government’s actions.

Meanwhile, former president Dodon told Russian media that the government’s allegations into his corruption morphed into authorities now also investigating his relatives.

Over at the line of contact between Moldova and Transnistria, which is patrolled jointly by troops from both sides and supervised by Russian peacekeepers, tensions are rising fast.

On 21 July, Ms. Sandu, in an interview with TVR, declared once more that the 1992 Peace Agreement was invalid:

‘This agreement was signed under the threat of the 14th Army, which of course did not have a peaceful purpose. In the subsequent period we faced a situation that hindered development, and until today the Transnistrian problem has not been resolved. Obviously, if there was no presence and support of the Russian régime in Tiraspol, this conflict would have been solved until now’, Sandu stated her viewpoint, who advocates the withdrawal of the military and peacekeepers from the country.

On the same day, 21 July, the Moldovan Foreign Ministry confirmed ‘the blocking of a Russian military rotation in unrecognised Transnistria’, as posted on the ministry’s official Telegram channel, as reported by TASS and other outlets (my emphases):

‘Several cases in which members of the Russian military has been refused permission to enter are related to the violation of the [peacekeeper rotation] mechanism. For example, officers of the so-called Operative Group of Russian Forces …were denied entry.’

‘In this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration repeats the position of the Moldovan authorities regarding the need to unconditionally resume the process of withdrawing Russian troops and ammunition depots from our country’, a spokesman added.

Earlier on Thursday, the director of the second department of the CIS department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Aleksey Polishchuk, expressed concern about cases of detention of Russian officers who, according to him, ‘were sent to Transnistria to staff the Russian contingent on a rotational basis’.

See the issue: there’s a treaty (from 1992), but the Moldovan government is so desperate to join the EU and NATO that they unilaterally abdicate their responsibilities. In addition, given the ramping up of censorship, the pressures on the opposition, and the increased cooperation (sic) with Romania, it will probably interest you to learn that ‘the EU will be providing additional military equipment to Moldova’, as reported by Ukrainian outlet (and I kid you not) European Pravda in early May (my emphases):

The visit of the Head of the European Council is taking place amid the aggravation and provocations in unrecognised Transnistria.

‘We will be helping Moldova strengthen its resilience and cope with the consequences of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Last year, we announced 7m € in equipment support for the army’s medical and internal needs through the EU’s peacekeeping mechanism.

This year, we plan to significantly increase our support to Moldova by providing its armed forces with additional military equipment’, Michel said.

A July Crisis in Our Times

If the ‘provocations’ in Transnistria escalate later this summer, do remember the following critical facts:

There was a significant change in Moldovan policy due to Maia Sandu’s election victory in 2020, which resulted in a drastically increased ramping up of the country’s pro-Western course.

This might lead to ‘unification’ with Romania, a current EU and NATO member, which is highly problematic due to the unresolved issues surrounding both the existence of Transnistria and the presence of Russian peacekeepers along the line of contact. ‘Unification’ with Romania would ‘place’ these Russian troops on EU and NATO territory (that is, if Russia would accede to recognize such a change, which, in bolstering its own moves towards reclaiming Crimea, they just might, but not entirely: Transnistria might become the new South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, or Donbass…).

Any such move, real, announced, or imagined, would certainly affect the conflict in Ukraine, which is poised to escalate anyways, but with the Donbass secured, it is reasonable to expect Russian military activities to increase in the south, i.e., a push towards—and possibly beyond—Odessa to establish a land connection with the Russian troops in Transnistria.

If, at this point, you’re asking yourself: what else could go wrong? Well, it certainly looks to me that combat operations could easily spill over to Moldova, and if Ms. Sandu (ab)uses that opportunity to announce an overnight ‘unification’ with Romania, that would bring the question of NATO support onto the agenda.

Bottom line: the Sandu government is acting highly irresponsible, in particular as the ‘aggravation and provocations in unrecognised Transnistria’ are not due to actions of the Transnistrian government. Remember that Mr. Serebrian, Moldova’s Minister of Reintegration, held that while ‘attempts at destabilisation could be repeated’, he noted that the Transnistrian leadership ‘is not interested in aggravating the situation’.

This is as open an admission of guilt by the Sandu government as anything, for if provocations between Moldova and Transnistria exist that aren’t emanating from the latter party—who is responsible?

Eerily reminiscent of the follies that ultimately led to the military escalation in Ukraine, western promises to their water carriers in Eastern Europe may turn up the heat in Moldova sooner rather than later, thereby unfreezing the conflict—and taking us all to the brink of a NATO-Russian conflagration.