Judge Anna K. was Sentenced for Permitting Last Rites during the 2020 Lockdown (Part 2)

An exploration of the meaning of intent shows both the unhuman qualities of 'the state' and its henchmen--and the humanity of Anna K.

As promised in yesterday’s posting, here is part two.

If you haven’t read part one, here you go:

Judge Anna K. was Sentenced for Permitting Last Rites during the 2020 Lockdown

As always, translation and emphases [as well as snarky commentary] mine; note that for readability, I’ve omitted the references and footnotes, which can be found in the linked original.

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When Doubts Are Not Permitted: The Gera Regional Court Ruled vs. Anna K. for Perversion of Justice

By Matthias Guericke, Netzwerk KRISTA, 3 Oct. 2024 [source]

The Question of Intent

Since the external course of events is undisputed, but the defendant had stated from the outset that she was not aware of the statutory ground for exclusion under Section 41 No. 3 ZPO [Zivilprozessordnung, the rules of due process] when the decision was made, the question of intent is decisive as far as the facts of the case (not the legal assessment) are concerned.

Unclear Findings in the Ruling

On the question of intent and motivation on the part of the accused, the judgement reads (p. 21):

The defendant [judge Anna K.] issued this order although she considered it possible that she would be excluded from the present proceedings due to her close family relationship with her father and she was aware of the importance of the requirement of impartiality because she wanted to help achieve what she considered to be a just result and that of her father—disregarding the mandatory procedural rules—and thus set her own standards of justice and law. In addition, she wanted to do her father a favour and distinguish herself vis-à-vis him. [note that the sentencing infers Anna K.’s motivations, which is quite…problematic; there’s a footnote in the original that notes this and supposes—although we don’t know—that the judge referred to another ruling: in dubio pro reo, I suppose…]

These findings on the subjective elements of the offence are incomplete. If the Chamber [orig. Kammer, meant is the judiciary/presiding judge] only writes that the accused ‘considered it possible’ to be excluded from the proceedings [a footnote mentions that this exact wording is repeated a second time, hence it’s not there by accident] but not whether she accepted this, then both intent and negligence could be meant. However, the Chamber certainly means intent, because otherwise criminal liability would not even come into consideration. This error is not a minor matter, as the appeal on points of law examines whether the findings can support the guilty verdict, i.e., the conviction of Anna K. for the perversion of justice. And here the appellate court has to piece together from the context what the Chamber wanted to say but did not say. This finding is confusing because contingent intent is hardly conceivable with regard to the exclusion under section 41 no. 3 ZPO: either the defendant was aware of the relevant provision when the decision was taken, in which case she acted with direct intent, or she was not aware of it, in which case she acted without intent, but the fact that it only seemed possible to her that she could be excluded from judicial office by law, i.e. that she ‘suspected’ section 41 no. 3 ZPO, but did not translate this suspicion into knowledge by looking at the law, is unrealistic. At later points in the judgement, it also becomes clear that the Chamber de facto assumes that the defendant acted with direct intent [although, it would appear, that evidence for this assumption is lacking].

How Intent Can be Proven in Court

Intent is an inner-subjective [orig. innersubjektive] fact. Since it is not possible to look into the minds of other people, the question arises as to how intent can be proven for a defendant who denies or remains silent. There are cases in which a certain conclusion can be drawn about intent from the external events of the offence alone. These are rather rare. If, for example, it is clear that the offender has struck a person standing in front of him in the face with his fist, there can be no reasonable doubt as to the intent to cause bodily harm. However, if—as is often the case—the external circumstances of the offence do not allow a clear conclusion to be drawn as to intent, further evidence is required. Such circumstantial evidence may arise from the history of the offence, from the person of the perpetrator or from his statement on the matter. Whether they are sufficient to dispel any reasonable doubt about intent or whether doubts remain in the end is the decisive question that the court must answer when making its decision.

