The Dirty Business of Manufacturing Media Reporting

A TU Dortmund study reveals massively outsized party leanings/affiliation of German journalists, thereby showing the far-leftist bias in ways hitherto obscured

Introspection is a wonderful gift, that is, irrespective if an innate a character trait or an acquired quality.

If we’re talking media criticism, we’d need to confront one thing clearly: the opinions and stances of ‘journos™’ influence their reporting, perhaps not in every individual news story they do, but in the aggregate their stance (Haltung) massively distorts portrayal of people and events.

Today’s posting comes in two parts: first, a legacy media piece about media bias (sic), followed by a discussion of what these ‘experts™’ left out.

There is this old saying that ‘media has a liberal bias’, but in the following, I’d argue that this is, in fact, old news. Researchers out of Germany have polled 750 journalists and learned that four out of ten ‘lean towards the Greens’, with ‘conservative™’ voices being virtually excluded from the spectrum.

Is it any wonder that media reporting and reality are increasingly at-odds?

As always, non-German content comes to you in my translation, with emphases [and snark] added.

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Expert: ‘Trust in the State and Media is in Free Fall’

Germans feel unfree and distrust the state and the media. Media impact researcher Roland Schatz explains the reasons for this.

By Carsten Korfmacher, Schwäbische Allgemeine, 30 Oct. 2024 [source]

[Carsten Korfmacher, hence CK] You and your research institute Media Tenor publish the Freedom Index every year in collaboration with the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research. How long has this index been around and what exactly do you measure?

[Roland Schatz, hence RS] The index has been around since 2011, but Media Tenor has been active since the 1990s. In fact, some of the questions we have included in the index are even older: Allensbach has been collecting data on freedom of opinion since 1953. Essentially, we want to provide answers to two questions: how free do citizens feel? And to what extent is their subjective perception of freedom positively or negatively influenced by mainstream media?

[CK] Could you briefly outline the most important results?

[RS] Only 35% of Germans said that they trust the state. In Switzerland, the figure is almost twice as high. 41% of Germans are now very cautious when it comes to expressing their opinions. In general, 52% of Germans say that they feel free. For a free country with a functioning democracy and freedoms secured on paper, the results should be clearly above 70% [if they ‘feel’ free, would that also mean that they are?]

[CK] Liberals often complain that Germans are too religious about the state. Your analysis comes to a different conclusion: only a third of German citizens trust the state. Could it be said positively that Germans are more critical than expected? [au contraire, I’d argue that this is a byproduct of near-constant ‘reckoning with the past’ (Vergangenheitsbewältigung]

[RS] When it comes to trust in the state and mainstream media, we are at our wits’ end. Lenin is said to have quipped that there would never be a revolution in Germany because the Germans would buy a platform ticket before they stormed a railway station. There is certainly something to that [oh, well, German-speakers are notoriously orderly, that’s for sure, and I’d argue it’s not the worst quality in a people, eh?]. But the Merkel years have led to a rupture among many citizens. When an entire nation hears for a decade and a half that there is no alternative to all political decisions, then at some point this generates resistance. Whether it’s the bank bailout after the Lehman bankruptcy, the Greek bailout, the refugee crisis, or the coronavirus measure—there were no alternatives? People don’t believe that. The fact that the former chancellor is publishing her book next month with the title Freedom of all things is somewhat cynical [and this is the submission of for this year’s ‘understatement of the year’ award].

[CK] What role does the media play in this process?

[RS] Corona has revealed a lot. People were very unsettled, especially at the beginning of the pandemic. During this time, they were dependent on the media, and in particular the state broadcasters, to provide them with clear and comprehensive information. And what did they get? Not independent reporting, but state broadcasting that did not critically scrutinise political decisions, but simply announced them, as former ‘Heute Journal’ presenter Claus Kleber said [that would be the face of the state broadcaster’s main evening news program].

[CK] That is not correct in this form. There were numerous critical voices, many decisions were discussed very controversially [shed a crocodile tear with me in defence of legacy media reporting, however unfair this may be to the Schwäbische Allgemeine].

