Germany to Recreate a General Staff under Total SPD Control

Reporting by the FAZ indicates that Germany's March of Folly, interrupted for a few decades after 1945, is picking up steam once more

Another day, more signs of concern from Germany. Today, we’ll follow up on this posting from a few days ago:

Germany's Renewed March of Folly

Translation, emphases, and [snark] mine.

---

‘More Effective and Faster’: How Pistorius is Restructuring the Ministry of Defense

The Ministry of Defense is to become more efficient, with greater emphasis on the armed forces and the military's expansion – but also on the leading SPD figures in the ministry. Streamlining is only planned for the "medium term."

By Peter Carstens, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 Aug. 2025 [source; archived]

Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) has begun another restructuring of the ministry, which is intended to further increase efficiency within the civil-military apparatus, which employs more than 3,000 staffer at its Bonn and Berlin locations. According to a statement, the aim is to strengthen leadership capabilities, further accelerate procurement of defence equipment, and organise the military’s expansion ‘more effectively and faster’. With the current change, Pistorius is once again expanding the ministry’s leadership.

A third State Secretary will be appointed to oversee the Legal Affairs Department and the new Abteilung Zentrales (Z [translates roughly into ‘central command’]). Unlike other ministries, the Ministry of Defense has not previously had such a central administrative department, which is responsible for, among other things, personnel and budgetary matters. The associated tasks were assigned to various departments. The current head of the Legal Affairs Department [Abteilung Recht, or R], Jan Stöß, a former state chairman of the Berlin SPD, who was brought into the ministry by Minister Christine Lambrecht (SPD) at the beginning of the previous legislative period, will be entrusted with the task, as will Margaretha Sudhof (SPD).

Stöß quickly gained respect within the ministry; Sudhof was replaced in 2023 by Pistorius’s close confidant Nils Hilmer, who had already served Pistorius as State Secretary in Lower Saxony [he’s a classic party apparatchik who has a) no done military service; b) while studying (whatever), he became a parliamentary staffer for the Netzwerk Berlin, an association of SPD MPs self-identifying as ‘progressives’; c) upon graduation in 2007, Hilmer worked as staffer/advisor for a variety of SPD luminaries; he’s been with Pistorius since 2011]. Hilmer’s role has been significantly upgraded as a result of the restructuring. This is already evident in the organisational chart, where he—instead of the Inspector General—has been moved to the center and directly under Pistorius. Furthermore, Hilmer ranks above the other State Secretaries and the Inspector General. Hilmer will become the ‘Deputy Minister’ in the ministry and thus ‘also bears the authority to command and represent [Pistorius]’, as it is stated [imagine—a political appointee elevated above career officers and second-only to the minister: what could go wrong?].

Inspector General Breuer is Not Left empty-handed

In addition to those already mentioned, another State Secretary is joining, Jens Plötner, former foreign policy advisor to Olaf Scholz (SPD) in the Chancellery [unlike Hilmer, Plötner is a career diplomat, although his former roles—related in this paragraph and this footnote¹—indicate that he’s seen as both a bit of an dilettante and the personification of pre-2022 soft-on-Moscow policies]. The diplomat Plötner was one of the architects of foreign policy and Russia policy under former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD). He is now expected to lead the two important departments, Armaments (Rü [or Rüstung]) and Innovation and Cyber (IC), without any prior experience. Long-time State Secretary for Armaments Benedikt Zimmer is being forced into early retirement. Plötner is expected to make up for his lack of expertise and experience with new dynamism [that’s apparently written w/o any irony].

The aforementioned Inspector General Carsten Breuer [he’s the military’s point-man for the German Covid response 2021/22, by the way] is not left empty-handed in the reorganisation. After Pistorius’s pet project, the ‘Planning Staff’ [Planungsstab], failed to fully prove its worth, Breuer will now be in charge of the ‘Situation and Command Center’, as well as responsibility for the overall conception of military defence [looks like a general staff to me, an institution that (West) Germany didn’t (officially) have since May 1945]. The number of staffers in Breuer’s office will be roughly tripled to more than 100.

