Covid in Austria: Experts Call for 'Zero Covid Strategy' (if needed), 'More Surveillance', and 'Better Communication'

This is our second warning about the shape of things to come--refuseniks shall be identified, the populace shall be 'better prepared' for more mandates in autumn

Last week, Covidistan experienced two comparatively important events: on the one hand, the régime’s advisory panel (which one, I don’t know, there’s so many) came up with their autumn/winter ‘planning’.

Let’s have a look at this, as well as at some of the ‘curiosities’ of the past couple of weeks, shall we? (For comparison, here are some of the Danish and Norwegian perspectives on this kind of planning.)

Covid Planning à l’autrichienne

As the advisory panel put out a first daft in April 2022, there was only a little huffing and puffing in the media. Given the stakes, I think this was mainly because the planning document was—perhaps inadvertently so—candid about the main driving factor: the virus, and nothing we puny humans could do would change any of it.

Here’s what the assembled experts found (it’s on p. 3 of the linked document, emphases mine):

• Antibody-deriving immunity against Sars-Cov-2 (no matter which variant) lasts only a few months post-infection (the panel points to South Africa and India, ‘which let the virus run free and experience high waves ever 6-7 months’.

• T cell response covers all prior variants, ‘lasts longer, and in all likelihood confers protection vs. severe course of disease’.

• ‘Vulnerable individuals’ experience severe disease more often [remember: you’ve gotta be an expert to know this]

• Current variants are so transmissible that ‘there will be more waves in the future’ [a bold, if somewhat illogical claim]

Not unlike self-identifying ‘quality media’, this is a fun piece, as no-one knows which bullet point or page is the one with the really important content. So, we’ve made it through a couple of points here, but then there’s this:

Mandates (in particular severe social distancing, mask mandates, and moralising media coverage) lead to permanent stress with in part undesired psycho-social and health outcomes for individuals, and they [the mandates] may also reinforce societal divisions.

No shit, geniuses, I wonder how many credentials one must have to know—or have known this—before such ‘mandates’ were imposed in the first place. Oh, wait, this was mentioned before (remember that ‘masks’ are useless against respiratory viruses until they weren’t) everything was turned upside-down. Same with ‘Covid Passports’, whose safety profile may be deemed slightly better than the injections, but the data on both of these efficacy serves also as a contraindication (still, the EU Parliament just extended the ‘Covid Passport’).

The remainder of the ‘planning’ list contains mentions of seasonal effects (while now acknowledged, ‘new waves cannot be ruled out’); the possibility of having multiple variants circulate at the same time thus creating multiple, contemporaneous and/or overlapping waves (‘provided low cross-immunity’), and the next big admission of sorts:

The by far biggest unknown variable in our planning are the epidemiological characteristics of future variants.

There you have it: this is all the best and the brightest can come up with. If you knew that already, you’re probably a better fit for these governmental advisory panels than any of the credentialled geniuses responsible for the planning.

The remaining items, though, are no joke, for the tell you what will come next, irrespective of future variants:

The impossibility of long-term prognoses requires an early-warning system to identify epidemiologically relevant waves, including the anticipatory identification of new variants and their characteristics. Apart from continuous national monitoring systems (e.g., wastewater monitoring and regular representative sampling) international cooperation and data-sharing are without alternative.

To flexibly manage future waves on short notice, capacities and demand must be anticipated for 1) rapid up-scaling of testing, 2) rapid deployment of vaccine centres, and 3) spare capacities in hospitals, esp. personnel, beds, and equipment.

There you have it: we don’t know what’s going to happen, but we need to do the same in the future. Now, we could perhaps argue that Covid-19 was ‘unprecedented’ (to certain degrees, our response was), but with planning documents such as this one, there’s no way in hell that whatever future variant and/or ‘pandemic’ comes along will see either any departure from the Covid script or that the argument that this is unprecedented will hold any water.

Hence, none of the scenarios outlined by these experts (pp. 4-8) mentions no surveillance structures. Only the ‘end of Covid’ scenario (p. 4) omits any mention of ‘vaccination’, by the way. Tellingly, all other numbered scenarios come with some form of mandates:

No. 2 (endemic Covid) mentions 1 injection per year for vulnerable groups and FFP2 mask mandates in autumn and winter.

No. 3 (drawn-out transition to endemic Covid): same for ‘vulnerable’ individuals, with a ‘recommendation’ of yearly injections for everyone; general FFP2 mask mandates

No. 4a (sustained pandemic): intrusive mandates (social distancing) will not be implemented because of anticipated resistance on part of the population; social distancing will be reinstated if hospitals begin to overflow; mask mandates (FFP2 are coming back) and mandatory injections once per year are envisioned, as are ‘lockdowns’

No. 4b (worst-case, i.e., escalation) shows that nothing was learned: ‘if the spike protein changes completely [ahem], a new vaccine must be developed and, while we await [EUA], non-pharmaceutical interventions shall be used’, which means ‘a Zero Covid strategy is unavoidable’.