The Defendant’s Defence

The defendant made a statement at a very early stage. In the disciplinary proceedings, she submitted a detailed statement on 24 April 2020, i.e., ten days after her original decision was issued. This was read out at the main hearing, is reproduced in full in the judgement (pp. 23-27) and will be referred to here with regard to the decisive points so that the reader can—at least to some extent—form their own opinion:

As already mentioned, Anna K. stated that she was not aware of the provisions of Section 41 No. 3 ZPO at the time the decision was taken. Although she had discussed with her father whether she might be biased, she had come to the conclusion that she did not consider her neutrality to be impaired. The main argument in her favour was that it was not about a private concern of her father, but about a concern as a pastor, which she would have examined in the same way with any other pastor. On the afternoon of 14 April 2020, she had also wanted to clarify whether there was possibly a protective letter from the nursing home and had therefore called the Jena District Court and the Altenburg District Court, but had not reached anyone although five calls were placed—the chamber does not doubt that the calls had been made. If she had reached a colleague, the issue of bias might have come up and a reference to Section 41 ZPO would have opened her eyes and ‘saved her from this catastrophe’. Only a telephone enquiry from the director of the Altenburg Local Court on 22 April 2020 as to whether the applicant was her father—which she confirmed with a clear conscience—prompted her to look up the regulations on bias again—‘just to be on the safe side’. Of course, she then came across Section 41 No. 3 ZPO and was ‘completely surprised and horrified’ that she had overlooked it. She also had no really satisfactory explanation as to how this could have happened to her. In addition to the haste and time pressure that prevail in on-call duty, she was ‘obviously over-motivated’, whereby the ‘over-motivation’ was probably also related to the fact that she wanted to do the job particularly well, ‘unconsciously perhaps also because of the father-child relationship’, precisely what the provision of Section 41 ZPO is intended to protect against [perhaps, which is the one aspect curiously missing here, her Christian upbringing and, probably—this is my inference—faith also played a role because she didn’t want that terminally ill care home resident die without last rites]. It probably also played a role that she did not want to ‘shirk’ an on-call duty. She had ‘simply wanted to do everything right’—‘and instead got the most basic things wrong’. If this mistake cost her her future as a judge, it would be the end of a lifelong dream for her [but it would nonetheless have been the right thing to do].

In a further extensive written statement dated 2 June 2020, in which she commented on the written report of the investigator in the disciplinary proceedings, which had since become available, Anna K. added that she had already seen a number of bias applications in procedural files in her previous professional activities [this means it’s reasonable to infer that she knew the bias rules]. However, these had always concerned (alleged) bias on the part of the judge and never a statutory exclusion as in her case. And the question of (general) bias had certainly been raised. In order to prevent any possible suspicion of bias, she had then justified the decision in as much detail as possible (judgement, p. 28-29).

In the main hearing, she confirmed these statements and added that, because she had not been aware of her mistake, she had also seen no reason to conceal anything. She had entered her father’s name as the applicant in the list of cases processed by the on-call service. She had also worked in the judiciary under this name until her marriage. She had sent the list to the presiding judge at Gera Regional Court, who would have known her maiden name. (Judgement, p. 45)

The defendant’s statement was confirmed in some respects by the testimony of the director of the Altenburg District Court, who, according to the defendant’s statement, was supposed to have been the one who had initiated the discovery of her mistake. This witness stated that he had learnt of the defendant’s decision, but had not initially known that the defendant’s father had been involved. He had only learnt about this in conversation with her. He had known that she came from a pastor’s household and that he also knew her birth name. He had then probably asked her that he hoped that the applicant was not her father. However, she had confirmed this. He no longer knew whether she had been surprised. He still knew that she had been convinced that she would have acted in the same way for anyone else. She had given the impression that she had been convinced that she had done the right thing. (Judgement, p. 78-79) [do you now see what I meant before?].

The written statements of the defendant, her statement at the main hearing, the testimony of the director of the Altenburg Local Court, and the personal impression gained of the defendant at the main hearing is all that the court could rely on in answering the question of whether or not the defendant was aware of the statutory disqualification from judicial office pursuant to Section 41 No. 3 ZPO. All other witness statements and documents read out were inconclusive with regard to this question. Nothing emerged from the testimony of the defendant’s father and his wife that could have refuted the defendant’s admission or at least cast doubt on it, and this is not claimed in the judgement.

Conclusions

The question the Chamber had to answer was not whether it believed the accused’s admission, but whether it could disprove it beyond reasonable doubt. It is this distinction that matters, because an allegation that appears implausible is not yet proven to be false [here, Mr. Guericke added the following footnote: ‘In his closing statement, the public prosecutor repeatedly stated that he ‘did not believe’ this or that allegation by the defendant or that he ‘simply did not believe’ that it had happened in this or that way. The lack of belief in the truth of the defendant’s statement was obviously enough for him to request a conviction.’].