[RS] Yes, in the private print media, but not in public broadcasting. There was almost no room for dissenting opinions [ouch]. We analysed how often which virologists had their say in which programmes on public broadcasters. In a comparison between Christian Drosten and the much more lockdown-critical Hendrik Streeck, for example, we found that Drosten appeared in over 95% of the reports, Streeck in only 5% [notoriously, Mr. Drosten now seeks to absolve himself from the consequences of his ‘expert opinions’]. That is just one of many examples. Claus Kleber himself said that public broadcasters took on the role of government spokespeople in the first few months of the pandemic. As a result, many citizens have lost trust in the media. This could be regained through an honest reappraisal [orig. Aufarbeitung]. But this is simply not happening. Incidentally, coronavirus is no exception; there are numerous other areas in which people do not see themselves reflected in ÖRR [this is the acronym for Öffentlich-Rechtlicher Rundfunk, the somewhat clumsy, if very German, name for state broadcaster] reporting.

[CK] What would they be?

[RS] Take gendering [a neologism in the German language, which refers to multiplying words by referring, at first, to both female and male versions of any given noun (as the grammatical rule that the plural form would, naturally, refer to both men and women, with the main ‘problem’ said to be that often the generic plural ‘looks’ like, and is spelled, like the male form), e.g., der Wähler (m.) = voter, die Wählerin (f.) = voter; we’re more ‘advanced’ now with using the functional equivalent of a nominalised present continuous, such as der/die Wählende (m./f.) = voting person; there’s a ton of other stupid things, but I suppose you get the point—this is how, within a few years, very concise words became…very hard to pin down], for example. According to Allensbach, over 70% of all Germans rejected gendering ten years ago, with only 20% accepting it. This rejection runs through all age groups, genders, and party affiliations. There was no population group in Germany that was overwhelmingly in favour of doing this, not even [sic] among young, female Green voters. Nevertheless, the state broadcasters almost force it on their viewers and listeners. This also leads to many people feeling that their opinions are barely represented on public television. The situation is particularly bad in eastern Germany, where only 13% of citizens feel their views heard by the state broadcasters. This is tantamount to an admission of failure for ARD and ZDF. Such dramatic gaps could sooner or later spell the end of representative democracy. If the citizens no longer feel reflected, then they will vote for those extremes that purport to represent them [and here, dear readers, we have a admission that, for over 30 years, ‘East Germans’ have been treated differently by their West German peers: remember A House Divided…?].

[CK] Why is it that such an imbalance has arisen between content orientation and viewer needs? It is also noticeable with other topics, whether it is the economy, the welfare state, climate protection, or migration.

[RS] In my opinion, this is due to personnel policy [and this is why Mr. Schatz won’t, in all likelihood, be permitted to explain himself: you cannot mention such things in media or polite conversation, because it is akin to pointing out that there’s a certain, subaltern class conceit (Standesdünkel) that unites ‘journos’; in case you’re wondering, yes, the same reservations apply to state officialdom]. ARD and ZDF do not pay much attention to diversity in the spectrum of opinions. And the people who work there see themselves as being blessed with a special educational mandate [orig. Bildungsauftrag, i.e., an obligation to do just that—represent a wide diversity of viewpoints]. Of course, this is particularly noticeable when it comes to controversial social issues, but you can also see it when it comes to the economy. Very few people there have a degree in business studies. That’s why 70-80% of economic reporting consists of red-green industrial policy; there is hardly any regulatory policy. You also hear far too little about small and medium-sized enterprises [the actual backbone of the economy], small businesses, or the thousands of hidden champions that we have in Germany. That’s why the reporting distorts reality. And at the same time far too negative [while I do agree with what Mr. Schatz says about what ails legacy media, he left out a very big part of the problem: media personnel is also virtually exclusively representing certain political stances (Haltung) as opposed to other views: if there’s, e.g., no ‘conservative’ among the ‘journos™’, then no such reporting will be done—and that’s exactly why I think this piece, as helpful as it is, is little more than a limited hangout as it omits the main issue; I’ve got more to say about this below].

