Germany Abrogates the 2+4 Treaty
Growing the Bundeswehr beyond treaty limits is a clear breach, hence we must ponder what other clauses Berlin will discard next
Today, we’ll deepen and widen our enquiry into the planning processes of Germany’s ruling elites by checking in with state broadcaster ARD’s reporting™ on the state of military readiness.
Below, you’ll find my translations of two ‘Tagesschau’ news items from early June and July, respectively, to follow-up on Berlin’s renewed March of Folly:
As always, emphases and [snark] mine, as are the Bottom Lines.
Bundeswehr Requires up to 60,000 Additional Soldiers
NATO defence ministers plan to make final preparations for a major rearmament program in Brussels. Germany wants to support this, but the Bundeswehr continues to struggle with a severe personnel shortage.
Via Tagesschau.de, 5 June 2025 [source; archived]
NATO wants to massively expand its defence capabilities. However, for Germany to be able to meet its share of these goals, the Bundeswehr needs up to 60,000 additional soldiers in the active force, according to German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius. The SPD politician said this before a meeting of NATO defence ministers, at which the new guidelines are to be approved:
We assume—but this is only a rough estimate, to be clear—that we will need around 50,000 to 60,000 more soldiers in the standing armed forces than today. And at the same time, the question will naturally arise: will the new military service be sufficient over the next few years?
Number of Soldiers Recently Shrank Again
In view of the ongoing threat from Russia, NATO wants to launch a major rearmament program. The defence ministers now plan to discuss new and significantly higher defence capability targets for their members one last time before they are adopted at the NATO summit in The Hague at the end of the month. This will apply to all branches of the military and also to the number of soldiers. However, many details are classified.
Secretary General Mark Rutte had previously stated: ‘We need more resources, troops, and capabilities to be prepared for every threat and to fully implement our collective defence plans.’ Top priorities are air and missile defence, long-range weapons systems, logistics, and large formations of land forces. Rutte called the defence alliance’s new goals ‘historic’.
However, the Bundeswehr’s existing personnel shortage is far from over—to the contrary: despite more recruitment, the number of soldiers fell slightly again last year. At the same time, the average age increased. By the end of 2024, there were approximately 181,150 soldiers, the Defence Ministry stated. A year earlier, on 31 December 2023, there were still around 181,500 men and women in uniform. However, the stated goal had recently been 203,000 active soldiers in the armed forces.
Capacity for a New Military Service is Still Lacking
A year ago, Pistorius had already provided figures for the need for soldiers in the standing forces and the reserves. He cited a total of around 460,000 soldiers: specifically, 203,000 men and women in the standing forces, the 60,000 existing reservists, and 200,000 additional reservists who are now needed. Military planners assume that the upper limit of 460,000 will remain, but that significantly more active soldiers and possibly fewer reservists will be planned [and in doing so, Berlin announced its unilateral abrogation of the 2+4 Treaty, specifically Art. 3 (2), which provides for an ‘overall ceiling (of) no more than 345,000’ soldiers].
Pistorius has now announced that Germany will ‘form and fully equip new large units’ [orig. Großvberbände]. The Defence Minister spoke of a ‘show of force’ [orig. Kraftakt] for which Germany had already laid the groundwork with its exemption from the debt brake on defence spending:
The time when we complained about the underfunding of past decades is over.
However, the need raises the question of whether the new military service planned so far will be sufficient over the coming years, Pistorius admitted. Conscription, however, is ‘of no use now because we have the capacity neither in the barracks nor in training’, he argued. ‘That’s why this capacity must grow’, the minister demanded. ‘Until then, it's voluntary.’ [isn’t that re-assuring? Berlin just told everybody, cheered on by its NATO allies (sic), that they will break the 2+4 Treaty (which I’m quite sure at this point no Western leaders have bothered to re-read; Moscow surely did its homework)—and that doing so will be merely a stepping-stone to further increases in military capacity building].
Defence Ministers Reaffirm Five Per Cent Target
Meanwhile, at the start of the meeting in Brussels, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth reiterated his country’s call for NATO countries to increase defence spending to five per cent of their respective gross domestic product (GDP): ‘We expect this to happen by the summit in The Hague’, Hegseth said. ‘That is our main focus.’