Since the examination of witnesses and other evidence did not reveal anything suitable for refutation, the statement should be able to be refuted by itself. However, since it is self-contradictory, this would only be possible if there were case precedent according to which it could be safely ruled out that ever (!) even one (!) judge would not be aware of the statutory ground for exclusion in section 41 no. 3 ZPO. Is there such a principle based on experience?

It does not exist. On the one hand, disqualification from acting as a judge in cases involving a parent may appear to be a matter of course. On the other hand, the cases under section 41 no. 3 ZPO are so rare that a judge can go through an entire professional life without being confronted with such a case even once. On the other hand, every judge regularly has to deal with questions of (possible) bias (Section 42 ZPO). If the defendant had stated that the fact that the application came from her own father would not have triggered any question of possible bias in her mind, this would indeed be so out of touch with life that—without leaving any room for doubt here—it would have to be judged as a false statement. However, the defendant stated that she had considered and examined the facts of the case with regard to the bias provision of Section 42 ZPO; she had only not thought about Section 41 ZPO. [here, we note, pursuant to what Mr. Guericke writes, that if Section 41 ZPO did not exist, a self-reported filing under Section 42 ZPO would have been the legally correct way forward]. According to this reading, Section 42 ZPO would have blocked her view of Section 41 ZPO, so to speak. The fact that this can happen (in exceptional cases) does not seem completely implausible, above all because grounds for exclusion can be understood as special cases of bias. They refer to circumstances in which the suspicion of a lack of neutrality and impartiality is so strong that the law—unlike in the cases of section 42 ZPO—no longer provides for an examination in the specific case, but the judge is absolutely excluded from exercising his office.

If the specific circumstances of the case are taken into account, it becomes even clearer: it cannot be ruled out per se that an ‘over-motivated’ trial judge in a case in which her father is involved, but which is not about his personal advantage, wants to prove her judicial neutrality in the matter without thinking at the decisive moment that she is not allowed to give this evidence for reasons of the law [this seems appropriate here as the Covid Ordinance on which Anna K. in her capacity as an on-call judge granted access to the nursing home was crystal clear in that regard: the priest was to be granted admission in any ways].

This means that the defendant’s defence cannot be refuted beyond doubt, which, according to the principle of ‘in dubio pro reo’, should have resulted in an acquittal [moreover, Anna K. had no personal or other worldly advantage to gain from permitting a priest—who happened to be her father but that is irrelevant here—to administer the last rites to a dying nursing home resident].

An Issue of Probability as Regards an—any—Alternative

The following shall be added at this point:

If a court tends to consider a certain course of events A ‘to be impossible according to life experience’, it must then examine whether it considers the alternative course of events B to be less impossible, with all the implications associated with B. However, if B appears similarly improbable as A or even more improbable, this means that the argument based on the judge’s experience cannot be correct and A cannot be ruled out as a possibility after all.

In the case of Anna K., this means that if she was aware of her statutory disqualification as a judge at the time the decision was taken, she must also have been aware that she was jeopardising her career as a judge. It was foreseeable that the decision would not remain hidden, but would attract attention (not only) in the judiciary. Due to the circumstances mentioned, it was also foreseeable that the fact that the applicant was her father would not remain hidden. And it was foreseeable that the violation of the law would result in disciplinary proceedings, even if she succeeded in convincing her superiors that she had overlooked the statutory exclusion. After all, even if committed negligently, a breach of the statutory exclusion rules is a serious offence (the accusation of negligence was enough for the employer to dismiss her!). And she must also have been aware that she was not in a secure position as a trial judge. All this could only have been overlooked or not taken seriously by someone who, detached from reality, considers himself invulnerable. However, there is not only no evidence that Anna K. was such a judge, her statement clearly speaks against it.

Is it therefore conceivable that Anna K. deliberately jeopardised her professional career as a judge (her dream job!) in order to enable her father to visit a [let’s not forget terminally ill] member of his congregation? [Mr. Guericke notes that it can further be ruled out that Anna K. wanted to make a political, anti-mandate statement ‘because she considers herself not part of that scene’]. Or, to put it more precisely: is this more likely than that she overlooked the legal grounds for exclusion? This question cannot—at least in the author’s opinion—be answered in the affirmative. Unsurprisingly, the Chamber did not even ask it.

