'Ukraine in Purgatory' = Col. Reiser Pens a Strange and Schizophrenic 'Analysis' of the Current Mess

A Public Disservice (and a professional disgrace to boot): Col. Reiser of the Austrian Military Delivers a Widely-Read, if Quite Misleading Assessment of the Ukrainian Mess

Note that this post is too long to be properly displayed by email. Please read it online.

I’m close to the end of a horribly busy teaching week, hence my reduced activity. As my obligations draw to a close, here’s what I found a bit earlier today.

Some of you may know the intrepid and media-savvy Col. Markus Reiser (he also posts almost frequent updates on Youtube) of the Austrian Military; credit shall be given where credit is due, for every now and then Col. Reiser departs from the approved narrative about the conflict and speaks a bit more truthfully. Yet, his most recent ‘big picture’ assessment, dated 1 Nov. 2022, is reproduced below in my translation, is more misleading in this regard.

All emphases and the brief comments, as always in squared parentheses, are mine; there’s a bunch of bottom lines below the piece.

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‘Ukrainian purgatory’--The War in Ukraine: A Brief Summary after 250 Days

After 250 days, the situation in the war in Ukraine is marked by further devastating escalation. These include several mutually executed spectacular attacks in recent weeks. These indicate that an end of the conflict can be ruled out in the near future. The greatest danger for the West, and especially for Europe, lies in underestimating the conflict with Russia over Ukraine.

The Russian attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, which have been ongoing since 10 October, have resulted in increasingly severe destruction. In the winter that is now upon us, this may [will] have a devastating impact on Ukraine, and its ability to continue the defensive struggle is at risk. The 35 million people remaining in Ukraine face a harsh winter with an uncertain outcome.

[Oddly, I don’t know about the 35m number; Wikipedia provides a ‘Jan. 2022 est.’, which set the number of inhabitants at slightly below 41.2m, which indicates a difference between the 5-6m in the four no-longer (?) Ukrainian regions and the massive number of refugees who fled West.]

War is first the hope that one will be better off, then the expectation that the other will be worse off, then the satisfaction that the other will not be better off, and then the surprise that both are worse off.’ (Karl Kraus)

The Tactical / Operational Level—On the State of the Ukrainian Offensives

The aim of a swift Russian victory over Ukraine failed at the beginning, with the defensive success of the Ukrainians near Kiev (phase 1). Russia then attempted to seek a decision in the Donbass. In the process, a regionally limited success was achieved in the Donbass (phase 2). With the arrival of heavy weapons from the West in the summer, Ukraine was again able to launch a counter-offensive in time for winter and regain significant terrain (Phase 3).

[line break added; I think the good Col. Reiser misinterprets the Russian diversion towards Kiev; to me (armchair general), it looks like a ruse that may have succeeded, had BoJo not ‘convinced’ Mr. Zelenskyy to keep on fighting. I also think that Col. Reiser conflates phases 1 and 2, which occurred at the same time; as to his third phase, well, see below.]

These terrain gains were significant and produced measurable successes, but resounding success is still lacking. [the first part of this sentence is invalidated by the second part; also, what is the unit of measurement?] This can only be seen in a collapse of Russian forces on at least one frontline section. The current successes of the Ukrainian forces were ‘technical victories’, which succeeded in taking possession of terrain and military equipment, but not in taking thousands of Russian soldiers prisoners. Only the latter would lead to a ‘knockout’ or collapse. From the area east of Kharkiv, for example, the Ukrainian side reported ‘over 5,000 Russian soldiers encircled’ in the town of Lyman. However, they were not captured. The second offensive in Kherson was marked by heavy Ukrainian losses from Russian artillery in the preparatory phase. Nevertheless, Ukrainian forces succeeded in attacking at three points and pushing against the north-eastern bridgehead. However, the Russians also managed to retreat here towards the southwest. Now the beginning of the mud season (‘Razputitsa’) is coming to their aid.

[So, in short, the ‘military expert’ tells us that, by all standards of measurement, Ukrainian successes were ‘significant’, but they failed to deliver a knock-out blow. I’ll limit myself here, but note that somehow the Russians are capitalising on the mud season, which appears…unknown to Ukrainians? I mean…can we have virologists talking about this, please?]

