'Germany: Multiculturalism is Arriving Faster Than Anticipated'

Just like that, the Berliner Zeitung is discussing™ mass (replacement) immigration, pointing eventually to France, held to be 'perhaps ten years ahead of the Germans on the road to civil war'.

Now that legacy media is beginning to talk™ and discuss™ the massive, gov’t-cum-UN-incited mass immigration-invasion of the past quarter-century, high time to revisit these three pieces for context:

Replacement Migration in Practice: Official Data show Austria took in 3.34m Immigrants Since 2000

‘In ten years, people will be grateful to Chancellor Merkel’

Migration Crisis 10 Years On: WEF Sock Puppet Admits: 'Open-Border Policy a Mistake'

And now for the main course—translation, emphases, and [snark] mine.

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Demographics in Germany: Multiculturalism is Arriving Faster Than Anticipated

Almost half of all newborns already have a migration background. After the Baby Boomer generation passes away, the native German population will become a minority.

By Thomas Fasbender, Berliner Zeitung, 2 March 2026 [source; archived]

Geography is destiny, as the geopolitical adage goes. Demography, too. The composition and quantitative development of a population determine its economic potential and many social processes, give rise to conflicts, and drive perpetual ethnogenesis. Demographic forecasts are fascinating also because they are among the most reliable of all predictions about the future.

The reason: tomorrow’s mothers are already born today; moreover, there are no sudden changes in either the birth rate or life expectancy. The major trends in population development remain surprisingly [are you baffled™ yet?] stable over decades.

To state this upfront: we will not be discussing the ‘Great Replacement’ or ‘population exchange’ [orig. Umvolkung] here. These terms mask the fear projections of people who are unable to cope with historical change [so much for a relatively even-handed discussion]. They are necessarily and always among the losers; this has been the case ever since the Neolithic Revolution confronted hunter-gatherers with agriculture [well, if that proposition is true, there is a certain inevitability to these developments—and a uselessness of even having such a debate, right? Also, let’s not forget that by noting this, Mr. Fassbender absolves the powers-that-be from any responsibility for this situation, which renders his piece a form of agit-prop for the powers-that-be (and that says a lot about the Berliner Zeitung’s self-declared, and self-righteous, cantankerous stance vs. the establishment™)].

However, one can give these fearful people credit: pressure to adapt has rarely been as high as it is today. It took millennia for agriculture to fully conquer Europe. The advanced civilisations of antiquity, in China and in the Mediterranean, existed for centuries without knowing of each other [which is odd as there is plenty of evidence, from both sides of that particular equation, of Sino-Roman relations from the first century AD onwards (Wikipedia link)].

Migration Impacts Society

Today, things are different [are they?]. Transportation and communication systems span the planet; economic interconnectedness, hardship, and courage trigger migration. Migration can be channeled, but it cannot be prevented—except perhaps on remote islands like Japan [‘In December 2024, there were 3,768,977 foreign residents in Japan, representing 3.04% of the Japanese population.^[93][106]’, via Wikipedia; so much for no country is an island, eh?]. For the major regions around the Mediterranean, the crossroads of the African, Middle Eastern, and European worlds, such a notion is absurd.

Consequently, societies are changing, and not subtly, not in secret, but quite obviously, in plain sight. The urban planning debate, initiated by the Chancellor with his usual clumsiness, does address a legitimate issue. The perception of city centres and train stations has changed, conveying new meanings: who is present? Who presumes to be? Who dominates?

Migration impacts society. It brings experiences of loss, both for the immigrants and for the people in the host country. Familiarity is lost, especially in a society like Germany, which has long been largely ethnically homogeneous. The shift toward heterogeneity causes collective stress.

And this shift is happening rapidly. Ethnic Germans of German descent exist, if at all, only at campaign events for the Green Party and the AfD, or at readings by former Chancellor Angela Merkel. Beyond such safe havens, society is developing rifts. A fermentation process is underway that promises upheaval.

This can be substantiated quantitatively. By mid-century, between 17 and 20 million Germans without a migration background will die; almost the entire Baby Boomer generation will be retiring. At the same time, Germans without a migration background (birth rate 1.3) will only give birth to six to seven million children, and with the birth rate continuing to decline, even fewer. This will reduce the proportion of the population of ethnic Germans of German descent by at least ten million.

