The End of Covidistan is Nigh

The Brittle Régime is Crumbling: Good Riddance to Pimp Kurz, Pusher Schallenberg, and Collector Blümel

For this update on developments in Covidistan, I had planned a round-up of a few items that caught my eye over the past couple of days. And then today we’re treated to a double-whammy: at first, former Chancellor Sebastian Kurz announced his complete withdrawal from politics, followed by the resignation of his successor, Alexander Schallenberg, leading his junior partner-in-tyranny, Werner Kogler (pictured) quite unhappy.

That caption reads: ‘the Greens’ reactions’ to Schallenberg’s resignation.

I will still write up my planned (and partially finished) post, but things are moving quite fast today, hence this takes precedence.

Here’s what’s in this post:

1. Kurz’s long shadow on Covidistan politics, 2011-21

2. A brief trip down memory lane to explore the Kurz-Schallenberg transition

3. The situation right now and its (likely) consequences

Let’s talk (briefly) about former Chancellor Kurz

While most of the juicier details of Sebastian Kurz’ tenure as chancellor (2017-21) must await a later post, here’s the short version: Kurz was the ÖVP’s ‘shooting star’ about 15 years ago, and he quickly rose through the ranks in the early 2010s. This wasn’t due to any accomplishments outside the party (he dropped out of law school after 4 terms, presumably because he already learned all he needed to know), but because he was protected by the (fake-) conservative’s powerful Christian trade unionists.

At this point, another facet of Austrian political reality is required: the country is technically a federal republic with strong welfare state institutions (trade unions) and chambers of what-not (commerce, a business round table, organised labour, etc.), but in practice the leading politicians treat these state, para-, and non-state institutions as ‘their’ own fief. And a number of these fief-tains protected Kurz: his main support came, as mentioned before, from the Lower Austrian Christian trade union (which mainly ‘represents’ public employees with academic training, such as officials, bureaucrats, and teachers), whose fief-tain (Spindelegger) was further protected by Lower Austrian’s long-serving state governor, Ernst Pröll, the ÖVP’s king-maker.

There’s no need to remember any of these names, it merely suffices to know that to succeed, you’d need protection from the powers that be, and if you do, all bets are off. You may, ideally, also have multiple protectors, so it’d be best to imagine Austrian pre-Covidistan politics as a kind of matryoshka doll.

Now, we’re ready to get back to Kurz’ rise: he had been ‘considered’ by these machine politicians as ‘up-and-coming’ talent, and, credit shall be given where credit is due, Kurz masterfully played the ‘old’ People’s Party hands.

At first, he was given the State Secretariat of Immigration (2011-13), a very thankless task, perhaps with the intent to burn him. During his brief stint, he managed to pull the formerly Christian-Social ÖVP very far to the political right on immigration, for which he was ‘rewarded’ with the appointment as foreign minister (2013-17). While his foreign policy (if we could call it that) was devoid of any content and/or ambition (if one could consider Austrian ‘alignment’ with Merkel’s Germany as such), Kurz’ and a small coterie of his close collaborators back from his pre-national politics in 2000s Vienna managed to torpedo the ÖVP’s governing coalition (as a junior partner) with the Social Democrats in 2017; Kurz then re-banded the ÖVP by adding the moniker ‘new’ and changed its colour—and won the 2017 elections.

At first, he entered into a coalition with the Freedom Party under Heinz-Christian Strache (2017-19), which broke apart in spring 2019 after the unveiling of the infamous ‘Ibiza Video’. In short: before entering government in autumn 2017, Strache met an alleged Russian oligarch’s female relative who promised campaign contributions in exchange for political favours; in ‘reality’, it is alleged that a P.I. single-handedly organised this meeting (which took place in Ibiza, hence the name of this affair), got Strache pretty drunk, filmed it all, and then sat on the kompromat for two years. German newspapers Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung ran a couple of compromising articles in spring 2017, Strache resigned, and the coalition government collapsed after two days of instrumentalised protests. President Alexander van der Bellen appointing a caretaker government until new elections were held in autumn 2019. (I promise you to write about this in the future, it’s too important not to bring this up in detail.)

The Kurz-Schallenberg Transition

After these elections—which Kurz won by a large margin—the ÖVP then entered into a coalition with the Greens in early 2020 There’s a lot to discuss about the many problems the ‘Ibiza Affair’ caused, but it suffices here to bring up a number of ‘loose ends’, which, incidentally, included strange political appointments by the Kurz-Strache gov’t, the destruction of evidence, and the fact that both the Chancellery and the ÖVP’s party HQ in September 2021, all of which occurred ‘on top of’ Covid-19 and the government’s lacklustre ‘performance’, and it’s a first since 1945.

