EU Commission Declares War 'Sustainable'

And thus the riddle of history is solved: with the military-industrial complex getting off the CO2 (scam) hook, there is no escaping reality--next stop: WW3

Translation, emphases, and [snark] mine, as are the Bottom Lines.

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EU to Categorise Arms as Sustainable: ‘War shall be greenwashed’

BSW [Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht] politician Fabio De Masi wanted to know how the EU Commission justifies its plans. The Berliner Zeitung now has the answer.

Raphael Schmeller, Berliner Zeitung, 4 Dec. 2024 [source; archived]

The new EU Commission has declared security and defence to be its top priority. Following her [s]election, the head of the authority [sic], Ursula von der Leyen, announced her intention to usher in a ‘new era of European defence and security’. [I’m studying how that ‘old era’ looked like: are you up for a replay of that?]

In order to be able to defend Europe ‘against Russia and other powers’, additional funds totalling at least 500 billion euros over a period of ten years are necessary, according to the CDU politician [that’s 50b per year, which isn’t nothing, but it won’t do much to increase military readiness or the like; all it does is signalling to the military lobbyists the frame of what can be siphoned off for the next decade].

Classification as ‘sustainable’ Shall Increase Investment in Defence

In order to facilitate this additional investment, Brussels wants to classify armaments as sustainable, among other things, as outlined in the ‘Strategy for the defence industry at EU level’ (EDIS) published in March [as usual, legacy media—even those that are somewhat not entirely captured like the Berliner Zeitung—won’t provide links to these materials, let alone report on these papers when stuff happens; the same holds true for yesterday’s piece, by the way; here is the link, and I’ll have more to say about its contents below]. This would not only polish up the image of arms manufacturers, but manufacturers of tanks, missiles or even nuclear weapons could in future hide in ‘sustainable’ share packages and funds without investors realising it. [here’s how that grift works: institutional investors—e.g., pension funds, social insurance, etc.—are legally obliged to buy investment products with certain labels (eco-friendly, ‘green’, etc.), which so far excludes the military-industrial complex for obvious reasons; this will now change].

BSW MEP Fabio De Masi wanted to know from the EU Commission how it justifies its plans—especially in light of the fact that the production of armaments and their operation by the military emits considerable amounts of greenhouse gases [to say nothing about their use on the battlefield; note also that the military is conventionally excluded from national CO2 emission statistics]. The answer from Brussels is now available to the Berliner Zeitung.

The framework for sustainable finance aims to incentivise investment in activities that contribute to the EU’s environmental objectives, it says. And ‘defence companies’ could, ‘just like companies from other sectors, report investments in the greening of their buildings or in transport solutions based on the taxonomy, for example’. [there, we greenwashed this for you: add ‘green roofs’ and buy into some NGOs that plant trees in, say, Borneo, which will make your ESG score go up and you’re fine]

In order to advance the transition to a ‘green economy’ and strengthen the resilience and cost efficiency of the European defence sector, the Commission supports ‘the efforts of this sector to improve sustainability, reduce CO2 emissions and increase circularity in the use of resources’ [if you haven’t fallen off your chair laughing madly, well, consider the recycling aspects of, say, tanks, artillery shells, or ammunition]. For example, a special category ‘energy resilience and ecological transition’ has been defined for the European Defence Fund. In its response to De Masi, the Commission confirms that ‘improving the defence industry's access to funding’ is a ‘priority’ [which means more grift, less oversight, far less enforcement of regulations, and, of course, way more gov’t money thrown at the merchants of death].

This generalised answer does not convince the BSW politician. The fact that armaments are also categorised as sustainable shows ‘that the military-industrial complex has Europe firmly in its grip’, said De Masi to the Berliner Zeitung [that it does, but the bigger issue here is, I’d argue, that it shows how much of a fake nonsense this entire ‘greening’ of the economy is]. Von der Leyen’s Green New Deal is above all a deal for lobbyists who want to greenwash the dirtiest business, war, via taxonomy [yep; that was entirely expectable if one did even the slightest bit of ‘research’ into how VDL ‘ran’ the German Defence Ministry under Merkel: in the same way, which explains, partially, the piss-poor state of the Bundeswehr in terms of combat readiness and the excessively high levels of corruption]. ‘This shows the madness: nothing is as harmful to the climate as war and destruction, but the main thing is that the tank saves fuel or the missiles are produced in a more climate-efficient way,’ said De Masi.