The Justification of Intent in the Ruling

The findings on the person of the accused and the offence comprise 48 pages in the written judgement, the assessment of the evidence 41 pages. On 33 pages of the assessment of evidence, the chamber explains in great detail how it arrived at its findings on the external events of the offence, the background to the offence, and the subsequent offence, whereby all of this is either unproblematic because it corresponds to the defendant's statement or is irrelevant to the question of whether the offence was committed. But then it obviously has to happen quickly. In order to justify why it is convinced that the accused was aware of the legal exclusion, the chamber only needs two pages (pp. 83-85), whereby the result is already clear after one page. On these two pages there is no room for a differentiated assessment of the defendant’s statements in the disciplinary proceedings and her defence in the main hearing. The testimony of the Director of the Altenburg Local Court, which confirms the defendant’s defence in essential points, is also not evaluated. Not a single argument that could speak in favour of the credibility of the defendant’s statement is cited and discussed by the chamber. Instead, the arguments are enumerated almost in staccato fashion. They are—unabridged—as follows:

The exclusion of a judge is a fundamental principle, enshrined in all rules of procedure and generally recognised. The defendant had already worked in the judiciary for almost 5 years. According to her statement, she was also fundamentally aware of the problem of statutory disqualification. The fact that she was not aware of this at the time of the offence was not credible. She herself had admitted that she had thought about the question of bias. And finally: ‘The Chamber is convinced that the accused, in view of her other research activities, would have searched for the relevant provisions in such a situation if she had not actually been aware of the statutory exclusion.’

That is the entire reasoning. The Chamber says: either the defendant was aware of the statutory exclusion from the outset anyway or she would have searched for the relevant provisions before issuing the decision and then she would have become aware of the exclusion. Why is the Chamber convinced (beyond doubt!) that the accused would have looked up the law? Answer: Because the defendant also did a lot of research in other respects!

The fact is that the search for certain rules presupposes a question, but that the accused, according to her admission, was of the opinion that she had answered the question of bias, is not seen by the Chamber. There is also no reflection on the circumstances under which it is even possible to say beyond doubt (!) how someone would have acted in a certain situation and whether this would not often and also in this case presuppose knowledge of inner psychological processes in the person concerned, which no person and therefore no judge can claim for themselves. Instead, the chamber elevates a mere presumption to certainty. This is not an act of cognition, but of will: the Chamber is convinced because it wants to be [this means—it wasn’t a judgement borne out by fact, i.e., this is the true perversion of justice here].

The Question of the Consequence of the Offence

Even if the defendant had deliberately violated section 41 no. 3 ZPO, this would not yet establish that the offence of obstruction of justice has been committed.

First of all, even before the question of the consequences of the offence, it would have to be established that the violation of the law in the specific case had the necessary weight to constitute an ‘elementary violation of the law’ [note the long-form, German-language discussion by the same association of critical judges and prosecutors as regards the Weimar family court judge who ruled against mask mandates and was later sacked]. This is not beyond doubt, because according to the case law of the Federal Court of Justice, this cannot be decided solely by assessing the weight of the violated legal norm, but only in an overall assessment of all objective and subjective circumstances. And in this overall assessment, it should be taken into account that Anna K. has, after all, put an end to a blatant injustice that contradicts the fundamental values of human society with her decision. It could therefore very well be argued that—despite the fundamental importance of the provision of Section 41 No. 3 ZPO, which is not to be denied here—there is already no elementary violation of the law.

But even if one were to assess this differently, the question would remain as to whether the factual success of an unlawful advantage or disadvantage on the part of a party has also occurred [more on the Weimar family judge]. In the case of a violation of procedural law—as here—the Federal Court of Justice requires that the violation has at least led to a concrete risk of an incorrect decision, i.e., a decision that violates substantive law. According to the case law of the Federal Court of Justice, if the breach of procedural law lies in an assumption of jurisdiction, such a concrete risk must be assumed if the judge has assumed jurisdiction for irrelevant motives. This is because an assumption of jurisdiction for irrelevant motives suggests that irrelevant motives may also have played a role in the decision itself, so that the (concrete) risk of an incorrect decision can be affirmed [so, charity is an ‘irrelevant motive’?].

It would therefore be a matter of proving that the defendant—assuming she was aware of the statutory exclusion from the proceedings—had an extraneous motivation [and here we get to heart of the matter: Christianity, the defendant’s possible faith, and the role of Anna K.’s ruling in the first place could have been an act of conscience and faith]. The Chamber cites two arguments for this: firstly, the accused had violated the provisions on statutory exclusion in order to ‘help achieve the result that she and her father (sic!) considered just’, and secondly, she had ‘wanted to do her father a favour and distinguish herself vis-à-vis him’.