In addition, a second Deputy Inspector General will be established, joining the recently appointed Nicole Schilling [Wikipedia (German); if you understand German, here’s an interview with a bunch of insights™, such as her being ‘open’ to enlisting non-German citizens, for ‘as long as they speak German, [holding citizenship] doesn’t make a difference’], the first woman to hold this position. The second ‘Deputy IG’ will also serve as Commander of the Operational Command [orig. Operatives Führungskommando, consisting of up to 1,400 staffers (planned), according to Wikipedia], serving as Breuer’s link to the operational level. This position is currently held by Lieutenant General Alexander Sollfrank [Wikipedia (German)].

The previous Planning and Command Staff, headed by Pistorius’ confidant Major General Christian Freuding, will become a reduced ‘Control Staff’. This staff will coordinate the work of the command offices and, according to the Ministry of Defense, act as a ‘coherence engine’ to avoid duplication of effort. At Pistorius’s request, responsibility for the ‘Special Staff [orig. Sonderstab] Ukraine’ will also remain with this staff.

Number of Departments Reduced From Ten to Eight

Below the highly politicised management level, which will be completed by two Parliamentary State Secretaries from the SPD [that would be a total of 5 state secretaries, in case you lost count], the restructuring will bring about a major change: The number of departments will be reduced from ten to eight. Two of these will be designated as ‘main departments’ [orig. Hauptabteilungen] with a particularly large number of sub-departments. These are a ‘Main Department of the Armed Forces’ and a ‘Main Department of Renewal’ [orig. Aufwuchs, i.e., force growth], where urgent personnel issues will be concentrated. It is still unclear who will lead these departments. The ‘Main Department of the Armed Forces’, with its five sub-departments, will be split between two departments; the minister felt harmonisation was appropriate [aren’t ze Germans lucky to be led by Mr. Pistorius’ feelings?].

In any case, it is clear that the restructuring of the ministry will by no means lead to a streamlining, as advocated by the Court of Auditors, for example. While two of the senior B-grade positions will be eliminated out of approximately 3,100 positions, this will be for 262 civilian and military positions with basic salaries of €10,000 to €14,000. In addition, a state secretary will be added, with a base salary of approximately €16,000. The total number of sub-departments will be reduced by one to 25 [this is your average reform™—obfuscation and deflection; I’m by the way in favour of doing it that way because this top-heavy structure means inefficiency, and that’s not too bad given that the Russophobes are in charge].

A Huge Obstacle to Efficiency

Of the current 176 departments, 169 will remain in the new structure—some with entirely new responsibilities, such as for the planned ‘New Military Service’ [orig. Neuer Wehrdienst]. It should be noted that, despite a significant increase in tasks and workload, Pistorius has eliminated several of the initial 190 departments in the two and a half years since taking office. However, this hasn't changed much in the staffing plan. For the ministry, this is the third round of restructuring within three years [how to render an institution inefficient in three years: institutionalise reforms™ and do one of them every year or so: the universities have been doing that for some 20+ years now, which means that any such reform™ cannot be assessed as there’s no baseline].

Officially, the next step is to streamline the department in the medium term, but internally, the plan is to limit the number of positions to a maximum of 100. Furthermore, Pistorius failed to address a major obstacle to efficiency either during the coalition negotiations or afterward: the division of staff between Berlin, with approximately 1,600 positions, and the formal headquarters in Bonn, with approximately 1,400 positions. This leads to difficult accessibility for employees and constant commuting [which, once more, shows how un-serious these people are].

But the Ministry of Defense remains optimistic [well, I’m optimistic, too, about good weather in the future]. A spokeswoman says the ‘medium-term streamlining will result from further ongoing task critique and the associated focus on core ministerial tasks’ [whatever that means]. For at least one person, the change will result in greater proximity to the troops: General Freuding, as Inspector General of the Army, will assume a role that at least allows for excursions into the actual Bundeswehr.