The New Deal under US President Roosevelt had given hope with higher wages and state investment, ‘the EU is putting a green seal of approval on BlackRock capitalism. That can't work’. [this is hair-raisingly stupid from the Berliner Zeitung: what FDR did was—he abolished capitalism as it existed before and introduced, essentially, dirigiste measures in the hope of reducing unemployment by way of confiscating the citizens’ gold, printing paper money, and went on a spending spree: it was both more expensive than, say, Germany’s policies from 1933-38, but also way less efficient in terms of outcome—the one thing that ‘saved’ the US economy in the 1930s was the combination of massive spending on weapons from 1937/38 onwards and the sustained period of price/consumptions controls (rationing) until after WW2; and, yes, to De Masi’s point, it didn’t work; going to war ended the Great Depression].

Did a Lobbying Campaign by the Defence Industry Influence the EU Commission’s Decision? [ahahahahahahaha: of course]

What is explosive about the EU Commission’s plans to categorise armaments as sustainable is that they are the result of a major lobbying campaign by the armaments industry over the past two years, as research by the NGO Lobbycontrol and the taz newspaper in October shows [watch out, this is gaslighting: ‘Europeans have long assumed that excessive lobbying is only an American problem. But over the past 15 years Brussels has become the world’s second capital of the dark arts after Washington, DC, with Berlin not far behind’, wrote The Economist in 2021; here’s a good piece of information from 2011, by the way, which has, it seems, not been updated since…]. The industry argues that investments in armaments and defence secure peace and thus enable sustainability [see how this works? If you want peace sustainability, prepare for war, as the ancient Romans knew as well /sarcasm]. According to taz and Lobbycontrol, this argument has found its way into at least two of the EU Commission’s most important strategy papers, including the EDIS mentioned above. It uses wording that corresponds word-for-word with passages from statements by an arms lobby organisation.

In fact, the EDIS strategy paper repeatedly argues that ‘the European defence industry makes a decisive contribution to resilience, security and social sustainability’ [there is, of course, no evidence for what some policy paper says]. Against this background, ‘the EU framework for sustainable finance is fully in line with the Union's efforts to provide the European defence industry with sufficient access to finance and investment’. [this kind of circular reason is why everything based on, or deriving from, circular reasoning—or dialectics—does not work: one presumes a desirable outcome in the future (‘sustainability’) and begins to change stuff to bring about that outcome—talk about a snake eating its tail].

Von der Leyen Wants a Zeitenwende at the EU Level

The fact that certain activities of the defence industry are not yet included in the EU environmental taxonomy has no impact on the ‘environmental performance’ of the defence industry and ‘should therefore have no impact on its access to funding’, the EDIS paper continues. The defence sector is already striving for environmental sustainability—these efforts must be made visible in order to contribute to the ‘general social acceptance’ of armaments.

The EDIS paper advocates ‘establishing a culture of defence readiness in Europe’. It can be seen as a kind of watershed moment at the EU level.

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Enter the BORG

As I said above, here’s the EDIS paper and we’ll now look at its most hair-raisingly stupid provisions.

The EDIS lays out a vision for a European defence industrial policy up to 2035, and announces actions that bolster the EDTIB [European defence technological and industrial base] through ‘increased, more collaborative and European investment from Member States’; strengthen the European defence industry’s ability to respond quickly and adapt to any situation; mainstream a culture of defence readiness across all EU policies; and join forces with the EU’s global, like-minded, and strategic partners.

Mention is made of the formalisation of NATO’s 2% of GDP spending on arms target, which occurred in 2014 at NATO’s summit in Wales.

This is a form of tribute to the empire, as most of these funds—we’re talking in excess of 350 billion euros right now (2024) per year—would be spent on US-based companies, such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, etc.

Since EU countries are about 1/3 short of the 2% spending target, we’re talking about adding some 175 billion annually over the next ten years, which brings ‘defence™’ spending in the EU close to official US spending on the DoD.

In terms of industrial gaps, the EDTIB is fragmented on both the demand and supply side. According to the investment gap analysis, the primary source of demand for domestic defence industries are their national governments, which also set the export regulations and oversee the entire procurement process for defence equipment. This has caused national defence companies operating in small markets to produce products in quantities that are wholly insufficient for the current geopolitical environment.