Among the population with a migration background, the higher proportion of women of childbearing age means that the number of births will also reach around seven million by 2050. Here, too, a birth rate of 1.3 is assumed—which contradicts reality, as it averages around 1.8 for mothers with a migration background. Adding the effects of the higher birth rate [among immigrants] and continued immigration of up to 400,000 people annually, the number of births among people with a migration background will reach up to nine million by 2050.

Even today, 40 per cent or more of newborns in Germany have a migration background; some sources cite half. Equal birth rates—with and without a migration background—will be achieved no later than 2030 [let that sink in].

Equal Birth Rates around 2060

Equal birth rates with regard to the total population (with and without a migration background) will then follow after 2050, at the latest by 2060—considerably earlier in Berlin and the metropolitan areas of western Germany [bye-bye urban life, welcome dystopia of ULEZ cameras, social credit scores, and the regimentation of inhabitants by force; do you still marvel as to why the war on family farms is pursued with such vigour?]. In rural areas, especially in eastern Germany, the proportion of people without a migration background remains well over 80 per-cent. Society is evolving not only in its composition but also geographically [Hunger Games, anyone?].

Even though there are no truly reliable forecasts for such long periods, if current trends (immigration, birth rate, life expectancy) continue, the native German population will only comprise 25 to 35 per cent of the population by the year 2100, at the turn of the next century [re-read this: that’s less time into the future than the end of WW2 is in the past].

Why are these figures of interest? They signal the high probability of significant societal changes over a historically very short period. The 75 years until the turn of the next century are considerably shorter than average life expectancy. The vast majority of those born today will still be alive at the turn of the year 2100.

Demographic Development is Hardly Discussed

Yet, and this is astonishing, the effects of demographic development are hardly discussed. A debate on the topic takes place only on the political right [and it’s both a necessary debate and a mostly stupid one]. This group has no problem with collective identities, national mentalities, and cultural differences [that debate is stupid because, as Mr. Fassbender admits, all other groups—here’s looking at you, leftoid and centrist people—have problems with collective identities, national mentalities, and cultural differences, if only because they are (way more) globalist than the right™]. With few exceptions, the general tone is negative: against foreign infiltration, against Islamisation, against mixing. The multicultural future is rejected, as if a return to the past were a feasible political project [note that this much-vaunted ‘return to the past’ is a thing that’s even more absurd: that ‘past’ was less than a handful of decades ago around the end of the Cold War].

On the left, there’s an air of optimism bordering on naivety. The idyllic, idealistic crowd produces TikTok videos of people jumping around, conjuring up a diverse and perfect world [lol, that’s not only naivety—that’s outright delusion bordering on the pathological]. For them, the more colourful, the better; all people are equal, all people are good. Anyone with reservations is labeled a Nazi.

Then there are the anti-Germans, who see German identity and the German nation as an inherent evil that must be overcome. The vast majority of those who identify as left-leaning or left-green subscribe to universalist [sic, what is meant is globalist] ideas; there’s a prevailing notion of equality that uses their own progressive ‘we’ as its benchmark. In other words: whoever comes to us and lives among us will automatically become like us. So progressive, so liberal, so enlightened, so tolerant, so secular, so childless, so enamoured with diversity. After one or two generations, all differences will have been smoothed over [perhaps that’s because the leftoids are dying (pun intended) to fulfil the Kalergi Plan?].

Expellees [orig. Heimatvertriebene] Not a Standard to Use

It is often pointed to the 150,000 Polish migrants who came to the Ruhr region in the decades before 1914, stayed there, and assimilated. Surnames like Schimanski or Kowalski bear witness to this; their bearers are an integral part of the native population. However, the difference to the 21st century is obvious. In 1914, what is now North Rhine-Westphalia had around ten million inhabitants; the integration of 150,000 Poles was not an issue.

The reception of 12 million expellees [this is the leftoid, sanitised version of the greatest ethnic cleansing-cum-organised mass murder in history (not my words, there’s actually a really good English book on this by R.M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale UP, 2012)] in both German states after 1945, almost a fifth of the total population, cannot serve as a standard either. Back then, these were Germans who spoke different dialects [and who also lost the 2nd World War together with their fellow Germans].

There is another difference. Germany 80 years ago, and even more so Germany before 1914, was a stable society characterised by clear rules of conduct. Individuals were more or less forced to conform. Very few contemporaries would welcome a return to such conditions. However, this compulsion to conform also contained a form of authority, and that is precisely what is missing [ah, can’t you feel this breath of fresh air from the crypt? Two paragraphs ago, Mr. Fassbender decried the political right’s desire of orderliness, and now he’s embracing it lock, stock, and barrel].