---

Bottom Lines

Germany didn’t have a general staff since May 1945, and whatever this might mean today, here’s the summary of their leadership structure (as per Wikipedia):

The Minister of Defence is supported by the Chief of Defense (CHOD, Generalinspekteur) and the service chiefs (Inspekteure: Inspector of the Army, Inspector of the Air Force, Inspector of the Navy) and their respective staffs in his or her function as commander-in-chief. The CHOD and the service chiefs form the Military Command Council (Militärischer Führungsrat) with functions similar to those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States. Subordinate to the CHOD is the Armed Forces Operational Command (Einsatzführungskommando).

With US influence clearly visible, there’s a bit more™ to consider (as the German entry ‘splains):

The Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVg), as the supreme federal authority, supports him in this task. Two civil servants and two parliamentary state secretaries are assigned to the minister [now a fifth is to be added]. The minister [1], the state secretaries [4, now 5], and the Inspector General [6] of the Bundeswehr jointly form the leadership of the ministry. The area subordinate to the ministry is divided into military and civilian organisational units, each of which reports to the corresponding directorates of the BMVg.

There’s six people who now officially constitute the leadership of the German Bundeswehr, albeit only (sic) one of them—Gen. Carsten Breuer—is a soldier. Whether or not this is good™ or bad™ isn’t relevant here, I’d argue; what matters more is the question: if this is a collegial body, who’s making the decisions?

It may be reasonably assumed that Gen. Breuer’s voice—as the only ‘true’ (sic) soldier—weighs more than, say, that of the 41 year-old Mr. Hilmer who didn’t even perform military service.

Thus, who was Gen. Breuer’s predecessor? Well, this is where it beocmes very interesting™:

• The soldier who served as the Bundeswehr’s IG before Gen. Breuer was one General Eberhard Zorn (German Wikipedia entry); what were the latter’s positions? Well, would you consider that:

  In September 2020, Zorn called for a fully equipped Bundeswehr;[6] there is still a long way to go to achieve this goal.[7] In the discussion about arming future Bundeswehr drones, Zorn clarified in 2021 that, in his view, the need for an armed drone ‘remains unchanged’. Armed drones are necessary in ongoing foreign missions to improve the infantry’s capabilities for action and deployment.[8]

  What Gen. Zorn meant is spelled out clearly in this gov’t publication entitled ‘Task: Territorial and Alliance Defence’ (orig. Auftrag: Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung), a white paper from 2016, in the version published in June 2020. On p. 19, one reads:

  Deter an opponent on equal terms and, in the worst case—in war—be superior to them [orig. Einen Gegner auf Augenhöhe abschrecken und ihm im worst case—im Krieg—überlegen sein]

  We may deduce that in terms of military policy, nothing had changed from the previous gov’t/IG to the current one.

• Why, then, would Gen. Zorn have to go? Here are two reasons (as per his German Wikipedia entry), and see if you can, however subtly so, spot the hypocrisy engulfing the German leadership:

  Zorn criticized the continuation of the Bundeswehr mission in Mali following the 2021 military coup there. He called the fact that Mali’s new, undemocratically legitimised government refused to hold elections for at least five years an ‘unacceptable situation’.[9]

  
  Preliminary passages of a Focus interview in September 2022 on the war between Russia and Ukraine sparked international criticism, including from Ben Hodges, former supreme commander of US forces in Europe. Zorn had expressed caution about the prospects of success of the Ukrainian counterattack, saying he saw at most ‘counterattacks that could recapture towns or individual sectors of the front, but not push Russia back on a broad front’. He also warned that Russia could unleash another war in Europe and spoke out against further German arms deliveries to Ukraine. Hodges described [in a Spiegel piece] Zorn’s remarks on Twitter as ‘a breathtakingly poor analysis’ of Russian capabilities, which were representative of the thinking of the German elite.[10][11]

So, if the positions of Generals Zorn and Breuer are virtually identical—including the call to arm the Bundeswehr to fight with its presumed opponents as an ‘equal’ (which may incl. nuclear weapons, by the way)—I consider the former’s resignation to be due mainly because he still thought independently. His successor, Gen. Breuer, does not suffer from this kind of defect.