[CK] You have analysed how AfD reporting affects the AfD’s poll ratings. You came to an astonishing conclusion: the more the AfD talks about factual politics, the lower its ratings. How do you explain this?

[RS] This is not a new realisation. The same phenomenon already existed back then with the PDS [Communist former East Germany’s Uniparty]. The party was on everyone’s lips, but there was hardly any coverage of what it actually wanted. This made it very successful for a certain period of time. Incidentally, it doesn’t matter whether the reports are positive or negative. The AfD is mostly reported on negatively, yet it is rushing from electoral success to electoral success. In the first few months of this year, before the European elections, ARD and ZDF primarily reported on AfD politics: Does the party represent Russian interests, what is its stance on China, what about social policy, and so on. The party’s poll ratings went down. After the European elections, the reporting changed and the focus returned to the usual topics, such as an AfD ban or the question of how an extremist party can be so successful. And then the ratings went up again. It’s amazing: in view of the concerns that many people have about our democracy, I really wonder why this aspect has hardly been discussed so far [perhaps because if all other major parliamentary parties are interchangeable, then the ‘odd one out’ becomes ‘the underdog’ (which people seem to prefer, think David vs. Goliath) and, even more simply, a, if not any, alternative].

[CK] However, it seems that parties only benefit from negative headlines. They have looked at other areas where there is a glaring imbalance, for example in reporting on Islam. Well over 90% of media coverage is negative. What are the consequences of this?

[RS] The simple consequence is that many people see every Moslem as a potential terrorist. Which is, of course, complete nonsense. In every population group there are 5% particularly good, 5% particularly bad and 90% normal people [which of these groups do people notice most when, e.g., thousands call for a ‘caliphate’ to be established in Germany?]. It’s the same with politicians, journalists and, of course, Moslems. But if 90% of reporting revolves around the bad 5%, then it’s clear that prejudices are growing among the population. That’s why we need much more diverse reporting on the topic of migration [boilerplate BS, that’s what I call for; I don’t think many Europeans actually want ‘more diverse reporting’ on mass migration and its consequences; poll after poll after poll shows Europeans—and Americans, too—seem to prefer less migration].

[CK] Did this only start with the refugee crisis in 2015 or was it already the case before then?

[RS] This began with the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001 and has been going on for a quarter of a century. And there is something else that is frightening: Moslems themselves hardly get a say at all; they account for just 0.3% of reporting. So journalists report on Moslems without talking to them [that would, logically, imply, that media should also include more anti-immigrant voices, too? Or more pro-AfD reports? Alas, that’s the second bridge too far here]. This is contrary to our editorial ethos and hardly any other topic. We have organised courses at the United Nations in New York to unlearn intolerance. That would also be a good idea in Germany now [I disagree; the UN is perhaps the worst example to uphold here].

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About Roland Schatz

Roland Schatz is a fifth-generation journalist. In 1993, together with scientists, journalists, and politicians, he founded the non-profit media impact research institute Media Tenor and has headed it ever since. Every year, the institute publishes the Freedom Index, a study that measures the interaction between media coverage and citizens’ subjective perception of freedom.

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Bottom Lines

Not too uninteresting, eh? Still, I maintain this is largely BS, and I shall provide two reasons for it.

First, what neither ‘the Expert™’ nor ‘the journo™’ enquire about is—the dreadful consequence of personnel policies in legacy media. Personally, I was positively surprised by Mr. Schatz mentioning this hot potato at-all, but he treated it on such a superficial, if not outright disingenuous, level, it boggles the mind.

Here is my Exhibit A, a brand-new ‘study’ by the Technical University Dortmund that surveys just that: the self-identification of journos vs. their political ‘leanings’ (sic). Entitled ‘Journalism & Democracy’, the pertinent section investigates ‘Journalists’, specifically the following question(s):

Confronted with the challenges of the media industry on a daily basis, journalists position themselves with their self-image and their (self-)criticism. A view from within.

