FM Schallenberg compares the Anschluss of Austria 1938 with Russian 'aggression' against Ukraine today. History fact: there was betrayal in 1938, but it was Czechoslovakia who was 'left alone'
Thank you for this very thorough history lesson. Being from the U.S.A. I know almost nothing about Austrian history between the world wars, even though I went to good schools and liked history! The situation in Austrian reminds me of the saying “The past is never dead. It's not even past.”
You're perfectly welcome, Erika, and I'm glad you found the above essay interesting. The past is never dead, but I'd argue that the more one knows about it, the less trust in government there is.
This sums up why the US and the EU flounders in the face of Russia:
"...in order to chip away at the Russian narrative…"
You cannot attack a narrative without also acknowledging it. That's rule #1 in memetic warfare. Instead, you attack the facts as stated by your opponent, and launch your counter-narrative that way. That may have been what Schallenberg meant but it doesn't look like it in english.
Russia has always ever dealt in realpolitik. If I'm allowed a sort-of metaphor, principles (or perhaps schools) of politics are layered on top of eachother much like how we envision the brain when looked at as a cut-out from the side.
At the center there is realpolitik, the reptile brain so to speak. Friend or foe, mate, food, play, fight, flee. Politics made from this will be dictated by strict material needs and wants. Unfortunately, perfectly legitimate political terms are forever tainte by you-know-who, terms such as 'Lebensraum'. Which is reality. We have one planet and only so much suitable land. Domination of said land will therefore always lead to conflict sums up realpolitik. Russia, China and the majority of what was called the third world deals with issues mainly in realpolitik terms.
On top of this we find the classic ideologies and schools of philosophy and religions, including economics from let's say Adam Smith onwards to set a starting point. Still a lot of realpolitik in the foundations but now tempered by more refined and nuanced processes of how to achieve goals, rather than meet needs and wants. This was most western nations from late eighteenth century to right before WW1 (with the usual fuzzy edges we always apply to time periods).
After the war, we get the to the main cerebellum so to speak: politics made from ideals, where every move is measured agaisnt how it follows specific dogma, naturally causing friction and conflict between semantics and pragmatics. Just look at how nazi-Germany gets to wear the dog head for eugenics, when what it did was copy those ideas and programmes from Britain, Sweden and the USA. Semantics those evil nazi bastards did it - in reality, or pragmatics Sweden retained eugenic laws until the mid-nineteenseventies.
Now, after the fall of the Wall we are in the frontal lobe. Cold corporatist neo-malthusian logic based on utilitarian ideals based on dogmatism based on (first and last and always) natural resources and demographics.
The above needs a lot of work to make better sense really, I excuse myself by saying that I am much better at arguing while speaking than I can get my meandering snakepits of thoughts down on paper. Or electrons as the case may be. I hope it offers an angel of approach often ignored in todays debate.
I apologies for the convoluted translation, but the problem isn't with the messenger (me, although I admit I should have done a better job), but with the original. Here's the stuff Schallenberg said (source: https://tvthek.orf.at/transcripts/show/1307583)
'Und wir haben eine Des-Informationskampagne derzeit, die seinesgleichen sucht. Und was ja genau die Amerikaner machen, ist immer wieder das öffentlich zu machen. Sie haben am Anfang gesagt, das ist außergewöhnlich, dass so viel Öffentlichkeit gesucht wird mit an sich Geheimdienstinformationen, um das russische Narrativ zu untertreiben, nämlich, dass sie hier eigentlich nur der russischen Bevölkerung der Ostukraine zu Hilfe eilen oder sich selber verteidigen müssen.'
Here's my slightly amended translation (it's really the last two lines, but I tried to clean up the translation to render it more readable, but the German original is sooooooo absurdly convoluted):
'We are suffering under a disinformation campaign unlike any the world has ever seen. What the Americans are doing is, well, precisely pulling this [disinformation] into the open. They said from the start that this is an extraordinary situation, by which is meant the sheer amount of intelligence that is shared with the public—in order to chip away at the Russian narrative, which holds that they only intend to aid the Russian population in Eastern Ukraine or act in self-defence.'
