Wither EU? Ever Heard of 'Wider Europe'? If not, here’s what it means in the Context of the Russian-Ukrainian/EU/NATO/US Conflict
Wither EU? Ever Heard of 'Wider Europe'? If not, here’s what it means in the Context of the Russian-Ukrainian/EU/NATO/US Conflict
'Wider Europe' is a geopolitical tool to integrate the Balkans, Turkey, and the post-Soviet spaces with an entity chained to the EU, and thereby to NATO and the US
This is a long post, hence please read it online or in the app. If you prefer the German version, please venture over to tkp.at.
As Michael Hudson recently noted, Germany in particular—as well as esp. Austria and Switzerland—are among the clear losers of the Ukraine conflict: the end of ‘capitalism with Central European characteristics’, above all its Mittelstand (it typically translates into ‘middle class’, but it’s not the same thing) is nigh. Overall prospects also look anything but rosy. Even if one somehow muddles through the winter of 2022/23, the Sword of Damocles-like question about next winter’s energy supplies won’t go away.
‘Demand Reduction is Key’
Notwithstanding the widely rumoured RAND strategy paper that emerged in summer, which its alleged originator described as ‘fake’, the contours of the future are slowly but surely becoming apparent (context here.) On the one hand, one can already witness a clear decline of industrial production and prosperity in Central Europe, which primarily affects the beneficiaries of gas imports from Russia: German, Swiss, and Austrian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have benefited disproportionately from cheap energy; it would be foolish, though, to think of this as a mere exchange of (fiat) ‘cash for gas’; to the contrary, in exchange, and via a multitude of contacts across industry and businesses, technology was transferred to the East. This, by no means, should indicate that large and heavy industry and large consumers of Russian energy—especially Germany’s vast chemical industry—in Central Europe did not profit as well. Yet, the assumption ‘the Russians’ were somehow dumb enough to merely sell their gas in exchange for foreign exchange is about as realistic and plausible as the oft-voiced notion of ‘Russia being ‘a gas station masquerading as a country’ (by, e.g., John McCain).
Irrespective of such value judgements (which are, after all, currently being reviewed in real time in front of all our eyes), it is worth pondering the drastic consequences that await European economies: as Michael Hudson correctly points out, per capita energy consumption is an inherently reliable indicator of income and prosperity.
High North News recently came out with a rather blunt indication of what the EU’s alleged strategy (their word, not mine) is for dealing with the energy supply crisis (my emphases):
Demand reduction will be key
The global LNG market is likely to tighten significantly in the months to come. China last week announced that it would halt the sale of LNG to foreign buyers in an effort to reduce the flow of LNG out of the country.
Efforts to overcome the dependency on Russian gas, both pipeline and LNG, in the long-term will require substantial reductions in consumption experts say.
Less Energy Demand = Declining Standard of Living
A significant reduction in energy consumption is tantamount to dwindling prosperity. If you still have questions about how this is to be sold to the electorate, the quoted article also provides an answer (my emphases):
‘The EU has a clear roadmap to reduce its dependence on Russia’, says Raphel Hanoteaux, Senior Policy Advisor on gas politics at Third Generation Environmentalism E3G, an independent climate change think tank.
‘Implementation of the Climate Law would put the EU on track to reduce its gas consumption by around 35% compared to 2019’, Hanoteaux concludes.
Beware of the EU Bearing Gifts
According to the EU Commission’s ‘additional proposals to fight high energy prices and ensure security of supplies’, the main planks of this policy platform are (again, my emphases):
Aggregation of EU demand and joint gas purchasing to negotiate better prices…
Advancing work to create a new LNG pricing benchmark by March 2023; and in the short term proposing a price correction mechanism
Default solidarity rules between Member States in case of supply shortages…
Make no mistake, ladies and gentlemen, because these proposals are a Trojan Horse on all three accounts:
1. No EU member-state had ever agreed to hand over its last vestiges of sovereignty and autonomy of action, energy policy, to Brussels (background here). Now, the EU Commission is moving to end the European national state.