Before his brief stint as chancellor, Schallenberg had been a career diplomat who had long been considered ‘a rising star’ among the Austrian corps diplomatique (which means a candidate for the top ambassadorships in Washington, New York [the UN ambassador], Brussels, or Berlin; this also gives away the power-political realities, by the way). Remember Kurz’ stint as Secretary for Immigration and later Foreign Minister? Kurz and Schallenberg knew each other for years, first because Immigration agendas were attached to the Foreign Ministry (because Kurz’ then-protector Spindelegger was—Foreign Minister) and later, once Kurz had become Foreign Minister, as Schallenberg’s superior.

This all (and much, much more) is the background to—Kurz’ resignation earlier this autumn. Disgraced, the two-time former chancellor ‘suggested’ Schallenberg as his successor and became an MP. (If, at this point, you wonder how that is possible: Austrian politics—citizens vote on party lists, and the party chairs may move the names on these lists at will; more about this, too, sometime in the future).

Now you know a bit more about these shenanigans that contributed to Schallenberg’s ascent to the chancellorship a few weeks ago, which led to the Covidistan putsch, inaugurated by Schallenberg with the announcement of house arrest for ‘the unvaccinated’ a mere three weeks ago.

Readers of this Substack know very much about what ensued; if you’re new to Covidistan’s putschist regime, I recommend you read up on my three-part series on the Covid Coup (here, here, and here) as well as my ‘obituary’ for the Austrian Second Republic.

Thus ‘fortified’, let’s briefly survey what happened today.

The Crucible of 17 Nov.-1 Dec. 2021

Earlier this week, I brought you an update on Covidistan régime—and I remarked, however briefly, that I thought this won’t end well for the Committee of Public Safety headed by Schallenberg. The reasons were pretty straightforward: a rising tide of protests had begun, unknown in potential size since 1945; there were signs that parts of law enforcement—all Covidistan police is federal—were voicing their concerns while their superiors denounced them as ‘oath-breakers’, a charge similarly unheard of since 1945.

I subtitled my piece ‘the brittle Covidistan régime’, but part of this was wishful thinking on my part, even though I’d like to add that privately, upon hearing of Schallenberg’s announcement of house arrest for ‘the unvaccinated’ on 17 Nov., I mentioned to my wife and co-workers that he should resign: there wouldn’t—couldn’t be any more highlights in his (political) life after this infamous step.

On 29 Nov. 2021, I summarised the current state of affairs in another post as follows: with the house arrests and ‘vaccine’ push clearly failing, I asked ‘what’s next?’ after the impending failure of the Committee of Public Safety to coerce the approximate 30% of the Austrian people who continue to refuse to get ‘vaccinated’ against (sic) Covid-19.

Well, on 30 Nov. 2021, I remarked that the putschists ‘dithered’, for they knew that their policies (if one could call it that) were hugely unpopular; at the same time, dissatisfaction continued to rise, fuelled by thinly-veiled threats against the people by Committee members, esp. Health Minister Mückstein and Interior Minister Nehammer. Then there appeared a letter by 150+ teachers who stated that if the ‘vax mandates’ would come, they’d quit (which is also unheard of in post-1945 Austria, until the Covid Coup, that is).

I also remarked on a statement by Nehammer who ‘became very emotional on the subject of the Corona protests’, highlighting that ‘the new large-scale demonstration planned by the FPÖ [come 4 Dec. 2021]’ would be ‘very challenging to police officers (for a fuller treatment and sources, click on that above link).

Here’s my assessment from three days ago:

As I mentioned in last weekend’s posting, police are under-staffed. I know from a relative (an in-law who’s a police officer in Vienna) that the situation is so dire that at times entire precincts have to be closed down due to manpower shortages.

Now you know that, too, and for all I care, we must assume the putschist régime knows it as well. While I personally find Nehammer’s appeal to conscience quite beyond (on second thought, maybe it’s projection, for he appears to have no conscience to speak of), here’s something else I thought while reading his utterances:

I smell: fear.

The régime knows it’s threading a very, very thin line here, and for all I care, I think the régime also understands that it’s running both on fumes and out of time.

This day, for all intents and purposes, has come today.

The End of Covidistan?