In secret [lol], Ukraine is trying to push for another third offensive. A thrust from the area east of the Dnieper knee or Zaporozhye in the direction of Melitopol and the Sea of Azov. If successful, the entire Russian force in the Kherson, Zaporozhye, and Crimean areas would be cut off from supplies before winter. The ‘eye of the needle’, the bridge over the Kerch Strait, and maritime transports could not compensate for the missing land connection. [What a hypothesis…] At the moment, Russian forces are trying to smash the Ukrainian deployments in Zaporozhye (analogous to the action in Kherson in August / September) with artillery, ‘kamikaze’ drones and air forces. Ukraine, on the other hand, is deploying its own long-range artillery (including US-supplied HIMARS systems), ‘Gepard’ anti-aircraft tanks [first put into service in the 1950s], and [originally Russian-developed] S300 anti-aircraft batteries. It is clear that Russia is digging in for defence along the territory it occupies. Extensive entrenchment work is visible in the Donbass and Kherson. The Russians have obviously come to stay. [Here’s an alternative option: they are creating an ‘anvil’…] A collapse of [Russian] morale is not yet evident, despite all the videos shown in the West to the contrary. Partial mobilisation has begun despite initial serious shortcomings. In December and January, the mass of those mobilised will arrive in the battlespaces, where they will make up for the main deficit of the Russian armed forces since February, the lack of infantry. Ukraine must prepare for this over the winter.

The Strategic Level: The Russian Terrorist Attacks

Since the beginning of October, the conflict has been marked by a further massive escalation. Not least the attempted Ukrainian attack and the severe damage to the Russian bridge over the Kerch Strait, a symbol of Russian occupation, has led Russia to change its strategy. Since 24 Feb., Ukraine has been the victim of widespread attacks by Russian air and naval forces. President Zelensky repeatedly gave concrete figures on this: by 9 June, 2,500 Russian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones had been used against targets, by 23 August 3,500, and by mid-October 4,500. Since 10 Oct., it has been one strike after another. Ukrainian sources say that over 40% of critical infrastructure has already been hit. Recent satellite images show an increasingly dark Ukraine. Although the arsenals of Russian long-range precision munitions, especially of the types 3M14 KALIBR, Kh101 and 9K720 ISKANDER are slowly emptying, there is no end in sight to the attacks. [I have no way of explaining how Col. Reiser’s words work together.]

The Ukrainian General Staff assumes that the potential of Russian cruise missiles is over 50% exhausted or that the available ballistic missiles are already below 20%. [so, ‘assumes’] However, Russia has managed to maintain its momentum by delivering Iranian drones of the type SHAHED-136. Russian attack tactics are well-considered. The attacks are carried out by swarms of ten to 15 SHAHED-136 drones, whose small radar cross-section makes it difficult for Ukrainian air defences to detect them in time. They are trying to detect and repel them at an early stage with their own auxiliary reporting systems. Russian cruise missiles follow the drones. Through the transmission of reconnaissance data by the USA, however, the cruise missiles approaching from the Black Sea (sea-based launching) or Belarusian airspace (deployment by Tu95 and Tu160 bombers) are detected in good time. Due to the previous ‘saturation’ of Ukrainian air defence with drones, quite a few still hit their targets. When the cruise missiles arrive in the target area, there is often already a lack of defensive missiles. Ongoing flight movements between Iran and Russia lead us to expect the arrival of more ARASH-2 drones and medium-range ballistic missiles. Russia is said to have procured 1,700 of the SHAHED-136 type alone. Ukraine claims to have already shot down over 350 of these.

The narrative circulated in the West claims that, overall, only 20% of Russian strike assets hit their targets; this cannot be considered true in view of the infrastructure destroyed since 10 October. Ukraine needs rapid and extensive modern multi-sensor air defence assets of short, medium, and long-range capabilities. Only in this way can it protect the country’s own depth and ensure supplies for the population. Ukraine still has an extensive 750kV and 330kV electric grid from the Soviet era. Power supply relies on a mix of nuclear, hydro (along the Dnieper) and thermal power plants. Russia began destroying the 330kV ring lines on 10 October. So far, about 60% of these plants have been destroyed. Then, in mid-October, the first attack was made near Kiev on the ‘central nervous system’ of the grid, the 750kV lines. These lead away from the remaining nine existing reactors in the three nuclear power plants and feed the 330kV lines via seven substations. The destruction of the substations and the central 750kV line would have devastating consequences. The target of the Russian attacks is clearly the Ukrainian population. Their suffering is to be increased to unbearable levels in the coming winter. The aim is to trigger resistance against the Ukrainian government or large-scale flight movements.

[As regards the final couple of sentences, while undoubtedly problematic for the population, the Russians obviously know what they are doing, hence they are pursuing a strategic, if not logical, aim here; there is no need for calling this out like this.]