As to your comment per se: it makes a lot of sense to me, esp. the periodisation from ± 1750 to 1945-ish as something one may, for whatever that is worth, refer to as 'Modernity', even though its heyday certainly didn't break through before the mid-19th century. The period after 1945, though, is certainly very different from the preceding 100 or so years.
The fake ascriptions of Nazi-German evil (not that they didn't commit atrocities) are also a given, esp. given the atrocities committed by everyone else that mustn't be mentioned in polite conversation. In short: I'd agree with the Cold War period assessment.
Where I do disagree, however respectfully, is the post-1990 world: I don't think it's a new thing, but a kind of more pervasive and accellerated version of the Cold War era--more bureaucracy, albeit of a more 'hidden' public-private partnership garden variety with very many empty words (discourse) that serve to obscure the naked power-political realities of our totalitarian-esque post-1945 world.
This also needs a lot more words, and I might write something about this in due time, but the bottom line is this: the 'bourgeois' century came to a close in the period from c. 1907-45; we're in a firmly post-bourgeois world since then, and the pace of 'development' appears to be quickening.
It may well be that it is my swedish perspective, which includes Sweden's history of forested rural backwater to superpower to actually functioning socialist democracy with corporatist capitalism to smothering welfare society to (now) Potemkin screens.
Also, I would never correct a native speaker on his own language :) No matter how much one studies a foreign tongue, things as tone and idioms remain illusive.
I must state (again?) it's a delight to to debate in normal form: most swedes nowadays barely manage to use up the keys allowed on twitter. Anything above a few hundred letters is too long.
Re the last paragraph: you might wish to add that it's not just about the shortness of the answers, but there's also the internally contradictory 'logic' that's, well, faulty.
Don't worry, PolarNinja, these things aren't really taught in schools in Austria either, and even less among professional historians. Virtually all of the above, but esp. the betryal of Czechoslovakia, is tantamount to heresy.
Re the Finland might join NATO (now): Sweden, according to Austrian media, is considering the same. Then again, Austria is already 'in', even not 100% formally.
Thank you for this very thorough history lesson. Being from the U.S.A. I know almost nothing about Austrian history between the world wars, even though I went to good schools and liked history! The situation in Austrian reminds me of the saying “The past is never dead. It's not even past.”
You're perfectly welcome, Erika, and I'm glad you found the above essay interesting. The past is never dead, but I'd argue that the more one knows about it, the less trust in government there is.
This sums up why the US and the EU flounders in the face of Russia:
"...in order to chip away at the Russian narrative…"
You cannot attack a narrative without also acknowledging it. That's rule #1 in memetic warfare. Instead, you attack the facts as stated by your opponent, and launch your counter-narrative that way. That may have been what Schallenberg meant but it doesn't look like it in english.
Russia has always ever dealt in realpolitik. If I'm allowed a sort-of metaphor, principles (or perhaps schools) of politics are layered on top of eachother much like how we envision the brain when looked at as a cut-out from the side.
At the center there is realpolitik, the reptile brain so to speak. Friend or foe, mate, food, play, fight, flee. Politics made from this will be dictated by strict material needs and wants. Unfortunately, perfectly legitimate political terms are forever tainte by you-know-who, terms such as 'Lebensraum'. Which is reality. We have one planet and only so much suitable land. Domination of said land will therefore always lead to conflict sums up realpolitik. Russia, China and the majority of what was called the third world deals with issues mainly in realpolitik terms.
On top of this we find the classic ideologies and schools of philosophy and religions, including economics from let's say Adam Smith onwards to set a starting point. Still a lot of realpolitik in the foundations but now tempered by more refined and nuanced processes of how to achieve goals, rather than meet needs and wants. This was most western nations from late eighteenth century to right before WW1 (with the usual fuzzy edges we always apply to time periods).
After the war, we get the to the main cerebellum so to speak: politics made from ideals, where every move is measured agaisnt how it follows specific dogma, naturally causing friction and conflict between semantics and pragmatics. Just look at how nazi-Germany gets to wear the dog head for eugenics, when what it did was copy those ideas and programmes from Britain, Sweden and the USA. Semantics those evil nazi bastards did it - in reality, or pragmatics Sweden retained eugenic laws until the mid-nineteenseventies.
