Brussels' New Shtick: Journos™ are Invited on 'Defence Trips'
All expenses are paid, there's high-level access to the makers™ and shakers™, and no more talk about seemingly outdated notions of 'diplomacy', let alone 'peace'
Well, I’ve been telling you about the pathological insanity of the EU for some time now, and here’s more evidence: Brussels now pays journos™ to visit and prepare the roll-out of proper™ messaging once the long-desired war against Russia turns ‘hot’ before too long.
Translation, emphases, and [snark], as well as the occasional WTF? mine.
A Journey into the Brussels Bubble: How the EU is Preparing for the Big War
The EU is mobilising record sums for armaments against Russia. Diplomacy hardly plays a role any more. A journalists’ trip shows: peace is not an issue.
By Raphael Schmeller, Berliner Zeitung, 8 June 2025 [source; archived]
The European Union is planning the largest military build-up in its history [which, let’s not forget it, began in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty]. Up to 800 billion euros are to be invested in weapons, ammunition, drones, military infrastructure, and other areas of defence by the end of this decade [let’s do some math and context here, shall we? That’s about a year in terms of US spending on the DoD, but the EU will spend this, perhaps, in 5 years]. To ensure that this European turnaround is perceived by the public as necessary and justified, the EU is organising so-called ‘defence trips’ [orig. Verteidigungsreisen] for journalists to Brussels. The author of this text was also invited on such a trip this week [kudos to Mr. Schmeller for the disclaimer; also: who pays the expenses for journos™? That would be the EU, too: in case you’re wondering what the term for conflict of interest is in German: Interessenkonflikt is the word].
‘Putin only understands strength’
For two days, briefings, panel discussions, and background talks were held with high-ranking EU representatives and politicians, including those who regularly appear on German talk shows vehemently in favour of increased armament. The agenda also included a discussion with Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius [Wikipedia profile: he’s a Lithuanian Russophobe; I searched around but was unable for find a program or, really, any reference to these ‘defence trips’ other than Mr. Schmeller’s piece here].
All dialogue [sic] partners in Brussels emphasised that there was no alternative to a massive rearmament in view of the threat posed by Russia [that would be Maggie Thatcher’s revenge, I suppose, for there’s little doubt where the money for weapons is supposedly coming from (see below)]. Whether behind closed doors in the Commission building, over coffee, or over dinner in a Brussels hotel [all paid for by the EU, which wants journos™ to get (stay) on message], the message was conveyed everywhere that the EU and its member states must prepare for a major war with Russia. As if this was inevitable. There was no talk of peace or diplomatic initiatives [this stance should scare the living shit out of everyone, esp. the supposed adults in the room: remember when, in 2012, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize?].
The Estonian MEP and former Chief of the General Staff Riho Terras [Wikipedia profile] is one of the staunchest advocates of the EU’s new defence policy orientation. For him, the Russian threat represents a historical pattern: ‘Estonia is attacked by Russia every 25 years’, he says. ‘42 times in a thousand years [you simply cannot make this up—it’s almost as inane and, of course, historically inaccurate, like when post-WW2 French leaders considered the ancient Gauls (who were Celtic peoples) their ancestors (notwithstanding the fact that the Franks were of Germanic origins)]. So nobody here is surprised that Russia attacked Ukraine.’ His conclusion: ‘Putin only understands strength.’ [I refer you to Guy Mettan’s Creating Russophobia: From the Great Religious Schism to Anti-Putin Hysteria (Clarity Press, 2017) to drive home the essential point here: this stance works both ways].
Terras calls on other member-states to follow Estonia’s example [sure, let’s make ‘ze Germans’ do this, too, right? Right!] The Baltic country already invests 3.5 per cent of its gross domestic product in defence, carries out comprehensive compulsory military service, organises civil defence exercises, and offers survival training. For Terras, this is not scaremongering, but rational precaution:
Every tree will shoot when the Russians come. If Ukraine loses, Europe will experience a major war. And it will be worse than what we’re seeing now [maybe this is true, maybe it isn’t; what will happen, though, is massive destruction as ‘Europe’ is essentially without means to protect its citizens from either a presumed Russian attack or the inevitable US involvement; both Moscow and Washington will be happy™ to have the fighting going on elsewhere and not on their territories].
Hannah Neumann [a female Green™ politico™ from Germany who studied political science and media studies who, just before she became a MEP, ‘was an associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations’, holds Wikipedia; she’s a member of the European (sic) CfR since 2023; don’t miss her ‘introductory/presentation video on her Wikipedia profile in which she self-identifies (sic) as a ‘smart activist’, whatever that means], a member of the European Parliament’s Committee on Security and Defence, also underlines the need for a military build-up:
We Greens are totally in favour of strengthening the European arms industry.