A proposal by NATO President Rutte calls for member states to spend 3.5 per cent of their GDP on defence spending and 1.5 per cent on defence-related spending—which, taken together, would correspond to the five per cent demanded by US President Donald Trump.
Other defence ministers also supported this demand in Brussels. Sweden’s representative, Pal Jonson, said his country would like to see NATO reach the five per cent target by 2030. Latvia’s Defense Minister Andris Spruds called the new spending target ‘absolutely crucial’ to achieving NATO goals.
Intermission
At this point, it’s perhaps of fundamental importance to cite the 2+4 Treaty’s Art 3 (2) at length to showcase the massively problematic issue at-hand:
Now, as the military build-up of ‘other participants’ since then rendered the rather unilateral reduction of Germany moot to a certain point, I’m not going to shit-talk Berlin for safeguarding what it perceives its own security needs.
Reduction of forces only works if all are in this together (i.e., ‘collective security’), for otherwise at some point, one will be weaker than the other and at the latter’s mercy.
We may, however, point to two aspects here that I think are crucial:
German c. 2025 isn’t the same country as it was in the early 1990s: mass immigration and the cession of considerable amounts of sovereignty to Brussels (the EU) has changed the dynamics of Germany—and the other EU member-states—drastically.
At the same time, there’s a ton of other relevant and highly contentious clauses in the 2+4 Treaty and several associated compacts that render this move by Berlin potentially far-reaching in terms of its implications (the below summary is from Wikipedia but serves the point here)
the two German states agreed to reconfirm the existing border with Poland in the German–Polish Border Treaty, accepting that German territory post-reunification would consist only of what was presently administered by West and East Germany—renouncing explicitly any possible claims to the former eastern territories of Germany including East Prussia, most of Silesia, as well as the eastern parts of Brandenburg and Pomerania.
And then there are these other (sic) parts of the 2+4 Treaty:
Germany also reaffirmed its renunciation of the manufacture, possession of, and control over nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and in particular, that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would continue to apply in full to the unified Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany). No foreign armed forces, nuclear weapons, or the carriers for nuclear weapons would be stationed or deployed in six states (the area of Berlin and the former East Germany), making them a permanent Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The German Army could deploy conventional weapons systems with nonconventional capabilities, provided that they were equipped and designed for a purely conventional role. Germany also agreed to use military force only in accordance with the United Nations Charter.[4]
If one of these provisions as crucial as the size of Germany’s armed forces is breached, it is reasonable to deduce the other parts of the Treaty may be violated, too.
The most hilarious aspect here, I think, is the last sentence of the cited paragraph: Germany already broke this in NATO’s war of aggression vs. Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999 (which lacked a UN mandate), as well as during subsequent breaches of int’l law in Libya, among others. It’s hard to see how the Bundeswehr, now rearming to confront Russia! Russia! Russia! will ever obtain UN approval for yet another round of war against Moscow.
With the stage thus set, we may now proceed to the next ‘Tagesschau’ piece.
Pistorius Defines Criteria for Conscription
Defense Minister Pistorius has specified his plans for a new military service. According to reports, the draft bill also includes criteria for mandatory conscription.
Via Tagesschau.de, 7 July 2025 [source; archived]
Federal Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has specified his plans for voluntary military service and a transition to conscription. According to Der Spiegel, which quotes from a draft bill, service should become mandatory if it absolutely requires a ‘short-term expansion of the armed forces that cannot be achieved on a voluntary basis’. Accordingly, the Cabinet and the Bundestag should decide on compulsory conscription, for example, if the threat situation escalates.
According to the Der Spiegel report, this would mean that compulsory conscription would no longer depend on a state of tension or conflict being declared. However, according to parliamentary sources, Pistorius argued in an SPD parliamentary group meeting that voluntary service would be so attractive that no obligation would be necessary in the coming years. Nevertheless, they wanted to prepare for it.
Service to Start with Those Born in 2008
Military service will initially continue to be voluntary, according to Der Spiegel report. However, more and more people will be drafted beyond voluntary service so that capable men can be recruited in an emergency.
According to Pistorius’s plans, a questionnaire will initially be sent to all young men and women. Men must complete it; for women, it is voluntary [there goes the entire charade of pick and chose your gender™]. The questionnaire will assess their interest in serving in the Bundeswehr. Suitable candidates will then be invited to the draft.