Sadly for non German-readers, these results are unavailable in English (as far as I can see it). Basically, researchers asked 750 journalists between 10 April-25 June 2023 (median age: 50) the following questions:

Who are they actually? What training and professional experience do they have, which media do they work for, and which parties are they close to? What is their professional self-image and what do they think is important to their audience? How do they see the status quo of journalism and its future?

And the results are, well, see for yourself:

• Asked if they consider their reporting trustworthy (orig. glaubwürdig), 78% answered in the affirmative.

• Of course, between 96-98% of journos is convinced to clearly, and transparently so, separate between facts vs. opinions, inform the audience in a neutral way, criticise problems, and deliver information so citizens may be able to have all available facts to make informed decisions.

• A mere 1% was of the opinion to ‘support the gov’t’ or ‘paint a rosy picture of political leaders’.

The real kicker, though, was hidden below these shiny graphs.

Presumed party affiliation: which party do you think journalists are most likely to support in the Bundestag?

45% of polled journalists declared that they presume their fellow journalists lean towards the Greens

If that part of the survey wouldn’t be catastrophic in and of itself—just note that Germany’s mainstream conservative-in-name-only tandem of CDU/CSU garners a mere 16% among those polled: the CDU/CSU is currently leading national polls by a quite big margin (c. 30% vs. less than 20% for the runner-up SPD, with the Greens hovering around 12%, and the FDP at below 2%). Note also that the extremely negative coverage of the AfD may be explained by the absence of sympathetic voices among legacy media practitioners.

Yet, it gets worse—because the above segment is about presumed leanings. Thankfully, the study also shows the actual political identification of journos:

Actual party preference

38% of polled journalists declared that they lean towards the Greens

While the current Traffic Light (SPD-Greens-FDP) gov’t polls at 0% approval among the citizens, look at their domination among journos: 38% Greens + 17% SPD (which is about their share in national polls) + 4% FDP = 59% of polled journos lean towards the gov’t.

By contrast, the CDU/CSU tandem garners 9% and AfD a mere 1%.

Talk about the media’s ‘liberal bias’ is certainly no longer accurate; it’s a far-left, green-washed dark-red morass.

So, I welcome the notion of ‘the expert™’ bringing up personnel policies in legacy media, but Mr. Schatz’s statement barely scratches the surface.

Second, we now need to discuss the implications of these findings.

If you’d add to this the 9/11 and the proverbial ‘bigger picture’, there’s no escaping of the simple truth:

If 38-45% of journos are leaning or actually sympathetic to the Greens in Germany, and if these media conglomerates represent powerful globalist interests, what’s the name for ‘journos’?

Paul Craig Roberts infamously calls them ‘presstitutes’, and it’s hard to disagree with him on this moniker. In German, there are the terms Lügenpresse (literally the lying press) and Lückenpresse (reporting riddled with holes), and I suppose they are all indicative of the one key problem:

Basically, in purely economic terms, there’s a massive cartel of state and non-state media that pushes certain narratives, be they pro-NATO, pro-New World Order, pro-Covid, or whatever. It’s all the same tune, as the pipers are the same few corporate interests.

It’s also how the Western totalitarianism works: by lying, either by commission (Lügenpresse) or omission (Lückenpresse), the one thing that always stays the same is—reporting™ that pushes this or that over the audience’s interests.

In democratic republics, this is supremely problematic as the audience is also the theoretically sovereign citizen. How informed decisions about important issues could be arrived at while drowning in a sea of party-politically tainted ‘journalism’, well, that’s anyone’s guess.

In the final analysis, I do consider those in the former Soviet bloc of having a distinct advantage over their Western peers: having had the experiences of such a brutally ghoulish régime, many will mouth the gov’t line (lies) and even toe the line in the most perfunctory manner, but they won’t believe a word.

To wrap up this piece, let’s return to 9/11, once again:

There’s an old saying in Tennessee—I know it’s in Texas, probably in Tennessee—that says, fool me once, shame on—shame on you. Fool me—you can’t get fooled again.