Neumann criticises the fact that many member states are acting alone. ‘We have agreed that we will do this at European level. In practice, however, the states often act alone,’ says the Green politician. Whether in defence production, export decisions, or strategic planning—there is often a lack of genuine cooperation. National solo efforts hindered a functioning European internal defence market [sic(k)].
Neumann calls for Eurobonds for defence. ‘But many member states, including Germany, didn’t want that’, she complains [perhaps because Ms. Neumann doesn’t know it’s illegal even (sic) under EU law™?] However, the pressure to coordinate defence policy more closely at European level is growing steadily, she says [given the Old World’s history, please ask yourself: what could go wrong?]
800 Billion in Defence Spending by 2030
The planned rearmament of Europe is anchored in the ‘Readiness 2030’ plan [actually a ‘white paper’, which I discussed extensively here] launched by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen [it essentially declared armaments ‘sustainable’ so the EU could pour money into it while labelling it ‘green™’]. The programme was originally called ‘ReArm Europe’, but some countries—particularly Spain and Italy—took offence at the martial sound. The new name was chosen deliberately: according to EU experts, Russia could be in a position to attack an EU or NATO country by 2030 [or right now, in 2040, or whatever; I refer you to Dino Buzzati’s The Tartar Steppe (1940) to enquire about this particular mindset].
Von der Leyen’s plan aims to raise a total of 800 billion euros for defence projects. 150 billion of this will be loans secured by the EU budget. The member states only agreed to the credit mechanism known as ‘SAFE’ (Security and Action for Europe) a fortnight ago [background here]. If EU countries access these funds, they have up to 45 years to repay them [lol, as if the EU will survive a war with Russia.
A further 650 billion euros are to be raised by relaxing EU debt rules [you didn’t really think that these amounts would be honestly raised, did you…]. This represents a remarkable break, as the EU’s strict debt rules were previously considered an inviolable principle [lol, this is also literally in contradiction to the EU’s foundational Maastricht Treaty and every other such compact; note the irony™ that the EU Commission’s authority derives from its position as ‘guardian of the treaties’, which the very same Commission is now terminating: trick question—how does that work in terms of logic, coherence, and, of course, real-world stuff?]. During the euro crisis, for example, drastic austerity measures were implemented in several EU countries, particularly in southern Europe, which led to considerable social cuts [so, exceeding the 3% of GDP threshold of new deficits is o.k. if the money is spent on…(read on)].
The mobilisation of private capital for armaments is also part of the readiness strategy [here’s a legacy media ‘fact check’ by Deutsche Welle, if you’d like to spend a moment or two on what players a think about it]. In France, for example, the government is considering diverting funds to the defence industry from the popular ‘Livret A’ savings account, which was previously used primarily for social housing [ah, taking money from the poor and funnel it towards big multinational arms manufacturers is the social policy du jour]. President Emmanuel Macron already made it clear in a televised speech in March: ‘The fatherland needs you.’ [I’m sure the millions of Moslems barely getting by in the country’s banlieux (run-down suburbs) will gladly fight ‘ze Rooskies’: let’s arm and train them, send them off marching eastwards across Germany and Poland…]
Defence spending by EU member-states 2024 (source: NATO) [the red bars/left-hand axis shows spending in billions of euros; the black bars/right-hand axis gives their percentages as share of GDP; the thin blue, dotted line indicates 2% of GDP defence spending target]
The coordination of the gigantic investments and the preparation of the European defence industry for mass production are in the hands of Andrius Kubilius, the EU Commissioner for Defence. He is regarded as a key figure in the reorganisation of Europe’s security policy. According to Kubilius, the ‘Readiness 2030’ plan is based on three pillars: firstly, military support for Ukraine must be intensified. ‘We have to do much more’, he says. Ukraine is ‘our first line of defence’ [here’s a thought: dear EU Commission, why don’t you volunteer, grab a rifle, and march eastwards?]. Secondly, it is important to close existing gaps in defence capabilities—not only with regard to current conflicts, but also future conflicts [i.e., create a bottomless hole into which Europe’s remaining wealth may be thrown into (that is, whatever is left once the permanent depression sets in due to the unavailability of cheap energy and the totally misguided policies emanating from Brussels)].
Thirdly, the European defence industry must be drastically strengthened [that’s what any weapons lobbyist just *loves* to hear]. It is no ordinary industry, but a key strategic resource [sure, which also tells you about the EU leadership’s deranged perception of economics: gov’t and (forced) private investments (war bonds) are funnelled towards protected corporations that serve no purpose other than make bombs and guns]. Europe currently only has 50 per cent of what it needs materially. That is insufficient. The EU must become an industrial defence power [here you can observe the sheer lunacy in all of this: whatever that 50% means, in practice the EU thankfully lacks the primary resources to build these weapons—let’s all be thankful that, unlike Russia! Russia! Russia!, the EU’s wish list cannot be implemented without key material inputs that are currently—and, hopefully, also in the future—lacking].
