More Bad News from the Upside Down: more Questions pertaining to NATO vs. Russia, Day 2

Neonazis in Kiev, the wider Ukrainian quagmire, and the coming new order: will the next separatist actions be on Ukraine's western borders to satisfy territorial aspirations by NATO members?

After another day of many events and misleading statements amidst the fog of war in Ukraine, it’s time for another set of Q&A.

Q: that’s good, for I’ve got a ton of questions. Do you know what’s going on in Ukraine?

No, not in any way, shape, or form that allows for analysis. There’s so much (dis-) information around that it’s hard to separate the wheat from the chaff, hence I can’t answer your question directly.

Here’s what is known to be true, as far as this can be reasonably be discerned: the Russian troops are advancing on all fronts, as are the formations of the Donbass republics. It’s hard to see an easy way out for Ukraine, especially as the only heavy fighting appears to be centred around the ultra-nationalist/neo-nazi formations in Eastern Ukraine.

Q: wait a second, but the Russians have stopped at the outskirts of Kiev—won’t that mean there’s going to be heavy fighting and successful resistance on part of the Ukrainian army?

You see, this question is unanswerable like the first one, but I shall try, o.k.? There is some heavy fighting in the area around Mariupol in the far South-East of Ukraine, which is where the ‘volunteers’ of the Azov Regiment are concentrated. These are hard-core ultra-nationalist/neo-nazi groups that were incorporated and had been shelling and firing into the separatist areas since, well, the Maidan revolution.

And lest you call me a conspiracy-monger, I get this kind of information from the OSCE, for example this official thematic report entitled ‘Civilian Casualties in the Conflict-Affected Regions of Eastern Ukraine’. Published on 9 Nov. 2020, the report covers the period from 1 Jan. 2017 through 15 Sept. 2020, holds (p. 4, emphasis mine):

Out of the total 946 civilian casualties confirmed by the Mission, shelling and fire from small arms and light weapons (SALW) accounted for 625 casualties (77 killed and 548 injured). More than 85 per cent of these casualties occurred in Donetsk region. Four hotspots that straddle both government- and non-government-controlled areas of the contact line, three in Donetsk and one in Luhansk region, accounted for nearly 75 percent of civilian casualties due to shelling and SALW-fire.

If you go to p. 9, you can see the following map, which indicates, however imperfectly due to dots of varying sizes on a too-small map, the locations where these casualties were sustained:

It’s not hard to see that most of them are on the separatist side, with small arms and light weapons fire emanating, obviously, from the Ukrainian side of the line of contact.

Q: you always bring up these ultra-nationalist/neo-nazi formations, but do you have any proof of this whatsoever?

Oh, you want proof? Sure, what kind of evidence would you like?

Here’s RT showing pictures (via AFP, no less) of former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko with a few soldiers just before they were deployed to the Donbass. Note two things—the highlighted insignia is from the 3rd SS Panzer Division ‘Totenkopf’ (see here). If you can read German, note the statement by Efraim Suroff of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Jerusalem who told

Russian media outlet Rossiya 1 that, despite a couple of days since this event, there was no official statement by Ukrainian officials, which was unacceptable and repugnant. The symbol [the skull and bones] was worn by individuals responsible for the killing of millions on humans.

The RT piece is from 12 Dec. 2018, and it took Ukrainian officials until 14 Dec. 2018 to issue at least, well, something. According to RT’s ticker, the soldier’s ‘excuse’ was: ‘I thought this was a kind of pirate flag.’

Now, go and have a look at some of the pictures the Azov Regiment’s social media shows (source here):

What a coincidence, eh? So, when the Russian government speaks about ‘de-nazification’ of Ukraine as one of their aims, this is why.

Q: So, one moron, well, there’s plenty of morons in any army, isn’t it?

While the statement is, in general, true, it’s even more true in the Ukraine. Sadly, there’s so much evidence on these ultra-nationalist/neo-nazi elements, it’s really hard not to see this in ‘Western’ legacy media of both state and de facto state garden variety. Here is some earlier evidence from German media outlets that, back in 2014, actually reported quite accurately on the ultra-nationalist/neo-nazi elements among the Maidan putschists and the armed forces.

Independent journalist Thomas Röper, for instance, had been writing about this for many years, for example in this piece from March 2019, he wrote

The Ukrainian General Staff announced new insignia for army units. The 58th Infrantry Brigade (mot.) received a patch with the words ‘simul ad victoriam’ (together to victory), the 30rd Brigade (mech.) insignia with the words ‘Dei Gratia’ (By the Grace of God), and the 72nd Brigade (mech.) a patch with the words ‘Україна або Смерть’ (Ukraine or Death).