So far, so expectable, even though, looking specifically at scenarios 4a and 4b, it’s hard to avoid Einstein’s (alleged) definition of insanity. Masks don’t work, and I think it’s safe to say that the enforcement of mandatory injections with the currently available crap or any future crap will trigger more protests.

Remember: injection uptake receded by about 5% from dose 1 to dose 2, and it receded further—by approx. 1/3 (!)—from dose 2 to the ‘booster’. I think the willingness of the population to take ‘more’ injections with these (or comparable) products against Covid-19 has only one way to go: down.

The rest of the ‘strategy paper’ (pp. 11-13) concerns ‘communication’, i.e., propaganda. Here follows a ‘best-of’, with my emphases and a brief commentary at the bottom:

After two years of the pandemic, worry, and uncertainty, many Austrians are in a state of emotional and psychological exhaustion (and the current war situation undoubtedly makes this even more difficult). Even if this certainly does not apply to all people to the same extent, the likelihood that the population will support pandemic control measures in the autumn or show understanding for incoherent behaviour on the part of political decision-makers is diminishing (the key term here is ‘driving on sight’ is no longer accepted). Persistent bad outlooks lead to a decrease in the population’s tolerance for unspecific and/or incoherent communication.

That’s about as much as an admission of failures that have been made by the régime. It’s also a confirmation of my above statement that many more people will balk at a mere repetition of these mandates in the absence of significant new information. Hence, the scenario planners outline two key issues that need to be defined beforehand:

1. what is (are) the objective(s)?

2. who must be involved to achieve them?

We need to reflect on these issues now so that we are prepared for the autumn. This must include a reflection on how these processes (if any) have worked in the past two years to identify which mistakes should be avoided. (emphasis in the original)

This is followed by another paragraph of odd connection-making:

After two years of the pandemic, sustainable and forward-looking action is necessary and all objectives must be communicated well in advance. The short-term announcement of measures was quite common during the first two years of the pandemic, and it should be avoided in the future. The state of exhaustion mentioned above is further exacerbated by other crises such as the Ukraine war, inflation, etc., which renders short-termism increasingly difficult to sustain.

The ‘experts’ then list a veritable bucket list of items, which ‘must finally be implemented’, although ‘none of them were left out in the past’. These include (emphases in the original):

Competent actors who should possibly speak ‘with one voice’ because the communication of mandates requires internal consistency.

Integrity, as to avoid the impression that we are pursuing self-serving interests or are dependent on someone else other than the public.

Transparency, to communicate to the public in an intelligible way, using clear terms, strategies, and criteria for success; transparency also means to more comprehensively inform about rules and procedures, their costs, etc to in particular reach all social strata.

Goodwill on part of the actors, which means they must more plausibly convey that the actors have the population’s best interests at heart.

Reading these pages, I thought of Ronny Reagan’s (similarly vacuous) sloganeering, but I think it’s important to keep the following in mind: given Covidistan’s track record, the lack of safety and efficacy of the injections the régime forced unto the people, this boils down to: ‘I’m from the government, and I’m here to help’ is—an unveiled threat.

Thus the panel’s recommendations (p. 13-14, my emphases):

Government communication shall be coherent but tailored to specific groups.

As to a renewed injection push, first the refuseniks shall be identified.

It’s furthermore important to ‘bring along’ those who so far supported the mandates, as the authors clearly recognise that even their patience has limits. To ensure this, they shall be reminded that ‘our welfare state is based on the continuous participation on societal rules/norms, which is perfectly normal behaviour in other circumstances (e.g., getting vaccinated against tick-borne disease, vaccination before travel, regular check-ups, etc.) while, at the same time, it must be communicated that Covid-19 remains a common cause of death for the elderly and other vulnerable persons’.

The efficacy and interrelated nature of the infection control protocols shall be communicated in simple, but robust terms, which shall include, if possible, quantitative information that may be understood by lay people. This includes measurement of compliance, e.g., reduction of infection via the introduction of mandates.

Bottom Lines

Yes, legacy media has performed reporting on this draft and its eventual promulgation (e.g., here and here before the above-discussed paper was presented, and here for a summary of its discussion by ORF).

It will probably not surprise you, but media discussions of the above paper don’t reflect it accurately. Yes, the four scenarios are there, but in the most cursory way, the original document isn’t linked, and most quotations are, again, ‘indirect’. So much for open, honest, and transparent communication.

Oh way, that’s precisely the kind of gaslighting we’ve been promised by the paper, so, I suppose: job well done.

I also see the problematic connections with the Ukraine situation and the exacerbating economic problems (esp. inflation). The latter has been mentioned: 1 in 8 Austrians is already struggling to pay for electricity and gas, and given the economic trajectories, this share will increase further in coming months.

Let’s not talk too much about the above implications, eh?

Welcome, to Covidistan 2.0, then, I suppose: ‘better’ communication of the same failed measures, incl. a ‘Zero Covid Strategy’ (sic) are in the works. We’ve been warned some time ago, and this is our second warning.