At this point, it becomes downright curious, because the chamber does not doubt that the ‘just result’ should also be the correct one in terms of substantive law from the defendant’s point of view and considers the decision to be at least justifiable. In doing so, however, the Chamber considers the intention to bring about a just decision, which is exactly opposed to creating the risk of an incorrect decision, to be an extraneous motivation! The Chamber has quite obviously not understood why the Federal Court of Justice requires an extraneous motivation in the so-called presumption of jurisdiction and it has not understood what ‘the matter’ is on which the question of extraneous motivation is decided.

The justification for the further assertion that the accused was also motivated by the desire to do her father a favour and to distinguish herself vis-à-vis him will not be traced in detail. Here, too, the chamber gets into an argumentative maze and is ultimately unable to substantiate the allegation, which remains an insinuation.

[I’ll add the footnote here to show and tell:

An example of the argumentative maze is relegated to the footnote: ‘The one-sidedness with which the defendant conducted and decided the proceedings also speaks in favour of the existence of the aforementioned extraneous motivation. This results from the overall view of the decisions made by the defendant, each of which must nevertheless be assessed as (still) justifiable on its own.’ (Judgement, p. 87)—This needs to be spelt out: The defendant made various partial decisions when issuing the order, each of which was legally justifiable on its own. But in the [the Chamber’s] overall view, the justifiable partial decisions result in one accusation, namely that of one-sidedness, and this one-sidedness speaks in favour of an irrelevant motivation.—With this logic, the chamber can turn any innocent person into a guilty one: actually, the accused did everything right, but ‘in the big picture’ it was wrong after all!]

Conclusion

The conclusion is threefold:

First of all, the judgement shows that the chamber was overburdened with the facts of § 339 StGB. To put it even more clearly: it is shocking that it is possible for judges to decide on such a serious accusation against a (former) colleague at such a legal level.

Secondly, however, this does not explain how the Chamber arrived at the affirmation of intent. The fact that the Chamber suddenly becomes terse and apodictic on one of the decisive questions of the proceedings, which was recognisable as such from the outset, and does not consider the pros and cons, but only states the cons and ultimately elevates a mere speculation to certainty, gives the impression that no doubts should be allowed here. There will be various reasons for this. The still young judge, who had to preside over the hearing due to the bias of the chairwoman of the chamber, was basically way over the head with this task—although this should not be an excuse; it should in itself have resulted in special care, especially with regard to possible doubts. The fact that the superior of the three professional judges of the chamber stated in detail in his interrogation why he affirmed the offence of obstruction of justice in the disciplinary proceedings certainly did not strengthen the courage to doubt.

But perhaps there is also an explanation on a deeper level. As self-evident as the principle of ‘in dubio pro reo’ may appear on the surface, it is an expression of the recognition of the dignity of the accused—regardless of the seriousness of the offence in question—and an expression of a self-restraint on the part of the state that is not at all self-evident [and, arguably, was thrown out the window by the Branch Covidians]. From the perspective of the state, the principle of doubt means that it is better to let 99 guilty people go free than to convict one innocent person. However, if authoritarian thinking spreads in the state and society—and the fact that this is the case and has been diagnosed from very different sides not only since the coronavirus crisis—the plausibility of this philanthropic and liberal principle dwindles. It can then happen that it is no longer the unshakeable maxim of judicial action that no innocent person should be convicted [well, shall we now bring up the RKI Files, the many admissions about adverse events of the modRNA death jabs, and the like?]. The protection of the innocent from conviction is then—without this being reflected upon—only one objective alongside others, in particular the state’s interest in criminal prosecution. However, once the absolute validity of the principle of doubt has been called into question, judges no longer go in search of doubt, especially if they believe they recognise a particularly important state interest in the prosecution of the alleged offence [there goes the rule of law: with a whimper, in a disciplinary hearing turned into a farce]. Then they no longer examine in detail whether the arguments in favour of a conviction stand up to criticism or not, but their thinking becomes diffuse, the arguments become blurred and a mere presumption can suddenly be declared a conviction [best wishes from Franz Kafka’s The Trial, by the way].