Kubilius emphasises that these plans are not directed against NATO:
We are not competing with NATO—we are supporting it with our industrial policy [that would be because, in the words of the EU Commission’s ‘cief of staff’ Martin Selmayr, ‘the European Army is NATO’].
Existing hurdles need to be removed because ‘our regulation dates back to peacetime’. It urgently needs to be reformed if Europe wants to be ‘ready’ [this all reeks of the EU’s equivalent of ‘Operation Warp Speed’].
The EU Commission intends to present a legislative [sic] package entitled ‘Defence Omnibus’ in mid-June [for my discussion of the background, see here]. This is a package of measures to reduce bureaucracy in the defence industry [current state of affairs via Hogan Lovells (28 May 2025)]. It is intended to speed up approval procedures and simplify environmental and labour law. Kubilius urges haste: ‘We have no time to lose.’ Putin will not wait until Europe is prepared.
For the Lithuanian, one thing is certain: Europe must not only catch up technologically, but also learn from Ukraine, especially when it comes to the fast, flexible, and effective organisation of armaments. ‘That’s why we are working with Ukraine to integrate this knowledge into our system’, he explains. Ukraine is a model of industrial adaptability under wartime conditions. Europe needs to cooperate more closely with Ukraine, particularly in the field of drones [so, how’s the US audit of Kyiv going?].
Kubilius praised Germany as a positive example: German defence spending could serve as a model for other member states [the Bundeswehr’s active-duty troops number around 182K; German military spending is nearly back to Cold War levels in the late 1980s]. He points out that the EU itself has hardly any financial resources of its own. ‘The money lies with the member states—we don't have any.’ [which is why the EU Commission pushes so hard for their Bills & Bonds, because Brussels desires to go down the well-trodden path of other central banking-warfare states in history].
Nevertheless, the commitment to a common European defence is enshrined in the treaties, Kubilius emphasises:
It's not an option, it’s an obligation. It’s in the treaties. [a few moments ago we learned that ‘650 billion euros are to be raised by relaxing EU debt rules’, said to ‘represent a remarkable break, as the EU’s strict debt rules were previously considered an inviolable principle’ because that’s in the EU Treaties™—now Mr. Kubilius uses the same Treaties™ to make his case: what do we call the selective, if not outright arbitrary, application of ‘inviolable principles’?]
When asked by the Berliner Zeitung what diplomatic steps the EU is taking to achieve peace in Ukraine, the Commissioner replied: I don't see that the Russians want to end the war. Diplomacy begins when both sides have similar goals. That is not the case at the moment. [the good Mr. Commissioner has obviously lost his marbles; for the record, here’s what that spook-infested repository of common knowledge (Wikipedia) says about this (references omitted): ‘Diplomacy is the communication by representatives of state, intergovernmental, or non-governmental institutions intended to influence events in the international system. Diplomacy is the main instrument of foreign policy.’ There you have it—Mr. Kubilius and his ilk are currently re-defining these terms]. Only when Europe does more for Ukraine can something move politically.
Is Friedrich Merz the EU’s New Beacon of Hope? [I’m, for one, unsure if this is satire]
Kubilius is not the only one to emphasise that Germany under Chancellor Friedrich Merz is seen as the beacon of hope for a new Europe in terms of defence policy [haven’t we kinda been at that particular juncture twice already in the past century?]. Numerous other dialogue partners are also pinning their hopes on the CDU politician. French President Macron, on the other hand, who has recently moved into the international spotlight, enjoys much less trust in Brussels. ‘The French talk, but they don’t do anything’, is a common refrain. Or: ‘Macron is a lame duck.’ The fact that France continues to purchase massive amounts of Russian gas despite Macron’s harsh rhetoric against Russia is also criticised [oh, why would France do so? For once, legacy media—here’s a piece by the AP—informs us as to why: ‘Russia’s biggest LNG project is in the Arctic Circle’s Yamal Peninsula, a joint venture with TotalEnergies, which owns 20%. Under a contract signed in 2018, TotalEnergies is committed to buying 4 million tons of gas from there annually. TotalEnergies said by email that it was legally bound to honor its contracts and will do so “as long as Europeans governments deem Russian gas necessary for the European Union’s security of supply”.’ There you have it—no evil Russian gas for the EU means freezing hungrily in the dark: care to guess how long the EUcrats stupid reign would last in that event…?]