The draft law therefore contains mandatory elements from the outset, with the mandatory declaration of readiness for men and the reintroduction of the draft, according to Der Spiegel. Young people born in 2008 and older will initially be drafted. The draft will apply up to the age of 25.
As previously announced, the draft law is expected to be presented to the cabinet at the end of August, if possible, so that the new military service can begin after parliamentary consideration in 2026.
Higher Pay for Conscripts
Pistorius plans to classify conscripts as temporary soldiers [orig. Zeitsoldaten] in the future, thus paying them significantly more, as reported by Der Spiegel. The six months of basic service can be completed as a temporary soldier with a salary of more than €2,000 per month [given that Germany’s starting salaries in this age bracket are quite low, that’s a perfectly insidious way of improving the willingness of young men to serve].
Regarding the length of basic military service, the draft only states that it should be set uniformly. However, it is reportedly initially intended to be at least six months.
30,000 Volunteers Per Year by 2029
According to Der Spiegel, the draft further states that military requirements require ‘deployable, cold-start capable, and sustainable units’. Currently, the Bundeswehr is unable to train and accommodate more than 15,000 volunteers.
According to his presentation to the SPD parliamentary group, Pistorius wants to increase this number to more than 30,000 by 2029, so that there will then be a total of 100,000 conscripts—and, as things stand, no compulsory service is necessary.
460,000 soldiers from 2030
By 2030, Pistorius wants to be able to field a total force of 460,000 soldiers. According to parliamentary sources, Pistorius hopes that some will want to stay with the Bundeswehr longer after their basic service. Furthermore, the number of reservists is to be initially increased to 200,000.
To achieve this, the goal is to have an active force of 260,000, about 80,000 more than the Bundeswehr currently has at its disposal.
Bottom Lines
This is quite bad, esp. in terms of optics, and more so in terms of Germany’s obligations under the 2+4 Treaty.
If these declared breaches will be permitted—and it looks like they will be, by which is meant that Russia will surely protest—the next question is what other clauses will be abrogated next?
I doubt that there is a willingness to re-draw borders in Eastern Europe to re-establish the former German borders; I do consider it possible, though, that the declared breaking of the 2+4 Treaty is merely the latest of a series of provocations to induce Russia to loose its cool and act rashly.
While I doubt that Moscow will do so, there may come a time when Russia can’t shirk responding.
I consider it equally likely that part of the former German territories east of the current German-Polish borders will be used in these shenanigans: here’s looking at the northern parts of former East Prussia, since 1945 known as the Kalinigrad oblast.
Since that patch of land is also coveted by Poland, if I—an Austrian by birth—was German chancellor (muahahahahaha), I’d induce Warsaw to reclaim that patch of land to make Russia’s response fall more heavily on Poland than on Germany.
Needless to say, this is an entirely transparent (and utterly stupid) move, hence I consider it quite likely given the cast of characters in charge of Germany these days.
If we ‘zoom out’ and consider the bigger picture, though, we may countenance the one enduring fact of international relations: you don’t step into the same river twice, as the Ancient Greeks knew already, and to presume the enduring nature of any treaty or compact is akin to falling victim to one’s own agit-prop.
The Russian surely know this, and I doubt that there are Germans, Balts, Americans, or anyone else, for that matter, who aren’t aware of this fact.
Europe’s long summer with no major conflagrations between major powers is over.
Hence, the inauguration of a new pre-war period.
"By the end of 2024, there were approximately 181,150 soldiers, the Defence Ministry stated."
Question: Do they actually 181 500 soldiers, or do they mean 181 500 military, inc. all the branches and officers, commanders and logistical staff and so on?
I ask because our politicians - and media! - always confuse the no. of /soldiers/ with the no. of people employed by Försvarmakten (Defense-force, the PC name of what used to be called Krigsmakten = Der Kriegsmacht).
For your international audience, who may not be as steeped in recent German history as you, it is worth underlining the importance of the 2+4 Treaty: this document provides the very legal foundation upon which the modern German nation-state in its current form was allowed to come into being. The 2 were the two Germanies, and the 4 are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Russian Federation (as a stand-in and successor for the Soviet Union, which was not yet defunct at time of signing, but already clearly moribund).