The Supra-Regional Conflict: A Conflict without Territorial Borders

Ukraine’s attack on the port of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol on 29 Oct. was aimed at hitting those Russian warships from which sea-launched cruise missiles are fired towards Ukraine. Despite the innovative use of a combination of ‘kamikaze’ drones as well as ‘kamikaze’ boats, another devastating wave of Russian attacks on targets in Ukraine occurred on the morning of 31 Oct. The Ukrainians reportedly shot down 44 of the 50 cruise missiles fired. Nevertheless, quite a few of these, combined with additional waves of drone strikes, hit targets in Ukraine. [sure, the remainder hit 18 targets, as per the NYT…you do the math…] The Ukrainian attack on the port of Sevastopol, as well as the earlier sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva and the attack on the Russian airbase of Saki in Crimea, show the increasingly intensive involvement of the West in the attacks. In this context, not only the provision of reconnaissance data (acquired by manned and unmanned platforms of the USA and NATO) is decisive, but above all the training of Ukrainian soldiers to enable them to carry out such spectacular attacks. It is striking that already in the summer, British media repeatedly reported British support for the training of Ukrainian naval special forces. Added to this is the recently decided EU training mission.

In recent weeks, there has also been an increase in supra-regional incidents. Among them was the destruction of three of the four NS1 and NS2 pipelines. Although Russia immediately pointed to the West as the culprit, the following fact is interesting: some time after the attack, the Russian offer came that they would be able to deliver through one of the undamaged NS2 pipeline after all. [cause and effect being offered in reverse] Subsequently, other interesting incidents occurred. These included acts of sabotage against the German railways and interrupted submarine cables in the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. Furthermore, problems with the power supply on the island of Bornholm and the arrest of a suspected Russian spy in Norway. [link break added]

Norway in particular is of great importance for Europe, because the loss of Russian resource supplies is supposed to be compensated by Norwegian raw material production. [Dream on, Col. Reiser, for not only are Norwegian resources to small, but there’s also the issue of transporting whatever ‘stuff’ to Europe; as of 2021, according to Norskperoleum, Norwegian gas supplies amounted to 23% of EU plus UK consumption] So it fits the picture that Norway put its armed forces on heightened alert on 31 Oct. [won’t make a difference either; if you care to browse even legacy media reports, there are so many items that declare massive problems with readiness, to say nothing about Norway’s severe lack of trainers and pilots for the F-35, to say nothing about all the mothballed stuff ferried to Ukraine, which would, in any way, exacerbate supply problems massively]. These events show that the conflict in Ukraine is increasingly taking on a supra-regional dimension. It therefore seems very likely that Russia is trying to increase the pressure on the European population through hybrid attacks.

The Economic War: The Russians’ Game with the Fear of the West

Hybrid war has already arrived in Europe. It is currently taking place primarily as a battle in the information space. Both parties to the conflict are trying to exert targeted influence here. President Zelensky’s hint that there will be a new wave of refugees to Europe, if Ukraine is not supported in stopping Russian air attacks on its critical infrastructure is an example of this. [talk about blackmail…] Clearly, for Ukraine, ‘the end justifies the means’. If it wants to survive as a country, it must do whatever is necessary to do so. Ukraine must accept all possible support in order to be able to continue in the fight against Russia. If it does not, it will cease to exist as a state. [true enough, but what about the ‘national interests’ of the European peoples and nations?] Indignation about their actions is out of place. Ukraine is fighting for its survival, whereas the Russian side is taking ever more massive action. [again, Col. Reiser suffers from a form of schizophrenia, it seems] Ukraine’s ‘centre of gravity’ is the support of the West. Without it, Ukraine cannot continue to fight or turn the conflict in its own favour. Russia has recognised this and is trying to be effective here. [Indignation about their actions is out of place, or so one would assume, if one were to follow Col. Reiser’s logic from, well, a few lines ago…] So, while Ukraine is scoring successes on a tactical / operational level, the Russian side is waging terror on a strategic level, there is also the struggle over our stance on the Ukrainian war. [the longer he writes, the more confused Col. Reiser gets, for the ‘tactical’ is a part of the ‘strategic’, or ‘operational’ level; note how Col. Reiser spent a lot of time explaining, apparently to the best of his abilities, that Ukraine isn’t winning on the strategic level] Russia is fuelling three fears in particular: [numbers added 1)] the fear of economic decline in Europe (triggered by the boycott or withdrawal of Russian raw materials); [2] fear of a nuclear catastrophe (triggered by an attack on a nuclear power plant, a ‘dirty bomb’ or a use of tactical nuclear weapons); and [3] fear of a wave of migration as a result of a global famine (triggered by the absence of Ukrainian grain on the world market) [I’ll address all three in the bottom lines, there’s too little space here]. Russia wants to bring the West to its knees at any cost [valid strategic aim, but I’m unsure if coexistence would be o.k., too, as long as the West remains not hostile towards Moscow]. The Russian regime despises Western societies as effete, decadent, and unable to defend themselves. [tststs, Col. Reiser, keep your value-judgements to yourself in pieces you label ‘analytical’]