During these two days in Brussels, a remarkable intellectual homogeneity was particularly noticeable. Criticism was largely absent. The thinking revolves around itself [this is perhaps the most important take-away: the Brussels blob is characterised by one over-arching quality (sic): group think]. One EU official says: ‘We are not doing enough for Ukraine.’ Another added: ‘We need to produce more than Russia.’ And all together: ‘Russia is finished.’ The reality is, however, that the strategy of winning the war through more and more weapons has not brought about a turnaround in three years. Despite this, they are sticking to it as if there were no alternative [re-read the definition of diplomacy above].
Armament is considered rational in Brussels. Anyone who thinks otherwise is seen here as a Putin-minded or naive. Hardly anyone here is asking existential questions, such as how the war should end, how Europe wants to pursue diplomacy or whether (re)armament really creates peace. An exit strategy for the Ukraine war? Not recognisable. The EU sees itself as a ‘beacon of democracy’—everything else is darkness [well, we’ve seen that kind of thought (sic) before in European history, and, until and unless these mad people are stopped, we’ll likely see it again before too long].
The beneficiaries of this political shift are clear to see. The European defence industry has been recording record orders since February 2022. Rheinmetall recently announced that it increased its turnover by 46 per cent in the first quarter of 2025. The order backlog is over 62 billion euros. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine [meant is Feb. 2022], Rheinmetall shares have risen by almost 1,900 per cent. In Brussels, it is said that this is just the beginning. Demand will continue to rise and production capacities will have to be drastically expanded [sigh; here we go yet again].
The industry welcomes [of course] the fact that the Commission is planning to exempt new defence factories from lengthy approval procedures [what will go wrong…]. However, criticism of the ecological and social consequences remains largely absent [cue Green MEP Neumann’s quip above]. Ukraine is also romanticised to a certain extent. The latest Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian airbases are being romanticised. It is repeatedly emphasised: ‘The Ukrainians are defending our freedom.’ [morons]
What was striking about the Brussels defence trip was not only the rhetorical force with which the case for armament was made. It was equally remarkable that critical voices within the European Parliament, such as those advocating peace policy alternatives or diplomatic initiatives, were not included in the programme [as I said before: group think and echo chambers—welcome to Brussels]. A not inconsiderable proportion of MEPs are also sceptical about armament.
EU Defines Itself Through its Enemies
The impression is growing: in the Brussels bubble, a security policy consensus has solidified that is hardly ever questioned. War is no longer the exception, but the political frame of reference. Armaments are not the problem, but the solution. The debate about peace? Suspended. In recent decades, the EU has liked to see itself as a peace project—it was founded to learn the lessons of two world wars [that’s BS—the EU was cobbled together in the 1980s; those who learned the lessons of both world wars in the 1940s and 1950s did not found the EU]. Today, however, hardly anyone in Brussels talks about it [Bernard Connolly’s insider account, The Rotten Heart of Europe (Faber & Faber, 1996), remains essential to this history].
Instead, we hear about ‘readiness’, ‘deterrence’ and the ‘wars of the future’. Russia, China, Trump—the new Europe defines itself through its enemies. Will this really lead to greater security? That is doubtful. But this question is no longer being asked in Brussels.
Bottom Lines
First things first—meet the EU’s ‘defenders of our freedoms’ in Ukraine:
Second, that nightmarish trip is horrifying beyond anything.
I’m writing this because I personally know the kind of people who are setting these policies™ in Brussels: you see, back in 2008/2009, during my Ph.D. time, I was working for a year in the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While I was part of a program called ‘administrative internship’ (orig. Verwaltungspraktikum), for reason unknown to me, I was assigned to the National and European Security Policy Division (Abt. II.1), and my day-to-day tasks revolved around the preparation of files for the routine meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC).
I was ‘there’ when Russian forces returned fire on Georgian troops in summer 2008, among other things:
According to the EU-financed independent fact-finding report, hostilities were initiated by Georgian armed forces, as can be seen on p. 10: ‘On the night of 7 to 8 August 2008, a sustained Georgian artillery attack struck the town of Tskhinvali…In a counter-movement, Russian armed forces…penetrated deep into Georgia…and stop[ed] short of Georgia’s capital’.
More on that one may be found here:
Third, let’s not mince words here—what the EU is proposing, and rapidly implementing, is nothing new in the experience of Western society.
Hence, I shall conclude with a few words spoken by Dwight Eisenhower (I know, yet for all his faults as a leader, these are actually true) in his 16 April 1953 ‘Chance for Peace’ speech:
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.
This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some fifty miles of concrete pavement. We pay for a single fighter with a half-million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people…
This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense.
Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.
Whatever one thinks of the present moment, it is neither unprecedented nor unique; so are the consequences of this mad rush towards war.
In case you’re wondering just how far the preparations have gone by now, I refer you to the below-linked piece:
Brussels™ is the old, new Heart of Darkness.