Anyone coming to Germany today seeking a structured, ideologically or religiously grounded reality instead of liberal nonchalance must feel like they are in a vacuum. What motivates such a person to integrate, let alone assimilate? Is it that German Christians have abandoned church attendance? That German women have abandoned childbearing? That the family hardly plays a role anymore?

The mainstream answer is generally: this nonchalance allows individuals to realise their own potential and emancipate themselves. Anyone who doesn’t see such emancipation as a primary purpose in life finds themselves rather perplexed in contemporary Germany.

Of course, generalisations are inappropriate. A good share of immigrants and their descendants readily accept the offer; this is evident in the liberal Moslems who thank the Prophet that Germany is their home. At the same time, the number of fundamentalists is growing. Many perceive the local identity—liberal, pluralistic, and in some respects arbitrary—as weak; it lacks density, intensity, and commitment.

In any case, the transformation is happening rapidly. If, in 30 years, the proportion of immigrants reaches half the population, the age structure will look different again. In the cohort of those under 35, the proportion of immigrants will then be between 55 and 65 per cent. Assuming that roughly half of all immigrants are Moslem, Moslems in this age group—young, determined, and energetic—will then constitute around 30 per cent. 30 years are a historically insignificant amount of time; almost two-thirds of today’s population will still be alive in 2055.

Hatred and Contempt

This description refers to changes that are inevitable [death and taxes are, Mr. Fassbender]. The right-wingers, who are now calling for ‘remigration’, have no idea what is feasible. Their leap will fail before it even begins. And the left, who paint a rosy picture of their own little world, will have a rude awakening when, as in France, the streets are ablaze [re-read this: the libtards and leftoids are doing this knowing that, as the remainder of this piece argues, France is both next door and about a decade ahead of Germany].

Meanwhile, the political and media centrists who, under the banner of ‘climate crisis’, elevate all sorts of long-term changes to scandal, circles around the far more acute ‘demographic crisis’ like a cat around a hot stove. This is no solution. The country has only one generation, a quarter of a century, to find a way to live together. The hatred of Moslems and foreigners pouring forth on social media inspires as little optimism as the growing contempt many migrants (including those of the second and third generations) feel for an aging, stagnant Germany. Looking at France, where they are perhaps ten years ahead of the Germans on the road to civil war, should give us pause.

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Bottom Lines

An ambivalent piece, at best, yet there are a few things to note:

• the first rule of holes applies: stop bringing in more immigrants

• ‘remigration’ won’t, and can’t, happen by force as long as there are incentives (welfare handouts) offered to immigrant-invaders—any sensible gov’t would have to stop handing out free stuff

• the most dishonest part of the above piece is that Mr. Fassbender decries the conflation of all immigrants while singling out concerns of the creeping, if intensifying, Islamification of Europe—not all immigrants are the same, and the main problem here is the mass importation of foreigners from beyond Europe/Western countries, which commenced around 2000; as long as the emotions are focused on Moslems vs. non-Moslems (or Jews, for that matter), that larger issue is overlooked

• the disgusting EUrotards support for the US-Israeli illegal war of aggression vs. Iran shows that those who run™ Western Europe are, in fact, the enemies of the European peoples; the Epstein Files merely revealed a bit more of the EUrotards depravity, and the joke is on the European peoples for not tarring and feathering these assholes

As to the proverbial banquet of consequences, I submit that the clusterfuck in the soon-to-be-former Middle East is revelatory in one core regard:

It drags into the open the capture of all post-WW2 institutions—from the UN (really, the victorious Allies’ WW2 alliance that never ended [see Art. 107 of the UN Charter: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.’) via NATO [Mark Rutte: ‘NATO, in that sense, is also this power protection projection platform for the United States.’], and the insufferable EU sock puppets [no worries, I won’t link to Kaja Kallas or Zensursula Von der Leyen]—and hence they will fade away before too long.

The failure of the UN to bring itself to punish Israel for issuing ‘evacuation orders’ in a neighbouring country speaks for itself. The sucking up to both the US and Israel by both NATO and EU condemn these disgusting politicos™ to future irrelevance.

It might be that catastrophic development-in-the-making in Europe that has the potential to change the above-discussed demographic trends: who wants to live in failed states with less sunshine?