'Austria—it's time to join NATO', Politico Opines, Arguing that 'its Euro-Atlantic integration remains only half complete'

Lots of half-truths and nonsense in Liam Hoare's piece, so why not look at it in the context of an old post from 23 Feb. 2022 where I asked, 'will Austria join NATO?'

We do live in strange, if interesting times. Every now and then, I do get a strange sense of what, for lack of a better term, I’d call ‘retroactive forbearance’. Yesterday was just such a day, and the reason for this was Liam Hoare’s op-ed in Politico.

Entitled, ‘Austria—it’s time to join NATO’ (3 March 2023), Hoare argues that ‘the view that country can remain neutral, balancing the interests of Russia and the West, while also being part of the West, is no longer morally or politically tenable’.

This is odd on a number of counts, not least bringing up ‘morality’ as a contributing factor in geopolitics. While I personally don’t object to a moral compass in foreign affairs, the days when such sentiments held any sway over politics are definitely over.

Sidenote: If you’d like to disagree, please consider Englishman William Wilberforce for his strong convictions to abolish the slave trade and slavery altogether, a feat no-one in the history of humanity had attempted before.

What remains to do with Hoare’s piece is taking a close look at the arguments deployed by Hoare, followed by a re-assessment of what I wrote about that subject on 23 Feb. 2022 (yes, that’s one day before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine):

Will neutral Austria join NATO?

So, here’s what I think this stupid episode actually means: having changed the domestic post-1945 régime via the emergency measures put in place to ostensibly ‘fight Sars-Cov-2 and Covid-19’, the Committee of Public Safety may now turn to foreign affairs. Long the proverbial poor relation of Austrian politics, at least since the decision to apply for EEC (later EU) membership in the late 1980s, it is appropriate to ask:

Will this belligerent and, frankly, outright unfriendly act towards Russia—which is very much in line with the shrill agit-prop emanating from Washington, NATO, and ‘Western’ legacy media—result in Austria formally joining NATO?

Finland is already considering doing so, with perhaps Sweden only a moment behind.

I should certainly hope this isn’t the case, but after the domestic Covid Coup, I wouldn’t be surprised a bit if the putschists would try to ‘revolutionise’ foreign affairs as well.

That this would come about with the more or less active support of the Greens should tell everyone about their true nature, too.

The below text excerpts are by Hoare, with my emphases and notes [in squared parentheses] added; the bottom lines are mine.

Image of President Van der Bellen (Greens) and Defence Minister Tanner (ÖVP) inspecting the Guard, likely taken last 26 Oct. 2022 (source)

Hoare opens his piece pointing out the obvious:

In many European countries, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a fundamental rethink of long-standing security and foreign policy doctrines [1].

This is followed by briefly recounting Finland’s and Sweden’s about-face, as well as Germany’s Olaf Scholz proposing a first trance of war credits (100b € for his Zeitenwende). Hoare then proposes the hypothesis of his piece:

Austria, though, has not yet gone through a fundamental rethink. Yes, it did sign onto the European Union’s sanctions against Russia and its financial aid regime in support of Ukraine, but it has opted out of any military participation, citing its constitutionally anchored ‘permanent neutrality’—a stance that is no longer feasible. [2]

Austria has neither exported weapons to Ukraine—even though it has 56 aging Leopard 2 tanks ripe for donation—nor has it participated in training Ukrainian forces. Imports of Russian gas are approaching pre-war levels, with 71% of Austria’s gas coming from Russia in December. And major Austrian companies like Raiffeisen Bank International and wood manufacturers Kronospan and EGGER remain active in Russia despite sanctions. [3]

A coalition of politicians, diplomats, artists and businesspeople did, however, recently publish an open letter marking the first year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Bemoaning the lack of serious political debate regarding Austria’s security policy, the ad-hoc coalition lamented that ‘large sections of domestic politics and society have fallen prey to the illusion that Austria can remain as it is’, adding that ‘important questions about the future of Austria, Europe, and the international order are being neglected’.

But in parliament, no party bar the liberal NEOS has sought to question Austria’s neutral status since the invasion began either. Indeed, the far-right Freedom Party, which currently leads in the polls, has embedded its opposition to European support for Ukraine in its rhetoric. And among the general public, a poll taken in May 2022—the very month Finland and Sweden applied for NATO membership—showed that only 14% of Austrians favored doing the same, with a whopping 75% opposed. [4]

It’s as though the clocks in Austria stopped dead on February 24, 2022.