This is literally the money paragraph: it means, in no uncertain terms, that the EU Commission desires the agglomeration of these many small defence industrial bases of the various bloc members into a gigantic, EU-wide cartel, or trust (monopoly).

Needless to say, this cartel will become so powerful it will simply dominate politics (if it doesn’t already), but it will be nurtured with taxpayer money in ways and means unheard of so far, and the EU will also override national regulations to facilitate the creation of a bloc-wide armaments industry of vast proportions.

Lack of cooperation also hampers the EU’s capacity to act: in its 2020 CARD report, the EDA concludes that fragmentation impairs Member States’ capacity to conduct joint operations, which is a clear deliverable of the Strategic Compass and the common security and defence policy (CSDP).

So, imagine, for once, Europe’s leaders (clowns) being in a capacity to act due to cartelisation of defence production and unified leadership structures across the bloc.

This will not end well.

It is essential that the EU make the most of the substantial increase in funding in order to achieve defence industrial readiness…

To guarantee the coherence of EU action in the defence industry, the EDIS proposes a Defence Industrial Readiness Board, which would include representatives of the Member States, the EU High Representative and the Commission. The board should carry out the EU defence joint programming and procurement function called for in the defence investment gap analysis. The proposed EDIP regulation would formally create the board, which would also assist in the EDIP's implementation.

At this point, it is clear what is happening: a new institutional framework (‘board’) will be set up, which calls out the problem (‘investment gap’), proposes ‘regulation’, and ‘assist in [its] implementation’.

If you thought that the EU was undemocratic so far, you ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

The EU has no separation of powers, and the EDIP crap stands poised to formalise, via bureaucratic streamlining, this situation by creating a new directorate (‘board’) that will be issuing ‘regulations’ based on its own ‘analyses’, and ‘assist’ in their ‘implementation’.

In other words: this is a military dictatorship in the making.

There is no accountability of the EU Commission to anyone other than the heads of the member-states’ governments (this is called the EU Council).

Now, the new ‘Board’ will direct everything without parliamentary oversight, and there will also be no accountability:

This is about setting up the industry in the EU to be able meet the Member States’ demands in time and scale.

Because, you see, the ‘Board’ does what it does to enable member-states’ demands.

Of course, this will go from a supremely bad idea to way, way worse before too long. In fact, that slippery slope has already been behind us for some time:

EU Commissioner for the Internal Market Thierry Breton pitched a debt-financed €100 billion fund during an event in January 2024 to boost joint procurement of defence products.

Which debt, you might ask, but I fear you know the answer: EU Bills and Bonds that are backed by—nothing:

EU Commission to Issue ‘Sovereign EU-Bonds and EU-Bills’

Back to the EDIS paper:

At the June 2024 European Council meeting, EU leaders held discussions on options to mobilise funding for European defence, and invited the Commission and the High Representative to ‘present developed options, to be discussed by the Council, for public and private funding to strengthen the defence technological and industrial base and to address critical capability gaps’…

Breton’s call for the €100 billion was supported by French President Emmanuel Macron, who has called for a fund mirroring the EU’s joint pandemic recovery fund with one for defence spending. [line break added]

Similar calls have been made by then Estonian prime minister (and now High Representative-designate), Kaja Kallas, and European Council President Charles Michel. Moreover, according to news reports, Czechia, Luxembourg and Finland appear receptive to the idea of discussing new euro bonds as long as the money raised is used exclusively for defence. CSIS experts already suggested such an approach in the past: ‘Following the model of the €750 billion … Next Generation EU recovery plan, the European Commission could borrow on capital markets to either support collaborative investments or pursue joint procurements on behalf of Member States’.

Do you see it yet?

Of course, there are other obstacles, which the both MEP De Masi and the Berliner Zeitung also omitted:

According to Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union, no expenditure that implies military or defence operations may be funded by the EU budget. However according to Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU is responsible for enhancing the competitiveness of European industry, which includes the European defence industry. Thus, the EU defence industry can be supported by the EU budget.

You need to know two more things about this load of bullcrap here (apologies to bulls): for the EU, there are two types of EU law™:

Primary versus secondary law

Every action taken by the EU is founded on the treaties. These binding agreements between EU member countries set out EU objectives, rules for EU institutions, how decisions are made and the relationship between the EU and its members.

Treaties are the starting point for EU law and are known in the EU as primary law.

The body of law that comes from the principles and objectives of the treaties is known as secondary law; and includes regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.