The Future: An Escalating Conflict with No Foreseeable End

Russia also continues to try to forge strategic alliances. A clear sign of this was the 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi subsequently drew attention with a joint press statement. This stated that ‘…China will strongly support Russia under the leadership of President Putin to unite the Russian people to overcome difficulties and disturbances and further strengthen Russia's great power status’ and that ‘…any attempt (by foreign countries) to prevent China and Russia from advancing is doomed to failure’. [line break inserted]

Russia is determined to push this war further. As long as there is no ‘October 1917’ effect in Russia, it will continue the struggle. One may find this hard to believe, but much points exactly in this direction. [given that the Bolsheviks entered Russia courtesy of the German government, this is hilariously stupid; also, note that Russia has been quite open about what it aims to achieve, but apparently Col. Reiser hasn’t read up on it] Russia has a potential of 144 million people, of whom over 30 million are reservists. These are matched by 35 million Ukrainians. This is already the fifth wave of mobilisation [in Ukraine], i.e., everyone up to the age of 60 is being called up. Europe is called upon to recognise the seriousness of the situation. The war over Ukraine will have lasting consequences for our societies. The sooner we recognise this, the better we can prepare for it. Russia must be seen as a serious adversary. It helps neither Ukraine nor us if we ridicule Russian forces and already see their end coming.

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Bottom Lines

I found it hard to finish reading this; to be fair, Col. Reiser has been among the more ‘realistic’ voices in the West, but his realism appears to have reached its limits. While I’ve inserted a few short notes, there are some items that warrant more attention.

Among them, his three ‘fears’ Russia is allegedly stoking are:

the fear of economic decline in Europe (triggered by the boycott or withdrawal of Russian raw materials);

fear of a nuclear catastrophe (triggered by an attack on a nuclear power plant, a ‘dirty bomb’ or a use of tactical nuclear weapons);

fear of a wave of migration as a result of a global famine (triggered by the absence of Ukrainian grain on the world market)

So, I don’t know about you, but the economic decline is coming about due to the lack of natural gas, which came about as a result of EU-imposed sanctions, i.e., Europeans refuse to buy from Russia. Now, don’t get me wrong, I’m myself torn between chastising Europeans for this stupid move and acknowledgement that any such political reversal (i.e., buying gas from Russia again) wouldn’t come with a hefty price tag, of which the actual price of gas might not even be the most bitter pill to swallow. Still, the end result is the same, i.e., economic decline is already baked into what transpired to so, with the resulting question being one of how deep that particular hole will eventually become.

Second, the nuclear fear is certainly the most disingenuous insinuation of Col. Reiser. Surely, the good colonel understands that the ‘attack on a nuclear power plant’ such as the one in Zaporozhe—which is under Russian control since March 2022—would have to come from the Ukrainian side (after all, it’s the Ukrainians who’ve been doing all the shelling ever since). As to the ‘dirty bomb’ issue, well, what else can be said that the good Col. Reiser doesn’t spell out, so please allow me to fill in the blanks: any such bomb would, essentially, be meaningless from a tactical point of view (little amount of radioactive material), but strategically, it might be a game-changer: use of such a device has been discussed in legacy media as something that might bring about NATO intervention, which—incidentally, much like the infamous case of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria—would not be in Russia’s interest (much like in Mr. Assad’s case), hence the more likely potential perpetrator would be Kiev in its insane and desperate hope of bringing about US and/or NATO intervention. As such, Col. Reiser, I consider you either out-of-depth or a useful idiot for the war faction; either way, please stop talking.

Third, the continued in-migration into Europe is a real threat, but given the staggeringly high numbers of migrants who are already here—virtually 20-25% of most, if not all, European countries—it’s quite likely the most realistic fear. I doubt it that Europe’s states can continue to absorb even a fraction of the envisioned (feared) immigrants, hence we’ll probably see a massive policy shift before too long. This will not come about voluntarily, which is to say that we’ll see more (presumably right-wing) governments before too long that promise to be ‘tough on crime and immigration’. Look at Italy and Sweden today to see what’s in store before too long. Naturally, the EU will not like this a bit and esp. the Commission will be yelling and up in arms about it, which indicates an increased likelihood of member-states vs. Brussels conflict.

As to Col. Reiser’s overall conclusion, well, it’s epitomised in the below quote:

Russia wants to bring the West to its knees at any cost.

I’m unsure about the ‘at any cost’ aspect. Nuclear weapons are a no-brainer, and the costs will certainly accrue to the Europeans much faster than to the Russians. There’s also nothing the US can (or will) do about this, mainly because it’s not in their interest.

If the above analysis by Col. Reiser is what passes for (quasi-) ‘independent’ thinking, it’s over for the West, at least in its present configuration.

Change will come before too long, one way or another.

Brace for impact.