Finally, there’s also this snippet from a piece that appeared on NBC in 2014, which cited Norwegian correspondent Øysten Bogen (TV2):

We were doing some filming about the Ukrainian Azov Battalion in the city of Uzuf in Eastern Ukraine when we saw these soldiers [shown in the images above the text in the below screen grab]

Bottom line here: the presence of ultra-nationalist/neo-nazi elements among the leading Maidan putschists is well-established, right from the beginning of the ‘new regime’ in Kiev, and no-one in ‘Western’ governments or legacy media appears to have had any problems with the company they were entertaining.

Q: This is awful, had I only known about this. This is pretty convincing, but—isn’t Ukraine a sovereign country that may permit these groups? I mean, isn’t this something Russia should not be involved with?

Well, theoretically, yes, and your question opens a veritable can of worms. There’s a lot of anti-Russian—and, let’s not forget about the mistreatment of other ethno-linguistic minorities by the post-Maidan government—sentiment among ‘Ukrainians’. First of all, let me point out that Ukraine is one of the ethnically and linguistically most complex countries of Europe (for a good introductory overview, see here), a helpful breakdown of the major ethnic groups’ disposition is below (based on the 2001 census):

All other things being equal, there are two key differences in how Kiev treats its minorities: first, the Russian-speaking segment is the largest single group; and, second, Russia is very much a different kind of weight in international affairs compared to, say, Moldova, Hungary, Poland.

Q: makes sense, in part—but aren’t Hungary and Poland EU and NATO members? Wouldn’t that count for something?

It sure does, but keep in mind that the key issue here would be the following: what does the selective application of allegedly universal principles do to a supra-national structure (like, say, the EU) that is composed, to a large degree, of multi-national member states (and, let’s not forget about them, multi-national accession candidates like, say, Bosnia-Herzegovina)?

Right, it would render some of the more glaring injustices even more absurd. Take, say, the mistreatment of desires for independence of at least a sizable part of the Catalan population as an example. Or Scotland, which might wish to re-join the EU after independence from the UK. Or the linguistic fault-lines in Belgium. You see, we can always talk about Eastern Europe, but that’s not necessary.

Speaking of the EU’s eastern parts, let’s do talk about them: why would the right to self-determination as per the UN Charter apply to Kosovo, but not to Eastern Ukraine (or Crimea, for that matter)?

Q: hey, you don’t get to ask questions in return! Let’s return to me asking you about other things (because I don’t know to answer the above), right?

One more thing about the Chinese position, though, then we shall do so, o.k.? You know, the problem with the selective application of seemingly universal principles cuts both ways—take a look at Taiwan, as an example: China deems this a wayward province, but if a referendum on independence would be held, the outcome may be o.k.-ish in terms of a simple yes/no vote (whatever the question), but we may be fairly certain that whatever the result, it won’t be a 99 vs. 1 percent result, irrespective of the outcome. In other words: what do you think will happen if such a hypothetical referendum would result in a 52 : 48 result (irrespective who ‘wins’)?

Q: you said I get to do the asking. Let’s return to the Neo-Nazis in Ukraine issue and what the Russians will do about them, o.k.? Isn’t President Zelensky of Jewish faith (or nationality)? How does this play together?

Ukrainian ethno-nationalism, infused in part by neo-nazi sentiment, is heavily, if not rabidly, anti-Russian, and there’s a lot of 20th-century history that informs this. From the atrocities committed by the Soviets in the 1920s and 1930s—look for ‘Holodomor’ on the internet—anti-Russian sentiment runs deep to the more recent statements by Mr. Putin that Russians and Ukrainians (and Belarusians, for that matter) would be ‘one people’.

It might just explain as to why, in the Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine, it would appear that armed resistance to the Russian attack is faltering, very much opposed to what we see in the more western regions. In the latter case, there’s more anti-Russian sentiment, i.e., there may be a more widespread sentiment of ‘we are defending out homeland (again)’.

Still, the key issue about Ukrainian ultra-nationalism and neo-nazi sentiment appears to be that it’s more anti-Russian than anti-Semitic. Hence the seeming contradiction between a Jewish-Ukrainian president working in cahoots with ultranationalists and neo-nazis.

Q: hmmm, interesting. Next up: is there anything that surprised you about the past 2-3 days?

Sure, a couple of things come to mind: first, I was very much surprised by the scale of the Russian attack. You know, I thought that a more Georgia-in-2008 intervention with very limited ground movement into mainly the two eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk was on the table. What we’re seeing, though, is a strategic operation of a scale that the world hasn’t seen for many decades, esp. if one considers the combined capabilities of the Russian forces (mechanised units, air assaults, deep tactical penetration of territory, etc.). This is a kind of combat operations that’s significantly different from anything we’ve seen at least since the 1980s, if not since WW2.

Q: just a follow-up on this one: what about the US-led attacks on Iraq in 1991 and 2003?