2. If you felt that the EU Commission’s handling of ‘gas markets’—specifically the Netherlands-based TFF Gas Exchange—has been a good deal for you as a consumer, I’ll have a bunch of bridges to sell to you, too. Kidding aside, the TFF Gas Exchange is ripe with fantastic amounts of speculation in, well, ‘futures’ and ‘derivatives’, you know, the kind of stuff that brought about the 2007/08 financial crisis; the EU Commission now proposes to create a ‘price correction mechanism’ on the way to create a LNG exchange akin to TFF: as yourself—what can(not) go wrong?
3. Also, no more opt-out for anyone as the Orwellian-named ‘default solidarity rules’ will hand extraordinary amounts of power to the ‘arbiters’ of the ‘joint gas purchasing’ overseers.
This is a big issue, and I shall return to the planning documents in short order, but for now, I fear, we must move on.
Think Tanks = Trojan Horses
What High North News calls an ‘independent’ think tank is, unsurprisingly, financed by the coterie of ‘usual suspects’. Disguised as a non-governmental organisation, its homepage lists, besides the EU, the governments of Germany, Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands, as well as the foundations of George Soros (Open Society) and the Rockefeller family, among others
What is being pushed—via enormous amounts of gaslighting—is therefore by no means ‘independent’ or even ‘without alternatives’. On the contrary, once again the long arm of Western state and corporate power is evident, which is, as it were, seeking to impose through the back door the environmental, social, and climate change policies that have almost fallen by the wayside in recent years.
This did not go unnoticed by Mr Hudson, who noted that that ‘another byproduct of America’s New Cold War has been to end any international plan to stem global warming’.
Regardless of the merits of an activist climate policy, what remains equally unmentioned in Hudson’s contribution is what declining prosperity means for you and me: the looming slashing of social security programmes, because one thing is clear: any economic crisis is almost always the coded language for, among others, pension reforms and the like. In other words: any such ‘crisis’ takes a pot shot at the social contract tying us all together into ‘societies’ (but perhaps Ms. Thatcher was correct about that…)
Lack of European Solidarity
The extent to which the transmogrification of the EU into something else has already progressed is not only reflected in polls showing a drastic increase in ‘anti-European sentiment’. In autumn 2022, a poll showed 27% were in favour of Austria leaving the EU, which is not yet close to the all-time high (33% in favour of leaving in July 2008), but as can be seen from the British example, EU membership is nothing irrevocable.
Add to this the lack of European solidarity mentioned in the High North News piece, and there is precious little resistance to the EU in its current constellation at the moment. However, if one considers the fact that the EU Commission still does not publish up-to-date figures on the consequences of the anti-Russian sanctions—click here for their ludicrous infographics, all of which cite ‘predictions’ or ‘forecasts’—questions at least arise about what ‘Europe’ will look like next year.
If at Night of Europe I think…
…we are faced with any number of unpleasant questions: the sanctions ‘against Russia’ and the uncompromising support for Kyiv have so far been overwhelmingly described as ‘without alternative’; but what about the credibility of EU and national leaders when their policies are now soon to be subjected to a fact- and reality-check?
One could also cite in passing the failure of the same EU and national leaders in relation to all matters Covid, but any such ‘comparison’ only raises more questions (and concerns) than answers.
Elsewhere I have written extensively about the background of the EU’s impending transformation; the key take-away, though, is not being the fundamentally anti-democratic nature of what is envisioned, and it’s not even the shamelessness of the same EU and national policy elites. Rather, I’d argue that what is at stake are the ‘reasons’ given for the impending radical change.
Now, I suppose you would like to see written proof for these kinds of statements, hence let me introduce you to my spare-time occupation (i.e., spending too much time on EU websites).
Have you Ever Heard about ‘Wider Europe’?