The third conclusion is an addendum: the court refused to get involved in the facts of life that were the subject of Anna K.’s decision. Any non-lawyer would think that the story of the 89-year-old nursing home resident, who was approaching death and was not allowed to be visited by her pastor due to an unconstitutional corona regulation, should have an important place in the criminal proceedings against the deciding judge. But no way! The representative of the public prosecutor’s office in Erfurt voluntarily and involuntarily admitted it in his closing statement when he claimed: ‘It’s not about coronavirus or an old woman. It’s about the independence and impartiality of the judge.’

That is the sad truth about the public prosecutor’s office: they are not interested in whether the actions of the accused did good or harm to people, whether the ban on visits ordered by the Free State of Thuringia was proportionate or unconstitutional. The only thing that interests them is that the defendant was not allowed to issue this order. How the judiciary intervenes in people’s lives is irrelevant to the public prosecutor’s office; the only important thing is that the procedural rules are observed.

The same applies to the Chamber. It cannot recognise the good intentions and the positive consequences of the defendant's actions, because this would also raise the question of the humanity of these criminal proceedings, which it cannot address [let’s note that the judiciary heavily criticised the Leipziger Volkszeitung for their reporting—and remember that this entire farce was about the alleged impartiality of a judge]. The fact that the defendant was concerned with achieving a just result, as the Chamber itself concedes, is attributed to her as an ‘extraneous motivation’ [yet we still don’t know what that motivation might be: what a strange coincidence]. The aim of justice is held against her by the Chamber.

The intention and consequences of the defendant’s actions are also not mentioned at any point in the sentencing considerations as mitigating factors. The defendant is credited with the fact that she has no previous convictions, that she is liable as a mother, that she has admitted the external events, that she faces professional consequences with regard to her licence to practise law, and that the offence was committed over four years ago. However, the chamber does not say a word about the fact that the order, which it was not authorised to issue, put an end to inhumane treatment of the nursing home resident, enabled a pastor to provide pastoral care, and gave the Thuringian state government the impetus to correct an unconstitutional regulation in a corona ordinance, all of which would have to be taken into account when sentencing. The Chamber manages to ignore all of this and focus solely on the violation of a procedural provision. It is not a human face that the judiciary has shown in these proceedings.

[I disagree with the conclusion: there were, in fact, at least three human faces: Anna K., her father, and the terminally ill nursing home resident; the unhumans were found exclusively among her adversaries on the bench]

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Bottom Lines

In case you had any lingering doubts, the main issue at-hand isn’t the defendant’s faith, her father’s pastoral obligations, or the sentiments of a dying old woman in a nursing home.

The issue at-hand, I would argue, is that ‘the state’, with its ‘willing executioners’ (yes, I’m using this inference for a reason) at the ready, has proven, once again, that it is a supremely unhuman institution.

As the saying/chant goes, ‘no justice, no peace’—it is a maxim to be applied, first and foremost, by every individual. It is a calling, if you like, to do ‘therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets’ (Matthew 7:12, KJV).

Most of the values of our civilisation—you might call them Judeo-Christian or skip the former part (as the Old Testament was, largely, superseded by coming of Christ)—boil down to try to do the right thing.

Judging from reading Mr. Guericke’s dense account and many of the links to legacy media reporting he provided, I do think that Anna K. tried to do the right thing.

It is also obvious that the people who ruled against her, her father, and, ultimately, the dying elderly person in the care (sic) home—are hiding behind the letter of the law. They also fail to hold themselves to the same standards.

Judge not, that ye be not judged. (Matthew 7:1 [KJV])

Considering the above verse to be one of the foundations of European civilisation—which used to be called ‘Christendom’ for the better part of its history, by the way—it is astounding to see how far our Lebenslüge (life-lie), as per Henrik Ibsen’s play The Wild Duck (1884):

Deprive the average human being of his life-lie, and you rob him of his happiness.

It’s been a while since ‘we’ have considered our existence in a somewhat accurate fashion.

I’m equally reminded of Nietzsche’s notion of ‘gazing into the abyss’ (which gazes back into ‘us’), and I do think that what transpired in the above-related case is precisely this notion by John Stuart Mills:

Let not any one pacify his conscience by the delusion that he can do no harm if he takes no part, and forms no opinion. Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing. He is not a good man who, without a protest, allows wrong to be committed in his name, and with the means which he helps to supply, because he will not trouble himself to use his mind on the subject.

Let us not cast aside our eyes, then, and face the consequences standing upright.