With these definitions out of the way, we can see, clearly, what the EU Commission is arguing here:

Art. 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) holds:

Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise shall also be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.

In cases where expenditure is not charged to the Union budget, it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 31(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.

This is quite crystal-clear that, if a member-state says, ‘ahem, nope’, then said member-state cannot be obliged to do so.

And here’s the perfidious work-around proposed by the EU Commission as per Art. 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU):

1. The [European] Union and the Member States shall ensure that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union’s industry exist.

For that purpose, in accordance with a system of open and competitive markets, their action shall be aimed at:

• speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes,

• encouraging an environment favourable to initiative and to the development of undertakings throughout the Union, particularly small and medium-sized undertakings,

• encouraging an environment favourable to cooperation between undertakings,

• fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development.

2. The Member States shall consult each other in liaison with the Commission and, where necessary, shall coordinate their action. The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote such coordination, in particular initiatives aiming at the establishment of guidelines and indicators, the organisation of exchange of best practice, and the preparation of the necessary elements for periodic monitoring and evaluation. The European Parliament shall be kept fully informed [i.e., the EU Commission must report what they do, but Parliament (sic) has no say about it].

3. The Union shall contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in paragraph 1 through the policies and activities it pursues under other provisions of the Treaties. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, may decide on specific measures in support of action taken in the Member States to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 1, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.

This Title shall not provide a basis for the introduction by the Union of any measure which could lead to a distortion of competition or contains tax provisions or provisions relating to the rights and interests of employed persons.

Basically, Art. 173 is something like the Commerce Clause in the US context.

Of course, these two articles of ‘primary law™’ are, actually, quite contradictory with respect to the EU Commissions stated aims of military-industrial policy outline in the EDIS paper.

Here’s how the EU Commission is telling everyone how they will subvert both their own ‘primary law™’ (sic) and the provisions on non-interference in, well, commerce:

• Art. 41(2) of the TEU will be (ab)used to go around the taxpayer-financing of any of the military-industrial plans of the Commission—by resorting to debt-based financing of this entire scheme. In other words: no taxes will be earmarked for this (which would be blatantly illegal), hence the EU Commission will simply raise the money via their Bills and Bonds. ‘We didn’t break any of the primary law™ provisions, we just did something that’s not mention in any of the Treaties (other than, say, the Maastricht Treaty explicitly forbidding the raising of shared, or pooled, debt, but then again, that’s a technicality for the Courts to resolve in a few years).

• Art. 173 of the TFEU will be employed at the same to argue two points: since this entire adventure will be debt-financed, as opposed to using taxes, literally anything the EU Commission will do to establish a bloc-wide military-industrial cartel can, and will, be done via this functional equivalence of the Commerce Clause, which affords the US Congress the authority ‘to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes’ (as per Wikipedia). Do note Art. 173 of the TFEU will be (ab)used in the same manner, with the key difference to the constitutional-republican provisions in the US being that the EU Commission, via the to-be-created ‘Defence Industrial Readiness Board’, will hold these powers.

Bottom Lines

If there ever was a good reason to get off the couch and protest, there is your reason.

If you’re reading this as a EU citizen subject and don’t get outraged, I don’t know what will get you angry at these power-mad and insane people.

If you don’t get off the couch and try to do something, don’t come back complaining about your children, friends, brothers and sisters being sent off to foreign adventures in due course.

This step by the EU Commission, once seen combined with the debt-based financing (also illegal under EU ‘Law™’), will change the EU into a fisscal-financial-military régime akin to earlier iterations, most importantly the Anglo-British ‘fiscal-military state’ discussed by John Brewer in his seminal The Sinews of Power (Unwin Hyman, 1989) and its US adaptation detailed by Max Edling in his A Hercules in the Cradle (University of Chicago Press, 2014).

I just wrote a long academic book about this topic (see here, esp. the Introduction in which I lay this out in great detail; a full Open Access will be made available in due time), but the main point here is, in John Brewer’s succinct phrasing concerning the quite good reputation of 18th-century Britain versus its more ‘autocratic’ competitors:

judged by the criteria of the ability to take pounds out of people’s pockets and to put soldiers in the field and sailors on the high seas … Britain was one of Europe’s most powerful states (p. xviii)

In other words: Parliamentary Britain beat its more autocratic rivals at their own game, and we will return to this point in due course.

For now: spread the word, raise awareness, and, for the sake of your children and grand-children: please do something about this.