I’ll leave you with a write-up from Gen. Breuer’s Wikipedia entry, which concludes in the following way:

Breuer was named as the new Inspector General of the Bundeswehr on 13 March 2023 and replaced General Eberhard Zorn, who was placed under early retirement. The move came due to reported disagreements on Zorn’s assessment to the War in Ukraine by government officials including the Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius, wherein Zorn commented Ukraine’s inability to launch a counterattack in Russian positions in Ukraine. Zorn’s comments came under from various officials, including former US officials and commanders. Breuer was also eventually promoted to the rank of General.^[8][9][10] On 08 February 2024, General Breuer, alongside Major General Christian Freuding and other key officials, visited Kyiv in Ukraine and met the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine General Valerii Zaluzhnyi and talked about the importance of defence cooperation and exchanges of ideas [sic] between the two countries.^[11] On 18 April 2024, in the aftermath of the NATO meeting in Poland regarding the situation in Ukraine, Breuer called for preparations for the next 5 to 8 years due to potential Russian attacks on NATO countries. The calls were made based on their analysis and stated that an attack ‘is possible’ as Russia continues to build its military muscle amidst its invasion in Ukraine.^[12]

We may consider the moves in the German MoD, then, as totally in line with US/NATO aims to increase militarisation of the bloc; moreover, unlike his predecessor Gen. Zorn, the current IG Gen. Breuer appears to have no qualms about carrying out whatever marching orders he receives.

Speaking of orders, though, we must note that there’s virtually no difference between the Bundeswehr’s overall mission: become, once again, the chief military in Europe able to deal with anyone as ‘equal’.

While my own opinion of Germany’s abilities to do so are less-than-friendly, I also note that it doesn’t take a lot to ruin this situation. I do trust ze German politicos™—who are now firmly in charge of these policies—do screw this up as totally as the CDU-led MoD under none other than Ursula Von der Leyen did.

That doesn’t rule out ‘collateral damages’, of course, and if there’s silver lining, it is the fact that Gen. Breuer’s chest has no space for additional decorations, as the German Wikipedia unironically notes.

While these moves appear to be re-creating, by other means, a kind of German General Staff in all but name, the more frightening aspect of it is, without question, the totally politicised control of the German Bundeswehr while however mildly critical voices are increasingly pushed out.

And thus the March of Folly continues. It won’t likely well.

1. Rough’n’quick translation from Mr. Plötner’s German Wikipedia entry (hence no links or references: see the linked original):

In April 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine's Ambassador Andriy Melnyk accused Germany of continuing to have too many vested interests with regard to Russia, such as its dependence on gas, oil, and coal, and specifically named Plötner and State Secretary in the Foreign Office, Andreas Michaelis. He also blamed the actions of former Foreign Minister and current Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier as head of the Chancellery and later as Foreign Minister.[5][6] FDP politician Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann [she’s the chief lobbyist for the arms industry] also criticised him: ‘Plötner is the epitome of the disastrous German Russia policy of the last 15 years, the ruins of which we are now facing.’[7] Polish MEP Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, considered a confidant of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, described Plötner and Michaelis as ‘Russia experts.’[8]

Plötner’s role in the fall of Kabul is also controversial. The weekly newspaper Die Zeit reported allegations that the then Political Director at the Foreign Office had deliberately thwarted the evacuation of Afghan local personnel and thereby exceeded his authority, for example, in relation to Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. Plötner was summoned to testify by the Bundestag’s Afghanistan Inquiry Committee.[9]