For background, start with the European Council on Foreign Relations dedicated content, which is about as ‘nice’ an institution as its U.S. counterpart:
On 23/24 June 2022, the European Council (heads of governments, the EU’s ‘steering committee’) met in Brussels to discuss, among other things, the plans for the deeper integration of the EU. The minutes of the meeting contain only a few statements, but their scope is decisive (my emphasis):
The European Council held a strategic discussion on the European Union’s relations with its partners in Europe. It discussed the proposal to launch a European political community.
What, who and how?
The aim is to offer a platform for political coordination for European countries across the continent. It could concern all European countries with whom we have close relations.
The objective would be to foster political dialogue and cooperation to address issues of common interest so as to strengthen the security, stability and prosperity of the European continent.
2. Such a framework will not replace existing EU policies and instruments, notably enlargement, and will fully respect the European Union’s decision-making autonomy.
3. Building on this first exchange of views, the European Council will revert to the issue.
The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same
The last time Brussels presented Europeans with such a ‘menu’, the ensuing ‘Constitutional Treaty’ was rejected by voters in France and the Netherlands. Brussels then relied on the ‘back door’ of the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2007/09 (refer to my long essay for background and further particulars).
Little has changed with respect to Brussels’ condescension for the continued existence of the legal and constitutional order of the EU’s member-states, as well as those states in the Western Balkans and the post-Soviet spaces.
The next ‘integration push’ is upon us, which, by the way, is to explicitly include ‘the countries of the Western Balkans, Turkey and the former Soviet republics’, as stated on the European Council on Foreign Relations as well as on the homepage of the aptly-named ‘Atlantic Initiative’.
Ask yourself: given the current quagmire in Ukraine, how would Russia like that?
Looking at the multiple crises we are facing in Europe—both self-inflicted and external in nature—I have a bad feeling about this. We have already seen in the summer how the EU Commission has massively pushed for the joint acquisition of ‘energy’ that have so far remained outside all other EU efforts.
Any mentioning of Brussels’ Covid policies are probably unnecessary at this point.
The next big push to change is just around the corner.
Beware of the EU Bearing Gifts—and remember: the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.
When people like me started calling it EUSSR 20 years ago, it wasn't as a joke. Neither did grandma joke when she called it Festung Europa 30 years ago. A fortress can keep people in as well as out.
Because the USSR and the PRC are the models by way of the germans thinking they'll be on the top of the heap and the french thinking they can 'guide' the germans, while the italians, spanish and greek just thinks "what can we grab" and the naive northerners actually believe the KoolAid being peddled from Brussels-Strasbourg.
You see, one of the conditions for being allowed at the table here is that a party drops its resistance to the EU - which all partys of the riksdag/parliament has done. Despite anti-EU sentiment sometimes being measured at 50% of adults.
But that's moot for us anyway, since "we" in 2010 made it constitutional law that EU-decisions supercedes swedish law in all matters, even before the EU has made a definitie decision: the existence of a suggestion is enough for the governement and the riksdag to push legislation through.
Just like in the Soviet Union or China.
The important thing to remember is that the EU does not have its own military, which means that it cannot actually force member states to remain member states. The EU is essentially a gigantic bureaucracy, and its raison d'être is to increase prosperity for its member states. As it becomes more and more clear that it's no longer doing anything of the sort (I'm sure some will tell me it never did, but that's quibbling at this point), expect more and more member states to head for the exist, if not de jure, then at least de facto. The EU cannot do much of anything about it. The real threat comes from the United States and its military machine, which might just be able to enforce obedience. We already know they're willing to blow up European infrastructure. (Although it's actually not clear that the US blew up the Nord Stream: it may have been the UK. But the UK can, without too much inaccuracy, be thought of as the 51st American State, so it mostly boils down to the same thing.)
I cannot for the life of me understand why Western Balkan countries are still trying to join the EU. 20 years ago, it would have made sense. 10 years ago, it would have been an understandable mistake. But now?? It's like trying to parachute yourself onto the Titanic, when the iceberg is 100 meters away, and there's no stopping the collision. The only explanation I can come up with is that there's a lot of inertia in the Western Balkans, too.