I’ll interrupt Hoare here to point to a few items, following the numbering in squared parentheses:

1. This is wrong. While I know that Sweden and Finland have changed their stance, there is no indication that the US (or NATO, for that matter) have changed their posture even one iota. If anything, they’re all-in for more heavy weapons—read: a bonanza for the armaments industry and its lobbyists—but there’s no indication whatsoever that Washington is ready to even consider talking to Russia about its proposals, published on 17 Dec. 2021. Remember, Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho), ranking member of the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, called the proposal ‘an insult to diplomacy’. Negotiations are insults. War is Peace. Oceania has always been at war with Eurasia, it seems.

2. Hoare’s condescending attitude towards Austria’s (admittedly tattered) constitution betrays his true colours: of course, everyone is entitled to his or her opinions, but it would appear that Mr. Hoare is abusing that privilege (to paraphrase Leo Trotsky).

   When would such open intervention in another country’s domestic matters be considered ‘o.k.’? We all know that there’s differences between big countries (e.g., the US, Russia) and small ones, but this continuous meddling in internal affairs, in particular in terms of security policies, is at-once both typical of big vs. small countries as it is extremely hypocritical: the collective West is assisting Ukraine to prevent just that kind of action (to make the world safe for Kyiv to join the EU and NATO) because Russia is Mordor, or whatever. Yet, Mr. Hoare is deploying precisely this kind of double standards that countries in the Global South, led by China and Russia, are decrying time and again. Hence, what remains but to refer to Matthew (7,3 KJV): ‘And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?’

3. This relates a bit to [1], but the crux of the matter is this: Mr. Hoare takes offence, it would seem, that Austria is actually following, to greater or lesser degrees, its constitutional obligations not to take sides (too openly). Sure, the Austrian President called anti-war protesters ‘collaborators’ (which, in post-WW2 German-speaking lands, has definitely a very bad ring to it), with his fellow Green Vice Chancellor Werner Kogler adding that ‘he who remains neutral, is an accessory' to Putin’s war of aggression’. While this has greatly eroded Austria’s standing—esp. in Russia—it at least appears that not sending armaments while also refusing to train Ukrainian troops is about as much as could be expected. I personally doubt it that Austria’s politicians may be able to reverse that impression anytime soon.

4. The notion of neutrality—something like the proverbial ‘Golden Calf’ in post-1945 Austria—is a tricky one, but here, too, Mr. Hoare is off the reservation. By cherry-picking his timeline, he obscures crucial aspects: Austria’s westward orientation was never in doubt, hence the moment it appeared feasible (due to a visibly weakening USSR in the late 1980s), Vienna applied, in summer 1989—that is, before the end of the Cold War—for membership in the European Communities (EC), the precursor to the EU.

   Moreover, there was strong pro-NATO accession support in the 1990s coming from both mainstream conservatives in the People’s Party (ÖVP) and the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ), a political stance that foundered on public sentiment against NATO accession that was about as high back then as it is today. If anything, the Austrian voters haven’t changed their minds, but the notion of such things is, it would appear, anathema to Mr. Hoare and his ilk. I think we should have a discussion about this kind of strategic alignment, and I’ll have more to say in the bottom lines below.

Let’s go back to Mr. Hoare’s piece, because he has something else to say about the reasons as to why Austria should join NATO:

The problem is Austria remains shackled to neutrality by the stories it tells itself.

The first of these is that neutrality was the price the country had to pay to end the postwar Allied occupation and regain its independence in 1955.

The second is that neutrality and prosperity—the so-called ‘economic miracle’ of the 1960s—are inherently bound together. That Austria wouldn’t have become a country with Western European living standards were the Soviets still in control of the country’s east.

And a third is that neutrality was the platform that allowed the country to play an outsized role in global affairs in the 1970s, when then-Chancellor Bruno Kreisky interceded in the Middle East peace process and sought to improve relations between the Global North and South.

All of these are more or less true—or, rather, they were. [Tricky, eh? Here’s a reminder about the US-led aggression vs. Yugoslavia in 1999: according to leaked information, published by Profil in 2002, Austria’s neutrality was ignored by the US-led alliance on 33 occasions.]