Now, after the fall of the Wall we are in the frontal lobe. Cold corporatist neo-malthusian logic based on utilitarian ideals based on dogmatism based on (first and last and always) natural resources and demographics.
The above needs a lot of work to make better sense really, I excuse myself by saying that I am much better at arguing while speaking than I can get my meandering snakepits of thoughts down on paper. Or electrons as the case may be. I hope it offers an angel of approach often ignored in todays debate.
Hi Rikard,
I apologies for the convoluted translation, but the problem isn't with the messenger (me, although I admit I should have done a better job), but with the original. Here's the stuff Schallenberg said (source: https://tvthek.orf.at/transcripts/show/1307583)
'Und wir haben eine Des-Informationskampagne derzeit, die seinesgleichen sucht. Und was ja genau die Amerikaner machen, ist immer wieder das öffentlich zu machen. Sie haben am Anfang gesagt, das ist außergewöhnlich, dass so viel Öffentlichkeit gesucht wird mit an sich Geheimdienstinformationen, um das russische Narrativ zu untertreiben, nämlich, dass sie hier eigentlich nur der russischen Bevölkerung der Ostukraine zu Hilfe eilen oder sich selber verteidigen müssen.'
Here's my slightly amended translation (it's really the last two lines, but I tried to clean up the translation to render it more readable, but the German original is sooooooo absurdly convoluted):
'We are suffering under a disinformation campaign unlike any the world has ever seen. What the Americans are doing is, well, precisely pulling this [disinformation] into the open. They said from the start that this is an extraordinary situation, by which is meant the sheer amount of intelligence that is shared with the public—in order to chip away at the Russian narrative, which holds that they only intend to aid the Russian population in Eastern Ukraine or act in self-defence.'
As to your comment per se: it makes a lot of sense to me, esp. the periodisation from ± 1750 to 1945-ish as something one may, for whatever that is worth, refer to as 'Modernity', even though its heyday certainly didn't break through before the mid-19th century. The period after 1945, though, is certainly very different from the preceding 100 or so years.
The fake ascriptions of Nazi-German evil (not that they didn't commit atrocities) are also a given, esp. given the atrocities committed by everyone else that mustn't be mentioned in polite conversation. In short: I'd agree with the Cold War period assessment.
Where I do disagree, however respectfully, is the post-1990 world: I don't think it's a new thing, but a kind of more pervasive and accellerated version of the Cold War era--more bureaucracy, albeit of a more 'hidden' public-private partnership garden variety with very many empty words (discourse) that serve to obscure the naked power-political realities of our totalitarian-esque post-1945 world.
This also needs a lot more words, and I might write something about this in due time, but the bottom line is this: the 'bourgeois' century came to a close in the period from c. 1907-45; we're in a firmly post-bourgeois world since then, and the pace of 'development' appears to be quickening.
It may well be that it is my swedish perspective, which includes Sweden's history of forested rural backwater to superpower to actually functioning socialist democracy with corporatist capitalism to smothering welfare society to (now) Potemkin screens.
Also, I would never correct a native speaker on his own language :) No matter how much one studies a foreign tongue, things as tone and idioms remain illusive.
I must state (again?) it's a delight to to debate in normal form: most swedes nowadays barely manage to use up the keys allowed on twitter. Anything above a few hundred letters is too long.
Re the last paragraph: you might wish to add that it's not just about the shortness of the answers, but there's also the internally contradictory 'logic' that's, well, faulty.
Seeings as Russia is now actively invading Ukraine, the EU has decided to act decisively:
Another round of meetings about harsher sanctions.
Somewhere, Hitler and Stalin are toasting each other in Hell and laughing their asses off.
Don't worry, PolarNinja, these things aren't really taught in schools in Austria either, and even less among professional historians. Virtually all of the above, but esp. the betryal of Czechoslovakia, is tantamount to heresy.
Re the Finland might join NATO (now): Sweden, according to Austrian media, is considering the same. Then again, Austria is already 'in', even not 100% formally.