Earlier today, Sebastian Kurz announced his complete withdrawal from politics, citing that he’d like to spend more time with his family (I’m not making this up). Here’s state broadcaster ORF on this (my emphasis):

‘The announcement of his withdrawal came as a surprise on Thursday. The Kronen Zeitung and the Bild newspaper first learned of Kurz’s plans…According to the [Austrian daily] Kurier, only the closest circle in politics was informed as well; among others, Kurz is said to have called the ÖVP state governors. Vice Chancellor Werner Kogler (Greens), on the other hand, had learned of the plans from the media.

Kurz was facing an impending vote on his ‘extradition’ (MPs are legally immune from prosecution due to their political activities, and ending that legal protection means MPs are ‘extradicted’ and may be prosecuted by the judiciary) so that he could be criminally prosecuted, hence this was, kind of, to be expected. He also added that ‘he would be reorienting himself professionally in the coming year’, which reads to me: he’s getting a cosy, well-paid ‘job’ by some corporate behemoth or the like. What a disgusting, if entirely predictable, end.

Next up, as most of Covidistan’s putschists were still reeling from this announcement and its potential implications—here’s my hope: a mani pulite moment akin to early 1990s Italy (hopefully without the rise of a Berlusconi-like personality), the next bombshell exploded.

Schallenberg resigned in the late afternoon.

Here’s, again, ORF on this:

‘”It is not my intention and was never my goal to take over the function of the federal party chairman of the New People’s Party. I am of the firm opinion that both offices—head of government and federal party chairman of the party with the largest number of votes in Austria—should quickly be reunited in one hand”, Schallenberg said in a written statement.

“I am therefore making available the office of chancellor as soon as the appropriate course has been set within the party”, Schallenberg said, adding he had “declared himself ready to take over the office of chancellor in a very challenging phase for the federal government and the New People’s Party.”

Those who read my obituary know to see through this: it’s the party hacks who ‘made’ a state in April 1945, not the other way round. Hence, Schallenberg’s infamous choice of words. Don’t be follow, he’s trying to get away scot-free.

While media speculation about his potential successor ensued, this was quickly dealt another blow. Media pundits were still speculating, with Interior Minister Nehammer the clear ‘favourite’—when the third bombshell exploded today.

Finance Minister Blümel Resigned, Too

Kurz’s long-time collaborator and Treasury Secretary Gernor Blümel also resigned in the early evening. Blümel, too, will in all likelihood be criminally prosecuted for handing out favours to his accomplices, but the main take-away is this:

Covidistan’s regime has lost the pimp (Kurz), the pusher (Schallenberg), and the collector (Blümel) on this very same day, 2 Dec. 2021.

It’s two more days until the big protest, planned for 4 Dec. 2021.

(If you’re in Austria, I recommend attending the Freedom Party rally: forget about your possible personal objections to many of their policy positions—I have a number of them—but the FPÖ is the only partially-systemic faction that can make a difference right now. Check out their protest calendar and bring your friends, family, and co-workers, if possible.)

The Greens, as spineless as expected now that they’re bottom-feeding at the public trough, already announced—before Blümel’s resignation—they’d like to continue, as per ORF:

‘Vice Chancellor Werner Kogler (Greens) stressed that his government team would “certainly remain the same”. This shows “once again that we Greens, together with others, provide stability in this country”. Sigrid Maurer, parliamentary leader of the Green Party, referred to the coalition agreement with their partner [ÖVP]. The Greens had also cooperated well with Schallenberg, but now one had to wait for the decision of the ÖVP.’

The Covidistanista’s Catch-22

Given recent polling data—all collected before 28 Nov., i.e., before last weekend’s escalation—both governing parties stand to lose at the polls.

Note that these polls show a drastic slide in the régime’s support since mid-November. If polled tomorrow, the FPÖ’s gain would be visible; I think that if elections are held before too long, the Freedom Party would win, for they are the only party that opposes the ‘vax mandate’, and the next election will definitely be fought about it (only).

Yet, both governing parties already changed a number of cabinet ministers since late 2019. Another rotation of the chancellorship would certainly lead to questions of legitimacy, especially as the main plank of the Committee of Public Safety is—mandatory Covid ‘vaccinations’.

In other words: it’s a lose-lose situation for the Covidistan régime, but I cannot see how the Committee of Public Safety can continue without protests reaching fever pitch.

I don’t pity these wannabe and tinpot dictators.

I move to call on the President to dismiss the government and announce new elections.

In any ‘normal’ country, this would happen.

If it doesn’t, it’s time to bring out the pitchforks.