The fall of the Berlin Wall meant that by 1990, Austria had gone from being a country at Europe’s periphery, on the fortified border between east and west, to one right at the Continent’s political center [as explained above, that train has left the station well before the Berlin Wall came down—which Mr. Hoare also admits to a bit further below (see the *)]

Austrian capital flowed east, Eastern European labor came west, and throughout the decade, the country became a natural destination for refugees fleeing former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević’s genocidal war. In 1995, Austria then joined the EU along with Sweden and Finland and signed up to NATO’s Partnership for Peace—members of its armed forces still participate in the peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina today.

Yet, despite all this, Austria continues to cling to its official permanent neutrality as if the face-off between Europe’s former military blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—were still ongoing and as though it isn’t an EU member. But Austria’s prosperity, security and place in the world is no longer tied to neutrality as the public and political class still seem to think [talk about foreigners meddling in domestic affairs: isn’t this what Russia! Russia! Russia! is doing?]

Quite the reverse. [I’ll comment on the following content below]

Last year, over two-thirds of Austrian exports were sent to fellow EU member countries, and the country’s economic reach into Central and Eastern Europe is both broad and deep. You can’t visit Romania or the Western Balkans, for example, without falling over branches of Raiffeisen or Erste Bank, or without filling your car at an OMV gas station.

It’s time to accept that Austria’s neutrality-linked independent foreign policy went the way of Kreisky when he left office in 1983 [*oh, look, I told you so above, now Mr. Hoare contradicts himself]. And the fact that the U.N. and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, among others, call Vienna home is the legacy of a bygone era. Were Kreisky alive today, perhaps he would have sought to negotiate a Black Sea grain deal, but that role was played by Turkey—not Austria.

Today, on almost all nonmilitary matters, Austria’s foreign policy is the EU’s common foreign policy. The country is totally enmeshed in the Continent’s political and economic structures—but its Euro-Atlantic integration remains only half complete.

No longer a border state, Austria is almost fully surrounded by EU and NATO members—Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Italy [true enough, but why would anyone omit similarly neutral Switzerland?]. Its military is little more than a natural disaster response unit, and it has effectively outsourced its security to its neighbors.

For Austria, neutrality has become an excuse to sit on its hands and do nothing while NATO supplies Ukraine’s military. The view that it can survive as a neutral country, balancing the interests of Russia and the West, while also being part of the West is no longer morally or politically tenable.

Bottom Lines

There’s a lot that’s true in Mr. Hoare’s piece, some things are partially correct, and esp. the second half of his op-ed are questionable in terms of accuracy, to say the least.

The over-arching thesis of Mr. Hoare’s piece may be summarised as follows:

• Austria is no longer neutral, and any such sentiments should be thrown onto the proverbial ash heap of history. The reasons cited are largely correct: Austrian neutrality has eroded to such a degree that ‘Austria’s foreign policy is the EU’s common foreign policy’ is factually as well as legally true. What Mr. Hoare objects to are the consequences of such de facto alignment.

• The arguments advanced by Mr. Hoare to further his claim that Austria should join NATO are ill-founded, historically inaccurate (but they may be politically true, on which see below), and deeply problematic: in making his case on ‘moral or political’ grounds, Mr. Hoare displays an condescending attitude towards the feelings and wishes of the Austrian population, which he admits is overwhelmingly in favour of not joining NATO.

The powers that be in Austrian politics, with the (partial) exception of the Freedom Party, all know this. While their conviction may or may not be true, one thing appears crystal clear: political and military neutrality is not a viable stance within the EU.

If anything, the past year has shown, conclusively, I’d add, that one ‘can’t have one without the other’, in particular as the EU’s Common Foreign and Security (CFSP) and NATO’s policies have become virtually indistinguishable, even though this was mainly achieved by Finland and Sweden—the other two militarily neutral EU member-states—opting to join NATO.

Personally, I’d favour a return to neutrality over the continued integration with the EU and NATO. While I doubt that the powers that be will allow for that to happen, I would also predict that if the Freedom Party would add a strong ‘Leave’ plank to their party platform, it would mark a significant development.

Let’s judge them according to their actions: if they hark about ‘neutrality’ out of political opportunism, it’s just that; if they’re serious about it, they’ll advocate to leave the EU (and, perhaps, team up with the Swiss whose current debates about the acquisition of F-35 jets also points, rather ominously, in the direction of sustained NATO/EU integration).