To violate the treaty is thus not (merely) to raise the spectre of Germany reasserting territorial claims in Eastern Europe, which I agree is incredibly unlikely in its own right (though baiting Poland into levying a claim on Kaliningrad is a tactic I hadn't considered); it is to set the legitimacy of the modern German state into question, as a matter of international law.
You are of course correct that Putin and his friends and underlings would make great hay of such a development, and take it both as provocation and license for further adventures of their own. But in a sense they have already done this; Sergei Lavrov, speaking in Berlin directly to the German elite, called the treaty's negotiations and results a "betrayal by the West" of Russian/Soviet interests, and speculated that the treaty had been violated to the point of no longer applying once the united Germany was accepted into NATO. His implication was that there was not really a legitimate legal basis for the very existence of the Federal Republic and that the Russian Federation could, at its leisure, decide that such existence was itself an offence (if not an existential threat).
Sergei Lavrov is not some random Russian oligarch mugging for a camera, nor a Dugin-esque useful-idiot mystic seeding pseudo-philosophical gobbledygook into the aether; he is the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, and his heart beats only so long as the sound and cadence please Vladimir Putin. Therefore it can be presumed that Putin is, at the very least, not offended by his Foreign Minister going to a foreign capitol and asserting that the sovereignty over which that capitol professes to command does not legally exist.
Very well. If Russia already thinks the treaty is only so much toilet paper, and the Americans don't care to enforce it, and the Brits and the French are too weak and distracted besides to reassert their roles as subordinate masters of Germany's fate...where do we go from here? The Russians could certainly try to come and wrest East Germany out of the Federal Republic, and would likely make cry-bully excuses at every step about how they're just "restoring the pre-Treaty status quo" or some such nonsense, but the question remains: is Germany a country in its own right, finally, or isn't it? Is it rather, through the treaty, a colonial project of the ever-more-distant victorious powers of the last great war?
Putin took the Maidan as an excuse to tear up the treaty whereby Russia guaranteed Ukrainian territorial integrity (in exchange for the Ukraine surrendering 2000+ nuclear warheads it had inherited after the Soviet Union's collapse). This is fair enough; he judged that conditions on the ground had changed sufficiently in the generation since that treaty's enforcement that it was no longer in Russia's interests to uphold it -- specifically, he saw a vassal state breaking away and coming under a rival's influence, just as happened to East Germany and the Baltics during those long dark years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and he saw this as existentially unacceptable to Russian interests. He has asserted his right to suzerainty over the Ukraine by force of arms, and failing that total victory has asserted his right to annex Ukrainian territory directly. The fact that these assertions have not come without challenge, namely from the Ukrainians themselves and from NATO, is just a part of the game of geopolitics; he can whine all he likes about how injust it is that he doesn't simply get to assert his will over a foreign state, and that his more-powerful-rivals don't actually actively collaborate with him in bringing that will about in reality, but the sheer brute fact remains that if he wants the Ukraine, or any part of the Ukraine, he's going to have to fight for them.
By the same token, if he wants East Germany, he's going to have to fight for it, too. Because a state's sovereignty does not ultimately rest on quasi-colonial legal instruments; it rests on the active recognition of one's peers, and also on one's own force of arms, without which said peers tend to not have very convincing reasons to offer such recognition. Germany has been intentionally disarming itself under the auspices of the 2 + 4 Treaty and the broader American imperial incentive structure for more than a generation now, but thanks in no small part to Putin's adventurism, Germany has slowly begun to wake up to the reality that unilateral disarmament is not actually a viable plan for asserting one's sovereignty. Conditions on the ground are rendering fidelity to a generation-old treaty an existential threat, and so it is an open question how long that treaty will be paid lip service to, and what the consequences of allowing it to die shall be.
Germany could of course attempt to follow the niceties, to parliamentarily revoke the treaty and to assert its sovereignty on other principles...but it is highly unlikely that Russia would deign to recognise such a process, and would only take it as yet another escalation. But it is hard to see what the Russians wouldn't take as provocation and escalation at this point, short of Germany voluntarily suborning itself to Russia and the United States actively collaborating in pursuing Russian interests in the Ukraine. The latter appears to be happening, to a certain extent, after many years and many lives sacrificed; the former will never happen.
This is both longer and more disorganised than I wanted it to be; a lingering cold has muddled my thoughts. I don't have any clear vision of how to get out of this mess that isn't just NATO giving Putin everything he wants, forever, which is simply never going to happen.