Fair point, but keep in mind that the US-led coalitions needed months to build up their forces before they attacked along entirely predictable avenues. Sure, Russia is Ukraine’s next-door neighbour, which renders logistics easier, relatively speaking, but keep in mind that the US attacked a basically defenseless state in both contexts (but even more so in 2003), whereas the situation in Ukraine today is a much closer thing, if not on military grounds.

Q: o.k., fair enough, back to the surprises question.

Second point, contingency plans for precisely this kind of strategic operation were certainly carried out. I mean, Russia had eight years (since the Maidan putsch) to think about these possibilities, so, this is basically what General Staff officers do, hence I’m convinced Mr. Putin was offered a number of options earlier this week, all within the range of the possible.

Q: what about ‘Western’ actions, anything surprising there?

No, not really. If you followed NATO’s devolution since the early 1990s, we’ve seen an over-emphasis on agile intervention forces, but the NATO we see today isn’t the one from the 1980s with its heavy tank units, mechanised infrantry in the tens of thousands in Central Europe. NATO today is very much small, light infantry units that rely on air superiority. Neither can be assumed when faced with Russia, hence, all the huffing and puffing was very much anticipated—and Mr. Putin and his advisors essentially called NATO’s bluff correctly.

As a follow-up, if I may, there is nothing NATO can do against Russia, short of a nuclear first strike.

Q: so, what’s going to happen next?

That’s so speculative it’s really hard to say, but I shall try.

In the short-term, we’ll see the end of the Russian attacks coming soon, perhaps as early as this weekend. I suspect that once Kiev will be in the hands of the Russian troops—which I think is a question of when, not if—many Ukrainian army units may cease to fight, provided there will be what used to be called ‘honourable’ terms on the table. There will be more agit-prop and empty talk forthcoming from ‘the West’, but that’s basically it.

The question then turns to the shape (territorial extent) of Ukraine after the guns fall silent. Since the Russian operation is strategic, I suspect that many territorial changes are coming, but the shape of them is not clear.

There are two small republics (Donetsk and Luhansk), which will perhaps remain independent, if not sovereign, in the medium term.

Given the scale of Russian operations, Mr. Putin might be tempted to carve out a third such client state—let’s call it Novorossiya (New Russia)—that may cover many, if not all, territories east of the Dnieper river to create a land bridge to Crimea. Perhaps such a new client state will also include the remainder of the Ukrainian coastline, thus reducing Ukraine to a land-locked state.

Q: but such a state would be much weaker, if more ethno-linguistically ‘compact’, right?

Sure, that may be so, it may also be ‘allowed’ (by Russia) to join the EU or NATO, even though such an impoverished and bombed-out ‘country’ would not be much of an ‘asset’ to the swamp planners in DC and Brussels. It might be a boon for a ‘reconstruction’-themed waste of public money for well-connected Western companies, though.

There’s at least two caveats that must be mentioned, though: first, what about Mr. Putin’s demands of Ukrainian neutrality? If such a smaller state would continue to exist, and Russia’s security concerns be ‘accommodate’ by tacit ‘Western’ de facto recognition of the post-conflict status, why would Russia care? I think that it’s too early to tell, esp. now with Finland and Sweden—and perhaps even Austria—considering NATO membership. I suppose that Russia is very much opposed to further NATO enlargement on its borders (here’s looking at you, Finland), which makes for horrific thought experiments.

In terms of things that may go wrong, Finland’s discussion about ending its non-aligned status (however this existed mainly on paper) might induce another set of Russian strikes just ‘before’ Finnish accession to NATO may be promulgated (i.e., before Art. 5 enters into force), but this is such a high-risk endeavour that I consider it very unlikely right now. Note that this doesn’t mean it isn’t a possibility.

Q: o.k., lots to think (worry) about. You mentioned two thoughts, what’s the other one?

Sure, here goes: Russia will ‘reorganise’ the territory east of the Dnieper river, that is a given. The one thing that further complicates the matter of post-conflict relations is this: all of Ukraine’s western neighbours have ‘historical’ claims to certain areas of Ukraine, first and foremost Poland, but there’s also Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia to be considered.

In other words: the question before us is: will ‘separatism’ flourish more along Ukraine’s eastern or western borders?

Imagine for a moment, if you will, Polish, Hungarian, Romanian, and/or Slovakian claims to this or that area of western Ukraine. Granted, some of these aspirations are more likely than others (here’s specifically looking at you, Warsaw), but this translates into one local/regional and one general problem:

Locally or regionally, while no-one in DC, Brussels, or Moscow might care very much about a couple of square kilometers changing hands here or there, this is certain to make the already-rabid ultra-nationalists and neo-nazis in Ukraine reconsider there future relationship with ‘the West’.

In a more general sense—and I’ve alluded to this two days ago—‘Western’ acquiescence of such territorial predations will go a long way to destroy the squeaky remnants of the post-1945/89 order. This means the current events have already rendered obsolete the OSCE and the Council of Europe, but the EU and NATO are only one or two steps behind.

In other words: more, not less, change is coming.